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INTRODUCTION

Federal administrative agencies are under attack. Their alleged
failure to perform their functions in accordance with the public interest
has led to numerous proposals for reform-among them, proposals
for increased public participation in agency proceedings. This Comment will consider a rather technical subject having important practical
implications: the mechanisms, fashioned by statutes, administrative
regulations and policies, and judicial decisions, by which groups seeking
to represent or promote the public interest are permitted to participate
in certain proceedings of the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC), Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB), Federal Trade Commission
(FTC), Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), and Federal Power
Commission (FPC).
The first part of this Comment will survey recent criticism of
federal administrative agencies. It will next discuss the legal basis of
public participation before the agencies and its relationship to the law
of standing to obtain judicial review of administrative action. It will
then explore the underlying problems in constructing a regulatory
model, defining the public interest and public interest groups, and determining the ideal role such groups should play within the regulatory
model. It will proceed to analyze the considerations that currently
shape agency discretion in permitting public interest participation in
relation to the effect such participation has actually had upon agency
proceedings. Finally, it will assess certain proposals to facilitate more
productive public interest participation.
In the second part, the Comment will set forth the particular statutory and factual situation confronting each agency, and attempt to focus
upon distinctive problems within the experience of each agency which
may provide some lessons for agencies in general. The FCC discussion
will examine the control third parties may exert over the determinations
when to convene and whether to settle a broadcast license renewal hearing. The CAB section will focus on the structuring of public participation within a hearing itself. The FTC analysis will approach the
problems of contouring and limiting public participation in informal
and formal enforcement proceedings. Finally, the AEC and the FPC
will be examined jointly in order to focus on their status as regulators
of segments of the power industry: the highly technical nature of the
subject matter and the complicated nature of the proceedings involved
in power plant construction licensing occasion some concern whether
public participation can be effective and, if not, whether alternative
means of improving agency policymaking may be necessary.
The recent change in attitude toward public participation may be
illustrated by contrasting two instances of judicial review of the treatment accorded applicants for participation in administrative proceedings. In 1955, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
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Circuit, in Kansas City Power & Light Co. v. McKay,1 reversed a

district court's grant of standing to several electric utility companies
attempting to attack certain Rural Electrification Administration contracts. The plaintiff utility companies alleged the contracts would enable
five federated cooperatives to engage in "destructive federally-subsidized
competition" with them. The court interpreted the provision of the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) 2 granting standing to obtain
judicial Review to "[a] person suffering legal wrong . . . or adversely
affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant
statute" 3 as merely preservative of prior case law governing standing.
That law, the court pointed out, gave the appellants no enforceable legal
right to be free of such competition. Quoting the Supreme Court's
opinion in Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes,4 the court suggested its reasons
for its narrow construction of the APA provision.' The court concluded by asserting broadly that
[c]learly, plaintiffs' interest as citizens, property owners, or
franchise holders considered separately from, and not merely
in aid of, their right to challenge alleged unlawful competition,
confers no standing upon them to challenge defendants'
actions in the courts. Merely as such, their status is no different from that of ordinary taxpayers who would not have
standing to sue here. Commonwealth of Massachusetts v.
Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 . . . (1923).'
The federal administrative agencies, performing roles created by Congress, were not lightly to be disturbed by the courts or the citizenry.
Fifteen years later, the same court decided National Welfare Rights
Organizationv. Finch.' Under the Social Security Act, the Secretary
of Health, Education, and Welfare was responsible for supervising distribution of federal funds to state welfare assistance programs and, if a
state did not conform to federal statutory conditions, for discontinuing
payments after notice and a hearing.' Congress had expressly conferred
Other
on the states both the right to a hearing 9 and judicial review.'
potential complainants were not given standing to appeal, either indirectly by creation of a statutory "right" or by other express statutory
provision, nor were they provided an opportunity to intervene in con1225 F.2d 924 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 884 (1955).

2 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59, 701-06 (1970).
3 Id. §702.
4302 U.S. 464, 480 (1938).
5225 F.2d at 928.
6 Id. at 933.
7 429 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
8See 42 U.S.C. § 1316 (1970).
9Id. § 1316(a) (2).
3O Id. § 1316(a) (3).
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formity hearings. It was not entirely clear in Welfare Rights just who
was attacking the agency or what injury was being inflicted on the
plaintiff, an organization of welfare recipients: as one of the NWRO
attorneys commented later, the attorneys themselves had selected their
client." Times, and judicial attitudes, had apparently changed, however. The court held that the NWRO had standing to obtain review
and, further, the right to be admitted as a party in the administrative
hearing below. 2
If the new kind of litigant now appearing before the agencies and
the courts is a strange beast,' 3 both its acceptance by the courts as a
participant in the labyrinth of federal administrative agencies and the
law the courts have constructed to accommodate it are stranger yet.
Indeed, because lawyers have long been bringing their "own" lawsuits, "4the change in the nature of the litigant may not be as startling
as the change in the view of the administrative agencies held by the
public and the courts.
For there has indeed been a revolution in the scope of public participation " in agency proceedings. Organic statutes were, in the heyday of optimism over governmental regulation, construed as vesting in
the agencies the power within very wide limits both to define and to
carry out public policy.' 6 Judicial review and the right to be heard
before the agency were available only when the agency interfered with
11 See Wexler, PracticingLaw for Poor People, 79 YALE L.J. 1049, 1062 (1970).
12 429 F.2d at 734-37.
13 See generally Berlin, Roisman & Kessler, Public Interest Law, 38 GEO. WASH.
L. REv. 675 (1970); Cahn & Cahn, Power to the People or the Profession?-The
Public Interest in Public Interest Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1005 (1970); Halpern &
Cunningham, Reflections on the New Public Interest Law: Theory and Practice at
the Center for Law and Social Policy, 59 GEo. L.J. 1095 (1971) ; Wexler, supra note
11; Comment, The New Public Interest Lawyers, 79 YALE L.J. 1069 (1970).
14 See generally C. MARKmANN, THE NOBLEST CRY: A HISTORY OF THE AmERIcAN Civi. LiBERTIES UNION (1965).
15 The term "participation" will refer to all types of nongovernment activity before
an administrative agency. "Intervention" in its most technical sense means entering
a proceeding initiated by others with all the procedural rights of original parties.
See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 956 (4th ed. 1968). In its broader sense, the term
includes participation in a proceeding with procedural rights which are often more
limited than those of original parties. Unless otherwise indicated, the term is used
here throughout in this broader, non-technical sense.
16

The need was for an arm of government which would be judiciary,
executive and legislature all rolled into one efficient and expert machinery for
regulation. The trouble at the root of this idea was that its proponents held
to a totally fallacious idea of how a decision can be made. They thought
there was an "administrative" decision, somewhere in between a judicial and
a legislative decision and partaking of both, which could be made by expertsand only by experts.
Griffiths, unpublished essay, quoted in Reich, The Law of the Planned Society, 75 YALE
Compare Judge Kaufman's characterization of the "New
L.J. 1227, 1235 (1966).
Deal concept of administrative agencies as pristine, technocratic, and autocratic
automatons methodically perceiving and promulgating the general will, unsullied by
the political wars that surge about them." Kaufman, Power for the People-and by
the People: The Utilities, the Environment, and the Public Interest, 88 Pun. UTIL.
FORT. 90, 94 (1971).
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the legally protected interests of individuals. Today, with regulation
more suspect, the judiciary has taken steps to ensure the opportunity
to review all but the most insulated agency policy formulation and to
require that the agencies carefully consider and include in a record any
responsible policy position urged upon them. Requiring public participation has become, in part, a technique for forcing the agencies to
engage in open, debated policy formulation and to construct a record
more likely to facilitate judicial examination of the process and
the result.
I. TOWARD A THEORY OF PUBLIC PARTICIPATION
Generalization in administrative law is admittedly dangerous.
There is, however, helpful perspective in such an approach occasionally
justifying the attempt. Throughout this Comment an effort will be
made to minimize the necessary difficulties by focusing as much as
possible on public intervention in adjudicatory hearings as set out under
section 6 of the APA, and on appeals from agency action as governed
by section 10.
A. The Agencies and the Public
Attacks on federal administrative agencies are widespread.'7 One
of the most common criticisms is that the interests of large segments
of the public are not adequately represented in agency proceedings
affecting them and that the agencies are not sufficiently accountable to
the public." It is further charged that agencies are, to varying degrees,
17 The most telling recent criticism comes from two men intimately acquainted
with agency decisionmaking at the highest level, former Commissioner Elman of the
FTC and Commissioner Johnson of the FCC. See generally Elman, Administrative
Reform of the Federal Trade Commission, 59 GEo. L.. 777 (1971) ; Elman, A Modest
Proposalfor Radical Reform, 56 A.B.A.J. 1045 (1970) ; Johnson, A New Fidelity to
the Regulatory Ideal, 59 GEO. L.J. 869 (1971). See also P. MAcAvoY, THE Cisis
OF THE REGuLATORY COMMISSIONS (1970) ; PRESmENT's ADvIsoRy CoUNciL ONr EXEcuTIVE ORGANIZATION, A NEw REGULATORY FRAMEWORK: REPORT ON SELECTED INDEPENDENT REGULATORY AGENCIES (1971) (the "Ash Council Report").
Is This criticism sounded as a refrain throughout the 1970 hearings on the proposed Public Counsel Corporation. See generally Hearings on S. 3434 & S. 2544
Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Practice & Procedure of the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). See also Bonfield, Representation for
the Poor in Federal Rulemaking, 67 MICH. L. REv. 511 (1969) ; Cahn & Calm, The
New Sovereign Immunity, 81 HARv. L. RLv. 929, 957-69 (1968). In response, the
Administrative Conference of the United States has recently recommended several
proposals which would accord inadequately represented interests more opportunity to
participate in agency proceedings. Administrative Conference of the United States,
Recommendation 28, adopted Dec. 7, 1971; see Gellhorn, Public Participation in
Administrative Proceedings, 81 YALE L.J. 359 (1972) (based upon a report to the
Committee on Agency Organization & Procedure of the Administrative Conference).
A number of public interest organizations have sponsored a set of model intervention rules. See 116 CONG. REc. 18,939, 18,942 (daily ed. Nov. 25, 1970). The
model rules allow intervention in any agency adjudication, rulemaking, ratemaking,
or licensing proceeding or "any other proceeding that may result in an order, sanction,
or relief as defined in [§2 of the APA, 5 U.S.C. §551 (1970)]," if the applicant's
"pecuniary or economic interest is exclusively that of a consumer or is otherwise
representative of the general public or of a particular geographical area, and if
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too much under the influence of the interests they regulate,' 9 and that
appointments to high agency positions are too often made on the basis
of sheer accommodation of those interests. 0 Emphasis on agency expertise, it is said, means that some issues are ignored and others framed
in such technical terms that non-experts and members of the general
public wishing to speak to those issues are either overwhelmed by technical jargon or politely ignored. 2 ' Indeed, in some contexts, hearings
seem to serve only to legitimate decisions already made by agency
staff.2" The public is unaware of the content and significance of formal
agency proceedings, and virtually no one except the parties directly
affected is aware of the content and significance of informal proceedings,
many of which are conducted in private.2" Investigatory facilities are
said to be inadequate in some agencies to monitor the activities of the
regulated interests.24 Jurisdictional conflicts among agencies 25 make
difficult the implementation of articulated national policies such as that
embodied in the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).26
Congress seems reluctant to pass major legislation to facilitate public
awareness and active participation.2 7 It is suggested that certain members of Congress exert a good deal of informal influence 28 over some
activities of independent agencies that might be jeopardized by significant restructuring. Former Commissioner Elman of the FTC has
noted a reluctance within that agency to make its organizational problems known to Congress..2 9 Responses of other agencies to a 1969
participation by such person under the ordinary rules of practice would be unduly
burdensome." An intervenor would have "all the rights of a party, including the
right to appeal any initial decision" of the agency to the same extent as a party.
The rules further provide for filing of single copies of documents, access to transcripts,
subpoena powers, "reasonable legal assistance" from the agency's legal staff for intervenors who cannot retain counsel, and notice to "persons who have communicated to
the Agency an interest in any subject matter or geographical area" within its jurisdiction of any proceeding that may affect that subject matter or area.
19See, e.g., M. BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT COMMISSION
86-102 (1955) ; R. FELLMETH, THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE OMISSION 15-22 (1970);
Lazarus & Onek, The Regulators and the People, 57 VA. L. REv. 1069 (1971).
20 Cf. Johnson, supra note 17, at 895.
21 See, e.g., Jowell, The Limits of the Public Hearing as a Tool of Urban Planning, 21 AD. L. REv. 123, 143 (1969) ; Plager, Participatory Democracy and the
Public Hearing: A Functional Approach, 21 AD. L. REv. 153, 156 (1969).
22 See notes 876-81 infra & accompanying text.
23 See notes 594, 678 infra & accompanying text. See also K. DAvIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§ 4.12-.13 (Supp. 1970) [hereinafter cited as K. DAvis (1958
ed. unless otherwise indicated)] ; Lazarus & Onek, supra note 19, at 1095.
24 See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 17, at 881. See also notes 448, 624 infra &
accompanying text.
25 See generally 3 K. DAvIs, supra note 23, § 19.09 (1958 & Supp. 1970) ; Reich,
supra note 16, at 1237.
26 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (1970).
27 See notes 303-05 infra & accompanying text (Public Council Corporation);
cf. notes
306-21 infra & accompanying text (Consumer Protection Agency).
28
See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 17, at 905; cf. ABA COMMISSION TO STUDY THE
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, REPORT 33 (1969).
29 Elman, Administrative Reform of the Federal Trade Commission, 59 GEO. L.J.
777, 780 (1971); cf. E. Cox, R. FELLMETH & J. SCHULZ, THE CONSUMER AND THE
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, reprinted in 115 CONG. REc. 1539, 1545 (Jan. 22, 1969).
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questionnaire of the Senate Subcommittee on Administrative Practice
and Procedure, which asked for an evaluation of citizen input and
agency responsiveness, reveal a similar self-satisfaction.30 Finally, the
standard of judicial review of agency action "' is thought to be too
narrow both in terms of review of findings of facts and in terms of unwillingness to review action committed to agency discretion.
Thus,
pessimistically viewed, the agencies are too much under the influence
of regulated interests and too insulated from judicial scrutiny; there is
little movement in Congress toward reforming them; and certain interests shared by large segments of the public are inadequately represented before them. Regardless of the validity of any of these criticisms,
the lack of public confidence they suggest may in itself seriously impair
the efficacy of the administrative process.
B. The Courts and Public Participationin Agency Decisionmking
At least concurrently with the expansion of public criticism of,
and interest in participation in, agency proceedings, courts have expanded the scope of standing to challenge determinations made in those
proceedings. In some cases where agencies have not voluntarily allowed
intervention to a class of individuals broader than that granted standing
to seek judicial review, courts have expanded the opportunity to intervene. Professor Jaffe has observed that
[t]here are two closely related motifs: whether an action is
in any likely case reviewable at all . . . and whether the par-

ticular petitioner is a proper party to secure review. An
opinion denying review may rest on the proposition that
judicial scrutiny as such is excluded by statute or by general
considerations of impropriety.

.

.

.

Or it may bear down

on the lack of legal interest or "standing" of the plaintiff to
secure review.

.

.

.

[I]f the class of persons most nearly

affected does not have standing the action is for all practical
purposes nonreviewable3 3
The trend is toward review. Thus, the District of Columbia Circuit in
Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus 34 declared:
We stand on the threshold of a new era in the history of
the long and fruitful collaboration of administrative agencies
30 Suocoamm. ou- ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE & PROCEDURE OF THE SENATE COMM.
ON THE JUDICIARY, 91ST CONG., 1ST SESS., RESPONSES TO QUESTIONNAIRE ON CITIZEN
INVOLVEMENT AND RESPONSIVE AGENCY DECISION-MAKING 5-16 (CAB), 19-29, 51-71
(FCC) (Comm. Print 1969) [hereinafter cited as RESPONSES].

31 See notes 136-54 infra & accompanying text.
32 See generally 4 F_ DAVIS, supra note 23, §§ 28.01-.21; Elman, supra note 29,
at 785-94; Johnson, supra note 17, at 904-05.
33 L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATVE AcTION 336-37 (1965) (emphasis supplied). See also Saferstein, Nonreviewabilily: A Functional Analysis of
"Committed to Agency Discretion," 82 HARv. L. REv. 367 (1968).
34439 F.2d 584 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
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and reviewing courts. For many years, courts have treated
administrative policy decisions with great deference, confining
judicial attention primarily to matters of procedure. On
matters of substance, the courts regularly upheld agency
action, with a nod in the direction of the "substantial evidence" test, and a bow to the mysteries of administrative expertise. Courts occasionally asserted, but less often exercised,
the power to set aside agency action on the ground that an
impermissible factor had entered into the decision, or a crucial
factor had not been considered. Gradually, however, that
power has come into more frequent use, and with it, the
requirement that administrators articulate the factors on
which they base their decisions."
An examination of the current relationship between standing to
appeal and opportunity to participate on the agency level suggests that
expansion of the latter is more directly related to a desire to review
policy decisions than to solicitude for the legal rights of the particular
plaintiff. Three related generalizations about the cases seem appropriate. First, where a hearing is required to be held by an agency, no
case appears to have approved the agency's denial of intervention to one
the court held to have standing to appeal, except in the narrow situation
where some party other than the agency was found to "represent the
same interest" and was admitted.36 Second, in those cases where a
petitioning party was properly excluded from a hearing below on that
ground, and where the party permitted to intervene failed to appeal,
the excluded party has been granted standing to appeal. 7 Judicially
articulated or not, the effect of these two phenomena is to help ensure
that the maximum number of judicially reviewable issues has a plaintiff
to bring them before the court with a record developed below that
reflects at least that plaintiff's policy position. These cases, however,
do not provide either opportunity to intervene or opportunity to appear
before a court to all persons or groups raising those issues. Although
this result is accomplished by finding that the party admitted to and the
party excluded from any particular proceeding had the same "interest,"
this "test" is unlike the one applied, for example, in conventional situations involving questions of privity of contract. As the analysis below
will suggest, it is doubtful whether current doctrines of standing retain
a requirement of a "legally protected right" in which two or more
individuals could be said to have something resembling a common
"property interest." " Third, there is some language in recent cases
351d. at 597.
30 Cf. Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d
994 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
37 See Shapiro, Some Thoughts on Intervention Before Courts, Agencies, and
Arbitrators,81 HARv. L. Rzv. 721, 767 (1968).
38 See text accompanying notes 49-84 infra.
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suggesting that the opportunity to participate in agency proceedings
must be available to every party having standing to appeal the agency's
action. While such a formulation would eliminate the problem of determining "identity" of interests, it does not seem to recognize the
practical necessity for controlling the size of the proceedings. The
oldest and clearest group of cases in this line involved agencies as to
which the statutory language governing intervention was, on its face,
entirely permissive, but was read as mandatory, when considered in
light of the statutory context allowing appeals only by parties. The
right to appeal depended on whether party status was enjoyed below,
and whether that status was, on the face of the statute, discretionary
with the agency. In National Coal Association v. FPC " the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that a competitor
had standing to appeal an FPC natural gas pipeline certificate award.
Relying on a provision of the statute limiting appeal to aggrieved parties
in the proceeding below, the court found that a competitor who would be
aggrieved by an FPC order had a right to intervene. 40 More recent
cases in the Second and District of Columbia Circuits have suggested
that intervention may be required in order to make the right of review
effective. National Welfare Rights Organization v. Finch 4 1 involved
an organic statute which immunized the Secretary's ultimate findings
of fact from review, unless unsupported by substantial evidence, and
required remand to the agency rather than review de novo by the
courts.42 Judge Wright felt that the power to remand did not adequately ensure the effective review sought by the petitioning welfare recipients' organization and that at least limited participation below was
Judge Wright's argument relating intervention to the
required."
statutory language seemed an afterthought to the broad assertion that
"[t] he right of judicial review cannot be taken as fully realized . . . ,
if appellants are excluded from participating in the proceeding to be
reviewed." 4

The rumblings are equally audible in the Second Circuit, although
not quite as strong, perhaps, as Professor Davis has indicated in his
assertion that "[t]he Second Circuit seems to adopt a rule that a party
having the right of judicial review must have the right of intervention." 11 The case Davis noted, American CommunicationsAssociation
v. United States,46 explicitly referred to National Coal's holding that
intervention below was required in order to secure the right to review
(under a statute that conditioned review upon having attained party
39 191
4

F.2d 462 (D.C. Cir. 1951).

0 Id. at 467.

41429 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
42 42 U.S.C. § 1316(a) (4) (1970).

See also id. § 1316(a) (5).

43 429 F.2d at 737.

44 Id. at 736.
45 1 K. DAvis, supra note 23, § 8.11, at 388 (Supp. 1970).
46 298 F.2d 648 (2d Cir. 1962).
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status below), and held that, even in the absence of an identical statutory context, intervention in the present case was necessary to secure
an effective right to review.47
No court has yet gone so far as to require intervention by every
party entitled to appeal an agency determination. In some situations,
review can arguably be effective without participation of the appellant
in the proceedings below. In many proceedings, however, where some
broad interest affected might be promoted by the adoption of any one
of a number of policy positions, and the fairness of the decisionmaking
process turns not so much on the verification of factual data (which
might be effectively presented by only one party) as on the resolution
of conflicting policy positions (which are best presented by a variety
of different parties), "identity of interest" is a difficult test to apply in
excluding potential participants from agency proceedings, or, for that
matter, potential appellants from full participation in judicial review.
The goal of public participation should be the fullest feasible debate on
the issues, rather than the "representation" of broadly or narrowly defined "interests."

45

If the judicial standing rule were well defined or narrowly circumscribed, it might be possible to define the minimum scope of the right
to intervene by reference to the maximum scope of standing to obtain
judicial review (leaving the agencies with discretion to permit fuller
participation in appropriate cases). The rule, however, seems to have
approached the case-or-controversy limit imposed by the Constitution,
and is consequently both vague and expansive: as the following analysis
will demonstrate, the courts have made the concept of an "interest"
conferring standing to obtain review very flexible, and hence unreliable
as a standard for choosing worthy participants in agency proceedings.
Although the two are related, it is important to distinguish standing before courts to initiate review of administrative action from
standing before agencies to intervene in their proceedings.4 9 Except
47

1d. at 650-51.
48 See notes 162-67 infra & accompanying text.
49

Since both standing to obtain review and the right to intervene in an
administrative proceeding involve a determination of what interests are deserving of legal protection, one might initially suppose that the law governing
intervention and standing would be about the same. But many factors affect
one and not the other. Statutes concerning intervention usually differ from
those concerning review. The central problem of intervention is usually the
disadvantage to the tribunal and to other parties of extended cross-examination; judicial review involves no such problem. Adequate protection for
interests obliquely affected may often be afforded through limited participation;
no such compromise concerning judicial review is customary. No constitutional restrictions affect intervention; standing to obtain review is substantially affected by the constitutional requirement of case or controversy.
Intervention means mere participation in a proceeding already initiated by
others; obtaining judicial review normally means instituting an entirely new
judicial proceeding.
3 K. DAvis, supra note 23, § 22.08, at 241. See also 1 id. § 8.11, at 564; Davis, Standing to Challenge and to Enforce Ad-ministrative Action, 49 CoLUm. L. REv. 759, 76872 (1949).
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to the extent that statutes preclude judicial review, 50 or agency action is
committed to agency discretion, 1 standing for purposes of judicial review is governed by section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act:
A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or
adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the
meaning52 of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review
thereof.

This right of review was first held, in the absence of a broader provision
in the organic statute of an agency, 3 merely to codify pre-existing case
law, which had conferred standing only when the plaintiff was threatened with or had suffered a "legal wrong," " presumably the correlative of a "legal right," which the Supreme Court had described as "one
of property, one arising out of contract, one protected against tortious
invasion, or one founded on a statute which confers a privilege." " In
1968 the Supreme Court held that a private utility alleging improper
expansion of TVA services into its market area should be granted
standing where there was an implicit congressional intent in the organic
statute to benefit it.5 6
In 1970 the Court decided Association of Data ProcessingService
Organizationsv. Camp5 7 and Barlow v. Collins.5 s These companion
cases completely rejected the legal wrong test and substituted in its
place the rule that a plaintiff has standing if he alleges that "the challenged action has caused him injury in fact, economic or otherwise" "
and that the injured interests are "arguably within the zone of interests
50 5 U.S.C. §701(a) (1) (1970).
51 Id. § 701 (a) (2).
521d.§ 702.
53 In FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470 (1940), the Court
granted the plaintiff standing to challenge the grant of a license to a competitor
under the Federal Communications Act, which provided for appeal by "any other
person aggrieved or whose interests are adversely affected by any decision of the
Commission granting or refusing any such application [for an operating license]."

Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, § 402(b) (2), 48 Stat. 1093, as
amended, 47 U.S.C. §402(b) (6) (1970). The Court felt that the legislative history
permitted a broad reading of the provision and that a competitor might be the only

party with sufficient interest to challenge illegal agency action. 309 U.S. at 477. In

Associated Indus., Inc. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 704 (2d Cir.), vacated as moot, 320
U.S. 707 (1943), the Second Circuit made the theory more explicit: a competitor
might act as a "private Attorney General" to "vindicate the public interest" by assuring compliance with the law. Generally, the courts have allowed challenges to
administrative action by competitors where it is felt that no other party is sufficiently
disadvantaged or has sufficient incentive to seek judicial review. Cf. notes 136-54
infra &accompanying text.
54
See Kansas City Power & Light Co. v. McKay, 225 F.2d 924 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 350 U.S. 884 (1955).
55
Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118, 137-38 (1939).
56 Hardin v. Kentucky Util. Co., 390 U.S. 1, 7 (1968).
57 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
58 397 U.S. 159 (1970).
59 397 U.S. at 152.
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to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee
in question." 6 The Court noted that these interests included noneconomic ones, such as conservation and aesthetics.6 1 The test has been
much discussed and criticized. 2 Professor Davis has argued that the
test is wrong, insofar as it requires a determination that the interest is
protected by the statute in question, and that the sole test should be
injury in fact.63 Professor Jaffe, on the other hand, maintains that
"a plaintiff who does not have a 'protected interest,' whether as an
individual or a group, does not have a right to review, but that a court
in its discretion may at the suit of such person review the legal
question if it deems such consideration to be in the public interest." 64
Jaffe seems to construe the phrase "zone of interests" narrowly, for he
argues that this discretion should be exercised if it appears that "those
having a defined 'legal' interest do not adequately represent all of the
interests intended to be protected by the legislation and if there is no
device for public control" or if the court concludes that the public
authorities are insufficiently responsive to the unrepresented interests.6 5
The requirement that the plaintiff's interest be "arguably within the
zone of interests to be protected or regulated" on its face preserves some
element of Jaffe's "legal interest" and may allow the discretion he advocates. If, on the other hand, the interest requirement is consistently
read as broadly as its vagueness permits, the test may be reduced to
Davis' sole criterion of injury in fact, which is susceptible of broad
interpretation as well.66
What will limit the discretion inherent in the broad formulation
of the standing test in Data Processing? The principal constraint is
the article III limitation of the judicial power to cases or controversies.
Requiring some personal stake-an interest or injury not shared by
601d. at 153.
61

Id.at 154.

62 See, e.g., K. DAVIs, supra note 23, §§ 22.00 to .00-5 (Supp. 1970) ; Comment,
Judicial Review of Agency Action: The Unsettled Law of Standing, 69 MIcH. L.
Rlv. 540 (1971) ; Note, Standing to Challenge Administrative Action: The Concept
of PersonalStake, 39 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 570 (1971).
63 See K. DAvIs, supra note 23, §§ 22.00 to .00-5 (Supp. 1970). Davis argues
that the second part of the test is faulty because (1) it limits the extension of
common-law remedies; (2) it excludes plaintiffs whose interests were not to be
regulated by the statute even if they were in fact regulated; (3) it is inconsistent
with previous cases granting standing on the basis of injury in fact; (4) it is contrary
to the congressional intent in the APA; and (5) the inquiry into legislative history
it requires is cumbersome and often inconclusive. Id. § 22.00-3.
64 Jaffe, Standing Again, 84 HARv. L. Rzv. 633, 634-35 (1971) (emphasis in the
original).
65 Id. 637. Jaffe cites National Ass'n of Securities Dealers v. SEC, 420 F.2d 83
(D.C. Cir. 1969), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Investment Company Institute
v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617 (1971), as a case where plaintiffs' legal interest was doubtful,
but standing was granted because the questions were of large public interest. In this
case there was no general grant of review to aggrieved parties as in Sanders, see
note 53 supra & accompanying text, and no implied intent to protect plaintiffs discernible in the legislative history, as there was in Hardin, see note 56 supra &
accompanying text.
66 See 397 U.S. at 154.
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members of the general public-is said to "assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of the issues upon which the court
so largely depends for illumination of difficult . . . questions." 67

It

has been suggested, however, that the requirement of a peculiar personal interest is a mechanism for judicial self-restraint rather than a
constitutional requirement.18 Judicial self-restraint deters courts from
attempting to extend their power to reach political disputes. The
prospect of increased litigation and decreased efficiency of the judicial
system has been raised, but as a practical matter the actual cost of
litigation tends to prevent frivolous suits, just as it tends to serve the
article III requirement of case or controversy.6 9 There is, finally, some
possibility that, if the parties whose interests lie on the periphery of the
"zone" or whose "injury in fact" is very slight, were granted standing,
they might use the delay accompanying judicial review to coerce those
whose interests were more central.7 ' None of these potential limitations,
however, compels a narrow reading of the DataProcessingholding.
If personal involvement in the outcome is indeed required by the
Constitution, it may be a very small one in economic terms, 7 ' or even
an ideological stake difficult to ascribe to a particular person or group.72
Indeed, in Scenic Hudson PreservationConference v. FPC 7' and Office
of Comninunication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC,74 it is difficult to discern how the plaintiffs had any more interest in aesthetics,
conservation, and recreation, or in the prevention of racial and religious
bias in television programming, than members of the public at large,
other than the fact that they had chosen to band together, at great cost,
to articulate those interests." These cases, cited by the Court in Data
Processing as examples of the "injury" required by the test,76 suggest
that the injury need not distinguish the plaintiff from members of the
public at large.
67 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962). If "concrete adverseness" lies at the
heart of the requirement, is not such adverseness demonstrated by willingness to bear
the cost of litigation? See Jaffe, The Citizen as Litigant in Public Actions: The
Non-Hohfeldian or Ideological Plaintiff, 116 U. PA. L. Rnv. 1033, 1037-38 (1968).

68 See Berger, Standing to Sue in Public Actions: Is It a ConstitutionalRequirement?, 78 YALE L.J. 816 (1969) ; Note, The Essence of Standing: The Basis of a Constitutional Right to be Heard, 10 AIZ. L. REv. 438 (1968) ; cf. Flast v. Cohen, 392
U.S. 83, 93-94 (1968).
69 See Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359
F2d 994, 1006 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Davis, Standing: Taxpayers and Others, 35
U. Cai. L. Rrv. 601, 634 (1968) ; cf. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 94 (1968).
70 Cf. notes 873-81 infra & accompanying text.
71 See Davis, supranote 69.
72
See, e.g., Allen v. -ickel, 424 F.2d 944 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (standing to seek
injunction against construction of Nativity scene in federal park conferred by plaintiffs' interest in establishment clause and free-exercise clause).
73 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966).
74 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
75 See Jaffe, supra note 67. But see Sierra Club v. -ickel, 433 F.2d 24, 30 (9th
Cir. 1970), aff'd sub nom. Sierra Club v. Morton, 40 U.S.L.W. 4397 (U.S. Apr. 19,
1972)76; Note, supra note 62, at 588-91.
See 397 U.S. at 154.
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The extent to which the law of standing has consequently expanded, so that any concerned citizen or group can be considered "aggrieved" within the meaning of section 10 of the APA, is, however,
77
still unclear. In Citizens Committee for the Hudson Valley v. Volpe,
the Second Circuit determined that a resident citizens group and a
national conservation organization that were concerned with the beauty
of the Hudson River Valley had standing to contest the issuance of a
dredge and fill permit by the Army Corps of Engineers to the State of
New York for the construction of a proposed highway.
Two of the plaintiffs (the Citizens Committee and the Sierra
Club) made no claim that the proposed Expressway or the
issuance of the dredge and fill permit threatened any direct
personal or economic harm to them. Instead they asserted
the interest of the public in the natural resources, scenic beauty
and historical value of the area immediately threatened with
drastic alteration, claiming that they were "aggrieved" when
the Corps acted adversely to the public interest.7"
The groups "evidenced the seriousness of their concern with local
natural resources by organizing for the purpose of cogently expressing
it, and the intensity of their concern is apparent from the considerable
expense and effort they have undertaken in order to protect the public
interest which they believe is threatened .

.

. " " The court held that

standing "as responsible representatives of the public" was afforded by
the public interest in environmental resources recognized by several
federal statutes.8 "
The Supreme Court, however, has recently rejected the Hudson
Valley approach, holding instead that "a mere 'interest in a problem,'
no matter how qualified the organization is in evaluating the problem,
is not sufficient by itself to render the organization 'adversely affected'
or 'aggrieved' within the meaning of the APA," in Sierra Club v.
Morton."' The Court felt that the "requirement that a party seeking
review must allege facts showing that he is himself adversely affected"
would "serve as at least a rough attempt to put the decision as to
whether review will be sought in the hands of those who have a direct
77 425 F.2d 97 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 949 (1970).
78
Id. at 102.

79 Id. at 103.
80 See id. at 104-05.
8140 U.S.L.W. 4397, 4401 (U.S. Apr. 19, 1972), affg Sierra Club v. Hickel,
433 F.2d 24 (9th Cir. 1970). Petitioner Sierra Club had sought declaratory and
injunctive relief against the issuance by the United States Forest Service of permits
for a "$35 million complex of motels, restaurants, swimming pools, parking lots, and
other structures [including 'ski lifts, ski trails, a cog-assisted railway, and utility
installations'] designed to accommodate 14,000 visitors daily," and against the approval

by the
line to
was to
Sierra

Department of the Interior of a 20-mile highway and a high-voltage power
serve the complex. 40 U.S.L.W. at 4398. The focus of these developments
be the Mineral King Valley, "an area of great natural beauty nestled in the
Nevada Mountains . . . adjacent to Sequoia National Park." Id.
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stake in the outcome." 2 It seems obvious, however, that, on the
facts presented, there was no significant difference between the "interest" alleged by the organization and the "interests" of its members who
used the affected area for recreational purposes, and this fact seems
implicit in the dissenting opinions. Justice Douglas suggested that
[t]he critical question of "standing" would be simplified and
also put neatly in focus if we fashioned a federal rule that
allowed environmental issues to be litigated before federal
agencies or federal courts in the name of the inanimate object
to be dispoiled, defaced, or invaded by roads and bulldozers
and where injury is the subject of public outrage. Contemporary public concern for protecting nature's ecological
equilibrium should lead to the conferral of standing upon
environmental objects to sue for their own preservation."3
And, in his thoughtful dissent, Justice Blackmun pronounced Douglas's
approach imaginative, and presented the following argument, which
speaks for itself:
I would permit an imaginative expansion of our
traditional concepts of standing in order to enable an organization such as the Sierra Club, possessed, as it is, of pertinent,
bona fide and well-recognized attributes and purposes in the
area of environment, to litigate environmental issues. .
We need not fear that Pandora's box will be opened or that
U.S.L.W. at 4401. The Court noted that
[t]he Club apparently regarded any allegations of individualized injury as
superfluous, on the theory that this was a "public" action involving questions
as to the use of natural resources, and that the Club's longstanding concern
with and expertise in such matters were sufficient to give it standing as a
"representative of the public."
Id. at 4400 (footnote omitted). The Court found the following statement of the
club's "interest" in the original pleadings inadequate:
Plaintiff Sierra Club is a non-profit corporation organized and operating
under the laws of the State of California, with its principal place of business
in San Francisco, California since 1892. Membership of the Club is approximately 78,000 nationally, with approximately 27,000 members residing in the
San Francisco Bay area. For many years the Sierra Club by its activities
and conduct has exhibited a special interest in the conservation and sound
maintenance of the national parks, game refuges and forests of the country,
regularly serving as a responsible representative of persons similarly interested. One of the principal purposes of the Sierra Club is to protect and
conserve the national resources of the Sierra Nevada Mountains. Its interests
would be vitally affected by the acts hereinafter described and would be
aggrieved by those acts of the defendants as hereinafter more fully appears.
Id. at 4400 n.8. The club could have easily relied upon individual interests of its
members, such as the fact that "various members of the Club have used and continue
to use the area for recreational purposes"; and the Court noted that its decision did
not bar the club from seeking to amend its complaint accordingly. Id. The lapse
of time, however, makes obtaining the relief originally sought much more difficult,
as Justice Blackinun pointed out in his dissent. Id. at 4406.
83 Id. at 4402 (footnote omitted). justice Douglas relied in part on arguments
contained in Stone, Should Trees Have Standing? Toward Legal Rights for Natural
Objects, 45 S. CAL. L. REv. 450 (1972).
8240
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there will be no limit to the number of those who desire to
participate in environmental litigation. The courts will exercise appropriate restraints just as they have exercised them
in the past. Who would have suspected 20 years ago that the
concepts of standing enunciated in Data Processing and
Barlow would be the measure for today? "
The effect of Data Processing on intervention in agency proceedings is not yet clear. Section 6(a) of the APA provides:
A party is entitled to appear in person or by or with counsel
or other duly qualified representative in an agency proceeding.
So far as the orderly conduct of public business permits, an
interested person may appear before an agency or its responsible employees for the presentation, adjustment, or determination of an issue, request, or controversy in a proceeding,
whether interlocutory, summary, or otherwise, or in connection with an agency function.8 5
This section gives the agency discretion in the first instance to determine when, where, and how an "interested person may appear." It
does not in terms define what interest a person or party must demonstrate or what form an interested person's or party's participation is to
take. The organic statutes are, with few exceptions, 6 equally. vague
as to what kind of interest entitles one to participate and what form
such participation may take. Definition is usually left to the agency,
subject to judicial review. The judicial power to construe an agency's
statutory mandate, and to review its determination of the interests that
must be considered thereunder and of the procedural rights that must
be accorded those representing such interests, constitutes perhaps the
most powerful check on administrative action. This power has been
utilized to expand the definition of those interests that must be allowed
to intervene and the scope of that intervention. 7
The two United Church of Christ appeals 88 reveal perhaps the
furthest incursion by a court into an agency's discretion to shape its
intervention policy. " The court, rejecting the assumption that an
agency always represents the totality of the public interest,9 initially
held that members of the listening public were entitled to intervene
8440

U.S.L.W. at 4406-07.

855 U.S.C. § 555(b) (1970).

86 See, e.g., notes 732-35 infra & accompanying text.
87 Cf. notes 57-84 supra & accompanying text.
88 See notes 363-76, 426-36 infra & accompanying text.
89 Cf. Note, Expansion of "Public Interest" Standing, 45 N.C.L. t~v. 998 (1967).
90 See note 373 infra & accompanying text.
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before the FCC 9 and later expressed profound dissatisfaction with the
form of participation granted the intervenors. 2
The two United Church of Christ appeals were precursors to the
broad test established in Data Processing.93 How that test will influence standing to intervene in agency proceedings was discussed, if
not resolved, in National Welfare Rights Organization v. Finch."'
That case first confronted a problem involved in standing to obtain
judicial review which also arises in the FPC and FTC: " whether a
statutory grant of standing to obtain review to one class implies denial
of standing to other classes. In Welfare Rights, the question was
whether a specific grant of standing to states to seek review of determinations whether their laws were in conformity with the Social
Security Act, implied that welfare recipients did not have a similar right.
Judge Wright noted that, although the statutory scheme spoke "only of
the functions of the Secretary and the rights of the state to a hearing
and judicial review," " such review should not be denied welfare recipients, who otherwise met the Data Processingtest, 97 absent a clear
showing that Congress intended to deny such review. Finding "that
Congress gave the states standing in order to strengthen federalism," 9'
the court declared that "it is not contrary to that purpose that welfare
recipients also have standing to seek review." "
One serious problem remained. Unlike the organic acts of the
agencies considered in this Comment which make some general provision for intervention, the Social Security Act is silent as to whether
participation in the prehearing negotiations and the formal conformity
hearings was limited exclusively to the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare and to the states affected,' though HEW's practice
apparently was to permit, in its discretion, some limited forms of thirdparty participation in the hearings.' 0 ' The court noted that "specific
statutory provisions explicitly controlling intervention are exceptional
when viewed in the context of all legislative enactments pertaining to
administrative proceedings" and that such provisions perhaps "represent special recognition by Congress of a need to have interested parties
91 See notes 374-76 infra & accompanying text.

92 See notes 431-36 infra & accompanying text.
93
See notes 53-84 supra &accompanying text.
94429 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1970). See Comment, Intervention in HEW Welfare
Conformity Proceedings, 6 HARv. Civ. RiGHTs-Civ. LIB. L. REv. 559 (1971).
95 See notes 682-706 (FTC), 746-47, 768-74 (FPC) infra & accompanying text.
96 429 F.2d at 732.
97ld. at 735.
98 Id.at 736.
99 Id.(emphasis in the original). The Ninth Circuit recently reached a contrary

conclusion in an analogous statutory context. See Rasmusson v. Hardin, 40 U.S.L.W.
2674 (9th Cir., Mar. 29, 1972).
00 See id. at 731-32.
10 1See id.
at 731 n.21.
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involved in agency proceedings to protect the public interest." 102 As a
general rule, however, the court felt that "[e]xcept for the adjustments
necessary for assuring the manageability of administrative proceedings,
the criteria for standing for review of agency action appear to assimilate
the criteria for standing to intervene." '0'
Although the court did not explicitly equate standing to obtain
review with standing to intervene, it held, on the facts presented, that
the "right of judicial review cannot be taken as fully realized . . . , if

appellants are excluded from participating in the proceeding to be
reviewed."

10

Under the circumstances presented in Welfare Rights,

and especially in light of the statutory provision that the Secretary's
findings of fact should be conclusive if supported by substantial evidence, 10 5 the court felt that important issues might be foreclosed on
review and that a full consideration of the competing interests would
only be possible through appellants' "full participation in the initial
agency hearing." 106 The statutory provision for remanding to the
agency with instructions to take further evidence was not sufficient to
cure the deficiency."0 7 The court felt that participation in the conformity
hearing would help avoid a multiplicity of suits 108 and recognized that
the expense of participation would limit any great influx of welfare
recipients into the hearings. 10 9 The court approved limiting intervention to groups which seem best able to represent the common interests
of welfare recipients." 0 Most important, the court stated that it contemplated enlargement of the participation already allowed such
groups "' "only to the extent of an additional right to present live
102 Id. at 732 (footnotes omitted).
lo3 Id. at 732-33. The court did not reach NWRO's claim that it had a constitutional due process right to intervene. 420 F.2d at 734 n.33. See Comment, spra
note 94,
at 569-71.
10 4 Id. at 736. The court relied primarily on the reasoning of American Communications Ass'n v. United States, 298 F.2d 648 (2d Cir. 1962), and of Judge
Sobeloff's dissent in First Nat'l Bank v. Saxon, 352 F2d 267 (4th Cir. 1965). In
the latter case, the majority held that the Comptroller of Currency could authorize
establishment of a branch of a national bank without first affording a hearing, even
though a competitor had a right to judicial review of that decision. Cf. Freedman,
Administrative Procedure and the Control of Foreign Direct Investment, 119 U. PA.
L. REv. 1, 70-71 (1970). In Data Processing, the Supreme Court did not consider
whether plaintiff had a right to a hearing before the Comptroller prior to the issuance
of regulations that might affect its interest. Association of Data Processing Serv.
Organizations v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
105 429 F.2d at 737.

1O6 Id.
107 Id. The likelihood in many cases that only a hearing will cure an erroneous
denial of intervention strengthens the argument that denial should be immediately
appealable to the full agency and thereafter to the court of appeals. See Note,
Intervention by Third Parties in Federal Administrative Proceedings, 42 NOTRE DAME
LAw. 71, 76-77 (1966).
108 429 F.2d at 738.
109 Id. at 738-39.

110 Id. at 739; cf. notes 374-76 infra & accompanying text. Thus, an individual
welfare recipient might properly be denied intervention in favor of the National
Welfare Rights Organization and its state counterpart.
111 See note 101 supra & accompanying text.
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witnesses and to cross-examine witnesses for other parties," 112 that
these groups were not entitled to participate in informal negotiations
between HEW and the states, and that the Secretary's right to terminate a hearing upon his determination that conformity had been reached
would be unaffected. The court further emphasized that the problems
of extended cross-examination and introduction of testimony irrelevant
to the issues before the agency should be controlled by the hearing
examiner." 3
Welfare Rights, then, is a good summary of the law-and the confusion-regarding the relationship between standing to obtain review
and standing to intervene. In cases where a hearing is held, groups
meeting the Data Processing test for review have standing to intervene
to the extent necessary to make the right of review effective. Having
established that principle, the court in Welfare Rights proceeded to
define the procedural rights that would make the right of review
effective under the circumstances presented, carefully preserving to the
agency the power to limit intervention to particularly representative
groups, to exclude repetitive or irrelevant testimony, and to exclude
intervenors from private informal negotiations. The court established
no precise formula from which the nature and extent of an intervenor's
procedural rights may be derived.
Because the problems of intervention before courts and agencies
are frequently similar, an examination of rule 24 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure and its shortcomings may reveal some principles
equally applicable to agencies." 4 To the extent that a group would
have standing under the Data Processing test to initiate review of
agency action, it would seem, at first blush, that it should be allowed to
intervene in review initiated by another. Rule 24, however, seems
312

429 F.2d at 739.

113 Id. at 739 n.46.

314 There are of course considerations which are unique to intervention before
courts. A prospective intervenor may be bound by the judgment; he may have a
related claim or defense which might be prejudiced if he were not allowed to intervene, or which might avoid duplication, delay, or inconsistent results if tried with
the original case. In diversity cases, he would have to meet jurisdictional requirements. See Shapiro, supra note 37, at 731-34. Given the limited scope of review,
see notes 135-55 infra & accompanying text, and the concern it reflects that courts
should not, indeed cannot, perform the tasks of the agency de novo on appeal; perhaps
the only inquiries of the court should be whether the interest of the party attackin
the agency decision should have been considered by the agency and in fact wa- not,
and whether there was substantial evidence in favor of other interests. _Jr1t limited
scope of judicial inquiry might thus reduce the need for full reproientation of all
parties appearing before the commission, though the need-,viotisly varies with the
nature of the agency action under review. Co-,pare Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating
Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cr. -1971), in which the central questionwhether the essentially procedural rules promulgated by the AEC fully complied with
the purpose of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 § 102(2), 42 U.S.C.
§4332(2) (1970)---could arguably have been decided without extensive participation
by power companies (although in fact one company did intervene and several others
filed briefs as amici), with Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 453 F.2d
463 (2d Cir. 1971), in which resolution of the complicated factual issues involved in
the court's review of the record was arguably facilitated by extensive participation
by third parties.
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considerably more restrictive."-5 Professor Shapiro has criticized the
present rule on the ground that intervention as of right under rule
24(a) may be granted too freely to certain intervenors 116 while the
scope of permissive intervention under rule 24(b) is too limited, and
restricts the scope of intervention by public interest groups or "private
attorneys general." "'T He has proposed a functional approach to permissive intervention which would consider
(1) the nature and extent of the applicant's interest in the
subject matter of the action and the degree to which the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or
impede his ability to protect that interest; (2) the adequacy
of representation of the applicant's interest by existing parties;
(3) the relationship of the applicant's claim or defense, if any,
to the subject matter of the action; (4) the avoidance of
multiplicity of actions; (5) whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the
original parties; and (6) the contribution the applicant may
make to the just determination of the issues."1 s
Shapiro would also give the court wide discretion to limit the scope of
permissive intervention and intervention as of right, and would make
denial of either immediately appealable." 9 An appeal would not stay
proceedings unless so ordered by a court. 2 ° Under the present rule
24(a), the fact that the potential intervenor's interest is adequately
represented by existing parties is a ground for denying intervention
altogether; Shapiro's proposal might permit informal or limited intervention as an alternative to outright denial. It seems clear, however,
that under either, meeting the Data Processing test alone does not automatically confer a right to intervene in a court proceeding, or, as Welfare Rights indicates, in an administrative proceeding.
115 FED. R. Civ. P. 24:

(a) Intervention of Right. Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an action: (1) when a statute of the United States
confers an unconditional right to intervene; or (2) when the applicant claims
an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of
the action and he is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a
practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest, unless
the applicant's interest is adequately represented by existing parties.
(b) Permissive Intervention. Upon timely application anyone may be permi+td to intervene in an action: (1) when a statute of the United States
confers i ,onditional right to intervene; or (2) when an applicant's claim or
defense and the -in action have a question of law or fact in common . ...
In exercising its discretin the court shall consider whether the intervention
will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original
parties.
116 See Shapiro, mipra note 37, at 757-59; cf. notes 625-40 infra & accompanying
text.
117 See Shapiro, supra note 37, at 758.
118Id. at 762.
119Id.
120 Id. at 762-63.
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C. Pursuing "The Public Interest"
1. The Decisionmaking Model
The agencies here considered are charged to act in accordance with
the public interest. 2 ' This bare mandate is vague; at times, it is
misleading. Criticisms of current agency practice and attempts to define the public interest in the administrative context have largely focused
upon devising procedures whereby "better" decisions may be derived,
rather than dictating the substantive norms that are most "in the public
interest" in specific contexts. Charles Reich, for example, argues that
the federal agencies, apparently defining the term "public interest" to
mean the harmonious balancing of as many of the competing or conflicting interests as possible in a specific factual context,'22 contribute
to the "central myth . . . that decisions concerning planning and allo-

cation can be, and are, made on an objective basis." 123 Adjudicatory
procedure enhances the myth, by giving the impression that value
choices-"what kind of television programs Boston should have," for
example--can be decided before agencies, as issues of fact are tried to
courts of law.'24 The adjudicative process, with its ad hoc, passive
mediation of the powerful private economic interests which customarily
present themselves before it, according to rules of procedure which tend
to foreclose consideration of unargued alternatives or attention to unrepresented interests, inhibits the independent formation of general
policies. 1 25 Reich views the administrative process as fundamentally
conservative and responsive only to immediate pressures. 26 He urges
that it has a responsibility for wide-ranging, independent, innovative
planning, which can be fulfilled in part by a broader definition of the
issues each agency must consider and by a much broader spectrum of
information upon which to base its value choices.
Reich implies a proposition that needs to be articulated more precisely and forcefully. In a highly pluralistic society such as ours, it is
almost impossible to say that there is a unitary public interest or that
any proposed action is a priori in the public interest.127 Apart from
121 See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 303 (1970) (FCC).
122 Reich, supra note 16, at 1234.
' 23 Id.1235.
124 Id. Some early theorists, and especially Max Weber, viewed the purpose
of the administrative process as the expert formulation of a system of rules, based
upon general principles implicit in the social structure or defined by the legislative
branch, to be applied to specific cases. See, e.g., G. BERKLEY, TEE ADMINISTRATIWV
REVOLUTION 8-9 (1971).
The neutral development and application of a national
policy might, under this view, be impeded if an agency were to respond to sectional
interest groups.
125 Reich, supranote 16, at 1238-39.
12 6 Id. 1239.
127 The only arguably neutral criterion of the public interest would seem to be
whether a perfectly generalizable effect felt by all citizens is "helpful" or "harmful."
Assume that the lives of citizens of a country must be preserved. Universal distribution of a vaccine needed to forestall an epidemic is in the public interest, while
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the obvious minimal function of the term as a symbol or "facade for
special interests and partisan position in the political battle" 12 and
the tautology that the public interest is what the agency charged to
act in the public interest defines it to be, there seem to be three views
of decisionmaking in the public interest-those Glendon Schubert calls
"rationalist," "idealist," and "realist"-which have served as bases for
models of the administrative process:
The rationalists . . . envisage a political system in which
the norms are all given . . . and the function of political and

bureaucratic officials alike is to translate the given norms
into specific rules of governmental action. The idealists . . .
conceive of the decision-making situation as requiring the
exercise of authority to engage in social planning by clarifying a vague criterion.

The realists

.

.

.

state that the

function of public officials is to engage in political mediation
of disputes; the goals of public policy are specific but in
conflict.'2 9
Schubert characterizes rationalists as "propublic, proparty, and
anti-interest group." They believe in the "popular will," which they
determine either through the outcome of the contests of a strong twoparty system or directly by consulting public opinion. "In both instances, administrators and judges are supposed to exercise technical
discretion [discretion to define the means but not the goal] to carry out
norms which they do not make, but which are supplied to them in the
form of constitutional provisions, statutes, and executive orders." 130
Idealists are "propublic, antiparty, and anti-interest group." They
conceive of the public interest in terms of a substantive natural law,
which may or may not be perceived by the public itself, and are
only in that sense "propublic." The public interest "is what the elite
thinks is good for the masses," and the administrative process entails
turning the country's military forces on the civilian population, even to preserve the
stability of a country's political structure, is not. But such unitary imperatives are rare
in modern pluralistic societies, as are effects as generalizable as those of plague
and civil war. Theorists, such as Jeremy Bentham, who posit the public interest to be
the sum of all private interests (the latter being widely defined to include aesthetic,
moral, and kindred interests of individuals, as well as the more traditional "legal"
interests such as a contractual right) find it difficult to explain the source of decisionmaking criteria applied by an administrative body to achieve a balance in a particular
case. See J. BENTHAm, A FRAGMENT ON GOVERNMENT and PRINCIPLES AND MORALS
OF LEGIsLATIoN 126 (1 vol. ed. 1948); note 122 supra & accompanying text. See
generally Nomos V: THE PUBLIC INTEREST (C. Friedrich ed. 1962) [hereinafter cited

as Nomos V].

128 Friedrich, Preface to Nomos V, supra note 127, at vii.
129 Schubert, Is There a Public Interest Theory?, in NoMos V, supra note 127,
at 164. See also Schubert, "The Public Interest" in Administrative Decision Making:
Theorem, Theosophy, or Theory?, 51 Ams. POL. ScI. REv. 346 (1957).
130 Schubert, Is There a Public Interest Theory?, in NoMos V, supra note 127,
at 164-66.

1972]

PUBLIC PARTICIPATION

primarily "the exercise of craft and conscience" 131 to achieve the administrator's perception of that good.
Realists are prointerest group, and tend to view both parties and
the general public in terms of their constituent groups. They view
decisionmaking as (1) responding to pressures actually exerted upon
them by groups, (2) responding to interests that they perceive, but

which are not actively pressed upon them, in addition to those pressures
actually exerted, or (3) independently determining goals based upon
what they conceive to be an ideal balancing of the interests and pressures they perceive. This third variant differs from the idealist view
only in that these realists make an effort to ascertain the desires and
needs of the interest groups they perceive, and hence this variant is

less inherently conservative than the first, which looks to existing pressures and their relative strengths, thereby favoring the status quo.
Schubert associates these realist attitudes toward the administrative process with what he calls the due-process-equilibrium model.
Its basic principle is that "decisions reached as a result of . . . full
consideration [of all available relevant information, including, in appropriate contexts, opinion] are more likely to meet the test of
equilibrium theory-i.e., 'satisfaction,' acceptance, and the like-and do
so most of the time . .. ." 13 Decisions in the public interest result
from the application of proper procedures. Thus, the model concentrates on decisions that are "acceptable," rather than decisions that are
"right" in an abstract sense: the emphasis is on procedures more than
on underlying norms or values.
The due-process-equilibrium model of administrative decisionmaking, and the definition of the public interest derived therefrom, seem
the most workable. There is, of course, no way this highly abstract
model can be proved "correct" or "incorrect"; perhaps the only relevant
questions about it are whether it has an internal logic, whether it makes
provision for all relevant variables, and-since it is, after all, an idealwhether it seems reflected in the thinking of people with practical experience in the area.'
-13

Id. 166-67.

132 Id. 170-71.

133 Reich, under this analysis, initially seems part idealist, part realist. He seems
an idealist in that he wants the agencies to exercise broad planning powers insulated
from immediate pressures. His more specific proposals-broader sets of criteria for
the agencies to consider, increased public participation in agency proceedings, advisory
hearings, institutionalized representation of previously unrepresented interests-seem

those of a realist intent on improving a basically sound system. His view of decisionmaking, then, is probably closer to the third realist variant. Similarly, FCC Commis-

sioner Johnson's suggestions go to improving FCC procedure by insulating the Commission from unduly concentrated influence by any particular interest, by increasing

the informational inputs through encouragement of participation, by improving its investigatory facilities, by obtaining as many "expert" points of view as possible before
making wide-ranging policy decisions, and by reducing regulatory delay. See gen-

erally Johnson, supra note 17. His suggestions, like Reich's, imply an assumption
that the due-process-equilibrium model will be viable if the process afforded is fair,
that is, if all interests affected by a decision are allowed to present information (in-
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The source of the decisionmaker's values is the central problem
of this model. Because it draws on the judicial model, it assumes
certain judicial qualities in the decisionmaker, most notably a degree of
impartiality toward or insulation from the parties before him. But the
model also contemplates that agency independence and expertise will
prevent the decisionmaker from being too much bound by precedent. It
invests him with more discretion, not always exercised, to formulate
policy than his judicial counterpart: he is free, to some extent, to choose
his own values. This problem is especially characteristic of the third
variant of realist decisionmaking.
Ultimately, Congress and the courts retain great power to dictate
values to agency decisionmakers, a power which may be more frequently exercised in the future. Congress, in supplying only the bare
mandate to act in the public interest, has not historically concerned
itself with providing specific values for decisionmakers. Recently,
however, popular concern over environmental damage has led Congress
to attempt to provide a more specific value in this area. The National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) "' purports to force decisionmakers to include among their values a concern for preventing further
damage to the environment. The resistance that has met the NEPA
leads one to doubt that values can be effectively imposed in this broad
manner. With the exceptions of radical restructuring of the agencies,
and of informal mechanisms of control exercised by Congress and the
President (such as budget allocations and appointment of personnel),
case-by-case examination by the courts may provide the only effective
review of agency value choices.
Traditionally, the courts have been reluctant to impose values upon
agency decisionmakers. They have, for example, found agency implementation of the NEPA deficient in several instances." 5 But, because
of largely self-imposed limitations upon their own power to review administrative decisions and thereby substitute their own judgment, courts
have at most demanded strict adherence to procedure, 3 ' or strict concuding, where appropriate, opinion) to the decisionmaker. Former FTC Commissioner Elman seems more the rationalist in that he would increase the accountability
of the Commission to the President and Congress. He is, however, dealing with an
agency enforcing vague statutory prohibitions, and he does concede that the FTC's
rulemaking processes should be decentralized and opened to more points of view.
See note 583 infra.
134 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (1970).
135 See, e.g., Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C.
Cir. 1971) ; Committee for Nuclear Responsibility v. Seaborg, No. 71-1732 (D.C. Cir.,
Oct. 5, 1971). For accounts of the effect of the NEPA in increasing the number of
issues the agency must consider, or in increasing agency responsibility to explore
alternative modes of action, see notes 800-03, 901-13 infra & accompanying text.
136 "Section 102 of NEPA requires, inter alia, that an impact statement assess
adverse environmental effects and discuss alternatives to the proposed action. On
the ultimate issue whether a project should be undertaken or not, a matter involving
the assessment and weighing of various factors, the court's function is limited. However, the court has a responsibility to determine whether the agencies involved have
fully and in good faith followed the procedure contemplated by Congress . .. .
Committee for Nuclear Responsibility v. Seaborg, No. 71-1732, at 5-6 (D.C. Cir.,
Oct. 5, 1971) (footnote omitted).

19721

PUBLIC PARTICIPATION

struction of an agency's statutory authority. 3 7 What prevents courts
from going further? The APA provision for review is, on its face, quite
broad.' 38 Unless otherwise provided by law, questions of "law" are
for the courts, questions of "fact" for the agency, reviewable by the
courts only when "unsupported by substantial evidence," "9 or lacking
a rational basis. 4 ° Professor Jaffe defines a finding of fact as "the
assertion that a phenomenon has happened or is or will be happening
independent of or anterior to any assertion as to its legal effect." "' If
this test were strictly applied, there would be little agency decisionmaking that could withstand characterization as questions of law or
mixed questions of law and fact, both of which are within a court's
competence to decide.' 4 2 Jaffe argues that, even though many agency
decisions are not findings of fact under his definition, "the legislature
in realizing its [statutory] purposes has chosen to work through an
administrative agency, and so (presumptively, as we have said) to
137 See, e.g., Citizens Comm. for the Hudson Valley v. Volpe, 302 F. Supp. 1083
(S.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd, 425 F.2d 97 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 949 (1970)
(construction of expressway enjoined because part of structure was a "dike" which
required specific congressional approval under the statute).
138 Administrative Procedure Act § 10(e), 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1970):
To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the reviewing
court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and
statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms
of an agency action. The reviewing court shall(1) compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably
denied; and
(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and
conclusions found to be(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with law;
(B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege,
or immunity;
(C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or
limitations, or short of statutory right;
(D) without observance of procedure required by law;
(E) unsupported by substantial evidence in a case subject to sections 556 and 557 of this title or otherwise reviewed
on the record of an agency hearing provided by statute; or
(F) unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the
facts are subject to trial de novo by the reviewing court.
In making the foregoing determinations, the court shall review the
whole record or those parts of it cited by a party, and due account
shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial error.
There are, of course, instances where this standard is made inapplicable to agency
action by, for example, a more restrictive statutory provision for review. See generally 4 K. DAvis, supra note 23, §§ 28.09-.16.
139 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (E) (1970).
140 See 4 K. DAvis, supra note 23, § 30.05.
11 L. JAFFE, supra note 33, at 548 (emphasis omitted).
142 Very rarely is a finding purely a finding of fact under Jaffe's formulation;
only in instances where Congress has provided a very specific definition of the public
interest in a given context (for example, a prohibition against certain concentrations
of pollutants in smoke emissions and a specification of a penalty) could an agency
determination (for example, that there had been a violation of the prohibition) be
considered purely a finding of fact.
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confer on it some policy-making function," and that "[t]his discretion
should normally be permitted to function short of the point where the
court is convinced that the purpose of the statute is contradicted." 143
Congress in providing its characteristically broad mandates to the
agencies and equally broad standards of judicial review, has left it to
the agencies in the first instance to determine many norms, and to the
courts to determine at least the outer limits of agency discretion in
this regard. If the courts were to attempt to usurp the value-determining functions of the agencies totally, Congress might respond by
specifically and narrowly the review or the
delimiting much more
1 44
courts' jurisdiction.

Judicial unwillingness to decide mixed questions of law and fact
may rest on considerations less compelling than the ultimate power of
Congress to restrict review to so-called constitutional and jurisdictional
facts.1 4 Professor Davis argues that "in numerous cases the Supreme
Court has customarily classified questions of application-so-called
'mixed' questions of law and fact-as questions of 'fact' whenever it
has seen fit to limit review; in other words, the Court has often used a
practical or policy approach to the law-fact distinction and has often
rejected the literal or analytical approach." 146 Lower federal courts
are presumably even more likely to make result-oriented characterizations of questions as "legal" or "factual." Davis explores at length the
reasons which might lead a court to make one characterization or the
other. The main reason for not substituting judgment is a court's
feeling that the question or value choice is "peculiarly within the
agency's competence and not especially within the competence of the
reviewing court." 147 In cases where judicial judgment has been subJaffe does not deny
143 L. JAFFE, supra note 33, at 573 (emphasis in original).
that courts retain the power to review such decisions: "[tihe judgment of the expert
may . . . be relevant to the decision, but it cannot by reason of its 'pure' quality,
its specifically expert character, transform a question of law into a question of fact
and so insulate the decision from legal judgment." Jaffe, Judicial Review: Question
of Law, 69 HARv. L. REv. 239, 269 (1955).
144 Cf. Military Selective Service Act of 1967, 50 U.S.C. App. § 460(b) (3)

(1970) :
No judicial review shall be made of the classification of or processing of any
registrant by local boards, appeal boards, or the President, except as a
defense to a criminal prosecution instituted under [50 U.S.C. App. § 462],
after the registrant has responded either affirmatively or negatively to an
order to report for induction . . . : Provided, That such review shall go
to the question of the jurisdiction herein reserved to local boards, appeal
boards, and the President only when there is no basis in fact for the classification assigned to such registrant.
See generally H.M. HART & H. WECHtSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL
SYSTEM

312-40 (1953).

Jaffe, Judicial Review: Constitutiontal and Jurisdictional Fact, 70 HARV.
L. REv. 953 (1957).
146 4 K. DAvis, supra note 23, § 30.01, at 190.
In the environmental area, at least, some commentators feel the
147 Id. 191.
only effective means of vindicating the public interest is by widening radically the
scope of judicial review so that courts may reach the merits. See, e.g., J. SAx,
-45 See

DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT

108-74 (1971); Sive, Some Thoughts of an Environ-
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stituted, the reasons for the substitution usually are not, and, Davis
suggests, "probably ought not to be articulated." 148 The judge may
be familiar with an agency and trust-or distrust 14--it; he may sense

injustice in a particular case which might lead to a closer examination
of the record and occasionally to a decision on the merits; he may be
unfamiliar with the technology, or the case may appear to be sui generis
and the complaining party's grievance unappealing, and he may conclude that there are other cases more deserving of attention; he may
disagree with the underlying policy he perceives in a decision; 150 he
may feel the agency should be left alone while it explores an undeveloped
area within its policymaking competence; or he may be influenced by a
number of other factors. 151
Courts, then, have the power to substitute their judgment for the
agency's in making value choices. They have not, however, done so in
most of the cases considered in this Comment; 152 rather, they have used
less drastic means calculated not to deprive the agencies of their power
to generate policy but to influence its exercise indirectly.153 A court's
decision requiring of an agency the most scrupulous adherence to procedure and liberally construing provisions investing the agency discretion to grant procedural privileges may of course suggest to the agency
that it alter its decision on the merits lest the court be moved to reverse
on a subsequent appeal.' 54 A court may believe the agency has inadmental Lawyer in the Wilderness of Administrative Law, 70 COLUm. L. REV. 612
(1970); Rogers & Hellegers, Book Review, 119 U. PA. L. REv. 1080 (1971). The
Second Circuit has rejected Sive's proposal for expanding the standard of review.
Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 453 F.2d 463 (2d Cir. 1971).
148 4 K. DAvis, supra note 23, § 30.08, at 233. In recent cases involving the
FCC, the D.C. Circuit has been less than reticent in stating its reasons for differing.
See, e.g., Business Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace v. FCC, 450 F.2d 642 (D.C.
Cir. 1971), cert. granted, 405 U.S. 953 (1972) (No. 71-864) ; Office of Communication
of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 425 F.2d 543 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
149 The frequency of reversal of FCC decisions recently by the D.C. Circuit
suggests something less than complete faith in the Commission's policies and fairness. Cf., e.g., notes 408-11 infra & accompanying text.
150 See FCC v. RCA Communications, Inc., 346 U.S. 86, 91 (1953): "Since the
Commission professed to dispose of the case merely upon its view of a principle which
it derived from the [organic] statute and did not base its conclusion on matters within
its own special competence, it is for us to determine what the governing principle is."
:151 See 4 K. DAvis, supra note 23, § 30.08 (1958 & Supp. 1970).
152 Perhaps the closest a court has come to taking a case away from an agency
in the cases considered in this Comment was the D.C. Circuit's disposition of the
second United Church of Christ appeal. Office of Communication of the United
Church of Christ v. FCC, 425 F.2d 543 (D.C. Cir. 1969); see notes 426-36 infra
& accompanying text. See also Business Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace v.
FCC, 450 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. granted, 405 U.S. 953 (1972) (No. 71-864).
153 Thus, Judge Kaufman, writing of the Scenic Hudson case, notes 768-84 infra
& accompanying text, speaks of "[p]ulling out many of the weapons in the arsenal
of judicial review that permit a court to skirt the question whether the Federal Power
Commission was right or wrong." Kaufman, sumpra note 16, at 92.
154 The Second Circuit in the second appeal of Scenic Hudson summarized the
copious record compiled from the hearing on remand and the concessions made to the
environmentalists, recited the customary language dealing with review of questions
of fact, and upheld the FPC's decision. The concessions did substantially reduce
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vertently or deliberately ignored information relevant to its decision
and that enforcing a procedural requirement-such as the impact stateor a public interest group's intervenment prescribed by the NEPA ...
tion in a proceeding-is the only viable means of informing the agency.
Finally, a court may wish to widen the scope of public participation in
order to force the agency to articulate the logic of its value choices in
the record in response to arguments and data introduced by the public
participant. The record, thus augmented, would facilitate judicial review of agency policymaking.
2. Public Interest Groups
If Congress and the courts have little present inclination to impose
new values, or priorities among values already held, upon agency
decisionmakers, members of the general public seem to have little power
to do so. One of the most often repeated criticisms of agencies is that
there is little citizen involvement in decisionmaking."' In terms of the
due-process-equilibrium model, the criticism is that a proper equilibrium
has not been established because certain interests affected by the decisions are not represented before the decisionmaker, who, whether or
not his values would permit a sympathetic consideration of those interests if they were represented, gives them little or no consideration in
fact. In theory, an office within the agency, such as the Atomic Safety
and Licensing Board of the AEC ...or the office of complaint counsel
in the FTC 158 is usually supposed to represent the broader, more general interests of the public not represented by the regulated interests.
Often these offices must compromise competing policy positions according to articulated or unarticulated agency priorities, with the result
that no one position is argued to the fullest. Full exploration of the
information that might be adduced to support each competing policy
position, or, indeed, the very knowledge that some problems and policy
positions exist at all, is often limited by lack of investigatory resources.' 5 9 Consideration of some policy positions might be foreclosed
altogether by an agency's priorities or its conception of its jurisdiction.:6 Some policy positions favorable to certain parties, then, are
likely to be ignored unless articulated by independent spokesmen skilled
in the legal argumentation and factual presentation that are at the heart
of administrative decisionmaking.
the visual impact of the project on the landscape. See Scenic Hudson Preservation
Conference v. FPC, 453 F.2d 463 (2d Cir. 1971) ; notes 777, 806-08 infra & accompanying text.
155

See note 136 supra.

156 See note 18

supra.

157 See notes 825-42 infra & accompanying text.
158 See notes 656-57, 685-86 infra & accompanying text.

159 See note 24 supra & accompanying text.
160 See, e.g., notes 893-900 infra & accompanying text.
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Public interest groups, so termed largely as a matter of convenience, attempt to serve as such spokesmen. They serve the function of
what may be called "public interest representation" before agencies, that
is, representation of an otherwise inadequately represented policy position, (which may or may not be factually supported or easily susceptible
of factual support) formulated to promote an interest which will be affected by the decision to be made. By that representation, they enable
the agency to make a more informed, fuller consideration of the problem before it, which is, in terms of the due-process-equilibrium model, 61
more in the public interest. Two qualifications should be noted. First,
the function of public interest representation may be served by others
than those usually identified as "public interest groups." An individual
might attempt to serve such a function; for example, a recent law school
graduate has made several attempts to initiate or intervene in FCC
proceedings.' 62 The function might be served by a labor union,' 63 a
trade association, 164 or a competitor.' 65 Second, the concept of an "interest" is as broad or narrow as agencies, courts, and Congress choose
to make it in any given case. Individuals and groups may be said to
possess numerous narrowly defined interests, many of them competing
or conflicting: everyone, for example, presumably has an interest, in
the broad sense, in avoiding food poisoning, but a hypochondriac might
go to great lengths to maintain a "proper" diet whereas a welfare recipient might get only what food stamps could provide. This Comment
speaks of interests in the broader, more abstract sense-for example,
the interest of the public in general in clean air-and seeks to distinguish such abstract interests as much as possible from policy positions
calculated to advance these interests in a specific factual context. Thus,
the interests in clean air might be advanced by a number of alternative
policy positions presented by a number of different spokesmen in a
given agency context. 166
Under the above definition, a public interest group need not have
1 67
an interest that would confer standing to obtain judicial review.
It need only effectively represent a policy position calculated to advance
such an interest. Under this theory, intervention, at least in a nontechnical sense of being allowed to present information and policy arguments, should be granted any group which offered expert representation
of a relevant policy position not otherwise represented. 6
16 1 See notes 129-33 supra &accompanying text.
362 See notes 389-400 infra & accompanying text.

See notes 516, 682-90, 845 infra & accompanying text.
See notes 650, 662-63 infra & accompanying text.
165 See notes 351-54, 750-51 infra & accompanying text. But see notes 396-98
infra &accompanying text.
166 Cf. text preceding note 681 infra.
163
3

64

167 See

notes 49-84 supra & accompanying text.

168 The intervention granted state and local governments and other government

agencies is justified by this rationale, although political accommodation may also play
a part. Intervention by competitors or industry advisory committees is sometimes
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What accounts for the relatively recent emergence of groups to
present interests which were previously inadequately represented, and
what interests are these groups likely to represent? The very existence
of such groups is difficult to explain under orthodox theories of such
special interest groups as labor unions, trade or industrial associations,
and professional associations. 69 Mancur Olson has argued that the
latter resort to collective action-lobbying, contributions to political
campaigns, litigation, advertising, and so forth-only where the individual benefit accruing to each member of the group outweighs the
individual cost of supporting the collective action, and then, except in
the case of very small groups where social disapprobation effectively
prevents failure to contribute one's share of the cost, only where there
is some additional incentive or coercion, quite apart from the achievement or failure to achieve the collective goal. ° The first requisite of
collective action-that the benefit to the individual outweigh or at least
equal the cost-would seem to be lacking for most public interest
groups. They often assert interests, such as control of radioactive
waste, 1 conservation, '2 preservation of historic landmarks or scenic
areas,' 7 3 prevention of deceptive or misleading advertising, 74 fair representation of controversial subjects in the broadcast media,'7 5 and protection from harmful effects of DDT,' 6 that are shared by persons
outside the group, often by every member of a large class or geographic
area affected by the agency decision. The benefit their members would
derive if their objectives were achieved would not, in monetary terms,
repay the requisite expenditure of time, effort, and funds. There is
perhaps a satisfaction derived by the members that would make up
the deficit in the cost-benefit equation: the personal satisfaction or sense
of morality that is derived from participation in what the individual
feels is a just cause. That very questionable assumption-that an enhanced sense of moral rectitude can sufficiently compensate for the
granted without regard to the interest represented, on the ground that the competitor
or committee possesses special expertise or access to data useful to the agency in
making a full consideration of the issues. See, e.g., notes 750-53 infra & accompanying text.

1 6 9 See generally H. ECKSTErN, PRESSURE GRouP POLITICS (1960); S. FnmR,

EMPIRE: A STUDY OF THE LOBBY IN GREAT BRITAIN (1966).
170 In large groups, the additional coercion or incentive is required by the
tendency of individuals to accept the benefit without paying their share of the cost:
the pressure labor unions are allowed to exert on employees to maintain the integrity
of bargaining units is a good example. See M. OLSON, JR., THE LoGIC OF COLLECTIVE
ACTION:
PUBLIC GOONS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1965).
17 1 See Crowther v. Seaborg, 312 F. Supp. 1205 (D. Colo. 1970).
172 See Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir.
1965). 73
ANONYMOUS

1

See

174 See

id.

Campbell Soup Co., [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP.
119,261 (FTC 1970), appeal filed sub noin. SOUP, Inc. v. FTC, No. 24,476, D.C.
Cir., July 24, 1970; see notes 598-608 infra & accompanying text.
175 See Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359
F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
176 See Environmental Defense Fund v. HEW, 428 F.2d 1083 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
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insufficiency in monetary terms of a benefit derived through collective
actions-is perhaps more easily made in light of the fact that some
groups do not bear the financial cost of their activities
public interest
77
themselves.1

This circumstance, viewed in one light, tends to help balance the
cost-benefit equation; viewed in another, it raises serious questions of
the reliability of the representation of the group's interest. For example,
the work of a major public interest law firm, the Center for Law and
Social Policy in Washington, D.C., has been subsidized by major
foundations.'" Many of the groups represented by the Center could
not independently provide themselves with the sort of expert representation required in agency proceedings. To some extent, then, the
Center not only represents these groups, but in doing so tends to define
their goals and, perhaps, their structure and internal organization as
well, if only in the discretion it exercises in choosing the types of cases
it will take, what strategies will be used, what remedies sought, what
compromises accepted. 9 The Center and other institutions like it
decide, in effect, what interests it is most in the public interest to represent. Critics have suggested that some of these decisions reflect a bias
against problems of the poor and in favor of interests, such as those of
the consumer and the environmentalist, whose problems are arguably
more susceptible to solution through the political process.'8 0
There is, at the very least, a danger that a public interest law
firm's concept of its client group's interest will not accurately reflect
that interest, to the extent that the client group is not well organized
in its own right, does not have well-established policies, does not
have a working knowledge of the administrative process, is
not able to draw upon its own internal information and
expertise to support its case, or, if unsatisfied with the firm's
presentation of its interest, is unable to afford other representation.
One measure of the integrity and legitimacy of a group, and hence its
ability to curb misrepresentation of its interest, is its ability to engage
in significant collective action (short of presenting its own case before
an agency) to promote its interest unassisted. Those groups which do
not engage in such action are less able to prevent misrepresentation than
Consumers Union,'82 and Common
those, like the Sierra Club,'
177 For example, in Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d
608 (2d Cir. 1965), the conservation group was "heavily financed by a public spirited
citizen." Jaffe, The Citizen as Litigant in Public Actions: The Non-Hohfeldian or

ideological Plaintiff, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 1033, 1044 (1968).
178 See Halpern & Cunningham, supra note 13, at 1104. For other general accounts
of the practice of public interest law, see Berlin, Roisman & Kessler, supra note 13;
Cahn & Cahn, supra note 13; Comment, supra note 13.
179 See Halpern & Cunningham, supra note 13, at 1107-10; cf. NAACP v. Button,
415, 462-63 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
371 U.S.
' 8 o Halpern & Cunningham, supra note 13, at 1107.
181 See note 788 infra.
182 See note 678 infra.
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Cause,1 83 which do.
The problem of misrepresentation of the interest asserted is not
limited to those groups which do not engage in other significant collective action unassisted. It is present when a group represents two or
more potentially competing interests. Such groups are not ordinarily
thought of as public interest groups, although they are allowed access
to administrative proceedings to present information not otherwise
easily available to an agency, and in that sense further the public interest.
Examples include large trade or professional organizations," competitors allowed to intervene in a role analogous to that of the "private
attorneys general," 185 and large labor unions that may claim to repre8 6
sent their members' interest as consumers or environmentalists.
Similarly, it is perhaps too easily assumed that municipalities or other
governmental units, which are often allowed to intervene in certain proceedings as of right, 8 7 will accurately reflect the balance of the comFinally, the problem of
peting interests within their jurisdictions.'
misrepresentation of the asserted interest induced by competing interests may be present in groups like that in PalisadesCitizens Association
v. CAB," 9 whose members' interest in environmental effects of an
agency decision may be difficult to distinguish from their individual
interests as property owners.
.83 But

cf. Schrag, Common Cause: New Paths for WASP Elites, 2 SocIAL

Poucy, Nov.-Dec. 1971, at 29, 31:
Common Cause was to be a membership organization relying not on a few
large donors but on the fifteen-dollar annual fee that each of a hundred
thousand concerned citizens would contribute. . . Common Cause suggested
that the thing called the Public Interest is distinguishable (to certain people)
from particularinterests; the Public Interest, moreover, was more noble than
particular interests and, almost by definition, could be articulated only by
those who have no overriding special interests to defend . . . , who were

already sufficiently secure or established (or saintly?) to be incorruptible
and selfless. Such people must necessarily be individuals who place themselves into an "American" tradition that is beyond class or race or time,
beyond even the memory of having made it. It is only the Establishment
which can deny the possibility that the Public Interest is simply an arrogant
misunderstanding of its private concerns, however selfless it may regard
them. It is only the Establishment which can toss out the word "we" as
if it meant everybody, as if there were no "us" and "them." The crisis
(real or, again, imagined) which gave impetus to Common Cause is the
breakdown of that "we"; it is the dawning realization that when someone
says "we" as if it did mean everybody there is a cacophony of count-me-outs.
84 See notes 650, 662-63 infra & accompanying text.
185 See, e.g., notes 351-54 infra & accompanying text.
186 See notes 516, 682-90, 845 infra & accompanying text.
187 See note 734 infra & accompanying text.
188 In Citizens for Allegan County, Inc. v. FPC, 414 F.2d 1125 (D.C. Cir. 1969),
a citizens group intervened but was unable to present its case against the sale of
power facilities to a private utility which had been approved by referendum. The
case presents a striking example of dissent from the prevailing consensus of the
community, which might have altered the Commission's view of the equities if a
hearing had been allowed.
189 420 F.2d 188 (D.C. Cir. 1969). See notes 533-47 infra & accompanying text.
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D. ConsiderationsInfluencing the Form of Participation
What considerations, then, beyond those outlined by Shapiro for
permissive intervention before courts should govern agency discretion
in formulating its intervention policy? That there are many types of
administrative proceedings and that within each type the effect of a
decision may be limited strictly to a single party or may extend to an
entire segment of the national economy suggest a similar variety in
forms intervention might take, depending upon the type of proceeding,
the intervenor's interest, and his potential contribution.
Three broad types of administrative proceedings are exemplified
in the analyses below of the individual agencies: proceedings which
formulate rules of general applicability; proceedings which allocate resources or privileges; and proceedings which enforce prohibitions
created by statute. Of course, these areas often overlap. An FCC
license renewal hearing, for example, may combine all three types.
Before a broadcast license may be reallocated, there may be charges of
past violations of the fairness doctrine which would raise the possibility
of enforcing sanctions, or there may be complaints relating to the
quality of programming or objections to the frequency or fairness of
advertising which might raise novel policy questions more commonly
considered in the rulemaking context. Enforcement proceedings in the
FTC are sometimes used by the agency to establish new rules applicable
throughout an industry.1 9 Although these examples point out the
danger in analyzing proceedings according to their form rather than the
issues they consider, 19 1 some general observations may be made of each
of the types of proceedings mentioned above.
The need for broad public participation, including participation by
public interest groups, is most obvious in agency rulemaking. 9 2 Rulemaking proceedings setting future standards or policies are "legislative"
in the sense that many interests are potentially affected, many interrelated issues involved, and a variety of solutions possible. Rulemaking
should be modeled on the political process to the fullest extent practicable. In areas where rulemaking is currently employed, the interests
of large segments of the public, and particularly the poor, are said to
be inadequately represented: there is not enough investigation of the
effects of contemplated rules on these interests initiated by the agencies
themselves, there is little coordination of the efforts of the unrepresented
groups to participate, and notice of contemplated rulemaking is inadequate. Indeed, matters relating to "public property, loans, grants, bene190 Problems unique to enforcement proceedings are treated below in the context

of the FTC.
191 See Robinson, The Making of Administrative Policy: Another Look at Rulemaking and Adjudication and Administrative Procedure Reform, 118 U. PA. L. REv.

485 (1970).
192

Formal rulemaking is governed by the Administrative Procedure Act § 4,

5 U.S.C. § 553 (1970).
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fits or contracts" 19 3-matters most likely to affect the poor-are specifically excepted from the requirements of the APA for notice and
participation "through the submission of written data, views, or arguments with or without opportunity for oral presentation" 194 or through
"the right to petition for the issuance, amendment, or repeal of a
rule." '
It has been suggested that these exceptions, and those for
"interpretative rules, general statements of policy, or rules of agency
organization, procedure or practice" 196 be eliminated or modified.' 9
Several commentators have suggested that agencies employ their rulemaking authority much more broadly than they now do, "98 and several
public interest groups have attempted to initiate such rulemaking with
varying degrees of success.' 99 Moss v. CAB,2 ° despite the narrowness
193 Id.

194 Id.§ 553 (c).

195Id. § 553(e). For analysis and criticism of these exceptions, see Bonfield,
Public Participation in Federal Rulemaking Relating to Public Property, Loans,
Grants,Benefits, or Contracts, 118 U. PA. L. Rxv. 540 (1970).
196 5 U.S.C. § 553 (b) (A) (1970).
197 See, e.g., Bonfield, Some Tentative Thoughts on Public Participation in the
Making of Interpretative Rules and General Statements of Policy Under the A.P.A.,
23 AD. L. Rav. 101 (1971) ; Bonfield, supra note 18.
198 See, e.g., Clagett, Informal Action-Adjudication-- Rulemaking: Some Recent
Developments in Federal Administrative Law, 1971 Dux L.J. 51; Robinson, supra
note 191; Shapiro, The Choice of Rulemaking or Adjudication in the Development of
Agency Policy, 78 HARV. L. Rav. 921 (1965). For an example of the use of rulemaking to expedite the hearing process, see note 917 infra & accompanying text.
199 On June 8, 1971, the Project for Corporate Responsibility and the Natural
Resources Defense Council filed a petition before the Securities and Exchange Commission for rulemaking proceedings "in order to require more adequate disclosures
of present and potential environmental effects of registrants' activities" in keeping
with the mandate of the NEPA, and to "modify its forms for registration of securities
under the Securities Act of 1933 and its current and periodic report forms to require
more adequate disclosures by registrants with respect to their compliance with the
requirements and policies of the federal Equal Employment Opportunity Act and
Executive Order 11246 relating to discriminatory hiring practices on the part of
federal contractors." Petition of Project for Corporate Responsibility and Natural
Resources Defense Council 1, June 7, 1971, copy on file in Biddle Law Library,
Univ. of Pa. Law School. Concerning the environmental issue, Chairman Casey of
the SEC subsequently responded:
To go further to the extent suggested in the petition . . . raises difficult
questions concerning the purpose and function of the Securities and Exchange
Commission. Traditionally, we have viewed our function in the disclosure
area . . . to be that of requiring inclusion of information which will enable
a prudent investor to make an intelligent judgment as to the merits of a
security considered in economic terms .
• . . We recognize that Section 102 of the [NEPA] may well have
broadened our disclosure obligations but we are still seeking to determine the
extent to which this section calls for a major reorientation of the mandate
given us by Congress in 1933 and 1934.
Letter from Chairman Casey to Representative John Dingell, Aug. 6, 1971, copy on
file in Biddle Law Library, Univ. of Pa. Law School. As of Sept. 27, 1971, the
Commission had made no official reply to petitioners. Interview with Roger S. Foster
of the Center for Law and Social Policy, in Washington, D.C., Sept. 27, 1971. See
Schwartz, The Public Interest Proxy Contest: Reflections on Campaign GM, 69
MIcH. L. Rav. 419 (1971).
Another attempt-before the FCC-to initiate rulemaking
met with more success. See note 338 infra.
200 430 F.2d 891 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
See notes 495-509 infra & accompanying text.
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of its technical holding, indicates a growing apprehensiveness on the
part of courts that the intricacies of summary rulemaking procedures
may be used to foreclose comment or protest by members of the public.
Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Committee v. ARC 201 reveals a kindred

willingness to scrutinize rules intended to implement national policy as
articulated by the NEPA. In general, however, agency utilization of
and public participation in, rulemaking have been limited.20 2 The scope
of participation is narrower than in adjudicative proceedings, particularly where notice and a hearing are not mandatory, and the standard
of judicial review of rulemaking under section 4 of the APA appears
even less probing than that of review of adjudicative proceedings.20 3
While, under the APA, any person may "petition for the issuance,
amendment, or repeal of a rule," 204 the choice between rulemaking and
adjudication is, of course, for the agency, and not those affected by the
decisions, to make.20 8 In some instances, however, a hearing is required
where initiated by a complaining party, and this normally affects the
complainant's intervention rights. 2 6 Greater use of rulemaking by
agencies might diminish the procedural rights and scope of judicial review now available to public interest groups in the adjudicative context.
On the other hand, public interest groups are usually better prepared to
address the broad questions of policy upon which rulemaking proceedings often focus than to marshal the expertise and factual data upon
which adjudicative proceedings tend to focus. 20 7 Statements of opinion

by public interest groups, even if unsupported by expert testimony and
factual data, are more appropriate to rulemaking because of its more
"legislative" format. "The failure of many agencies to rely upon informal rulemaking proceedings rather than trial-type hearings to decide
general policies is itself a significant cause for public intervention in
trial-type proceedings." 208 The danger that regulated interests will
overwhelm both the agency and public participants with finely focused
expertise that is both difficult to counter and obscurative of broader
policy considerations, is perhaps diminished when decisions involving
broader questions of policy are made in the rulemaking context.2 0

a

The

201 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).

202 Cf. note 18 supra & accompanying text.
203 See Robinson, supra note 191, at 488 n.15.
204 5 U.S.C. § 553(e) (1970).
205
See NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759 (1969); SEC v. Chenery
Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947) ; Bernstein, The NLRB's Adjudication-Rulemaking
Dilemma Under the Administrative Procedure Act, 79 YALE L.J. 571 (1970).
206 See Shapiro, supra note 37, at 726-29.
207 SOUP's lack of success in the Firestone case may be an example. See notes
658-81 infra & accompanying text.
208 Gellhorn, supra note 18, at 378.
209 In Udall v. FPC, 387 U.S. 428, 436 (1967), for example, the decision below,
which focused on whether the purposes of a proposed hydroelectric power project
would be better served by private or federal development, was reversed for failure
to consider the threshold question whether any project should be constructed.

738

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vo1.120:702

regulated industries, furthermore, have the resources to endure an extended adjudicative proceeding.
Beyond these areas of agency jurisdiction subject to the notice
and public participation provisions of either rulemaking or formal adjudication, lies the vast realm of informal agency action which has long
been a sacred preserve virtually unviolated by public scrutiny or judicial
intervention.21 ° The reluctance of courts to entertain appeals from
agency actions for which there is no hearing record or other articulation
of policy may in many instances indicate a sound deference to the
agency's control over its own resources and priorities, but it has become
strikingly clear that greater disclosure of and public participation in
informal agency decisionmaking is necessary to secure confidence in
the administrative process.211 While the need for informal adjudication
and policymaking is uncontested, openness and the structuring of discretion can operate to minimize the dangers of covert arbitrariness,
bias, and inconsistency. 12 The due process clause of the Constitution
demands some minima of procedure and articulated standards of decision to ensure fairness in informal adjudications.21 3 Beyond this
"ultimate source" of power to compel formalization of procedure and
greater articulation of policy, the governing statutes often can be read
to allow review of informal agency action and to compel the institution
of more formal proceedings.214 Aided by the presumption of reviewability,2 1 courts have expanded the outer periphery of effective judicial
review by closely examining administrative inaction or delay 216 and
by assuming a pragmatic approach to the major exception
to review2 17
ability, the committed-to-agency-discretion doctrine.
210 See Clagett, spra note 198, at 55.
211 See Gardner, The Procedures By Which Informal Action Is Taken, reprinted
in Hearingson S. 1177 & H.R. 10835 Before the Subcomin. on Executive Reorganization & Government Research of the Senate Comm. on Government Operations, 92d
Cong., 1st Sess. 233 (1971).
212 See K. DAvis, DIScRETIoNARY JUSTICE 97-120 (1969).
213 See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Holmes v. New York City
Housing Authority, 398 F.2d 262 (2d Cir. 1968) ; Hornsby v. Allen, 326 F.2d 605. (5th
Cir. 1964).
214See Clagett, supra note 198, at 66; Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v.
Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584 (D.C. Cir. 1971). But cf. Nor-Am Agricultural Products,
Inc. v. Hardin, 435 F.2d 1151 (7th Cir. 1970).
215 See Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 139-41 (1967).
216See Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093 (D.C. Cir.
1970) ; Goldman, Administrative Delay and Judicial Relief, 66 MICH. L. Rav. 1423

(1968).

217See 5 U.S.C. § 701 (a) (1970).
One influential article has suggested that
reviewability of discretionary agency action be determined by analyzing in each case
the interest of the agency in informal proceedings, the burden on the courts of increased review, and the interests of the affected individuals. Saferstein, supra note
33 at 371. See Hahn v. Gottlieb, 430 F.2d 1243 (1st Cir. 1970) ; Medical Comm.
for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659, 666-67 (D.C. Cir. 1970). By examining
the scope of an agency's authority and the congressional scheme, reviewing courts
may determine the extent of agency discretion, the expertise necessary to decision,
the managerial nature of the agency, the usefulness of informal proceedings, the
effectiveness of review, and the desirability of expeditious operation of the agency.
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In Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Ic. v. Volpe,21s the
Supreme Court has recently attempted to define the scope of review of
informal agency actions. The Court found that section 10(e) of the
APA 21 9 demands thorough, searching review to determine whether
an agency has exceeded the scope of its authority, whether there has
been an abuse of discretion, and whether procedural requirements have
been observed by the agency. 220 Though the Court refused to impose
a requirement that formal findings and statements of reasons accompany
informal decisions, 22' reviewing courts were instructed to examine
critically "the full administrative record," treating restrospective findings with caution, and were authorized, where there are no formal
findings and where additional explanation is necessary to make judicial
review effective, to "require the administrative officials who participated
in the decision to give testimony explaining their action." 222 While
the Court refused to require contemporaneous findings for informal
to lend
agency decisions, Overton Park would nevertheless appear
223
impetus to increased formalization of informal processes.
Adjudicative allocation proceedings figure prominently in the developments within the agencies considered below. In general, they
involve the grant of some privilege-a license to broadcast, to build a
hydroelectric project, a pipeline, or nuclear power plant, or to provide
air transportation for a given locality-that may be enormously profitable to the recipient but potentially harmful not only to his competitors
but also to members of the public residing in the area affected by the
license. just as rulemaking sets standards or policies for the future,
many of these allocation proceedings will affect a multitude of interests
for an extended period of time. The immediate impact of the allocation
of the resource or privilege heightens the desire of affected interests to
participate. On the other hand, intervenors may have less of a role to
fulfill in trial-type proceedings with an "individualized impact" on the
regulated interest.224
See Saferstein, supra note 33, at 377-95. After considering these factors, courts
should also inquire into the possibilities of limited review of separable issues. See id.
395-96. See also Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness: A Synthesis, 78 YALE L.J.

965 (1969) ; Davis, Administrative Arbitrarinessis Not Always Reviewable, 51 MiNN.
L. REv. 643 (1967).

See The Supreme Court, 1970 Term, 85
218 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
38, 315-25 (1971).
219 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1970).

HARv.

L. REv.

220 401 U.S. at 415-17. To find an abuse of discretion, reviewing courts "must
consider whether the decision was based on a consideration of the relevant factors
and whether there has been a clear error of judgment." Id. at 416.
22 1
1d. at 417.
222 Id. at 420. The holding was thus an explicit limitation on United States V.
Morgan, 313 U.S. 409 (1941), which prohibited courts from inquiring into the mental
processes of administrative decisionmakers. Id.

223

See Clagett, supra note 198, at 62-63; The Supreme Court, 1970 Term, supra

note 218, at 321-22.
224 Cf. Gelihorn, supra note 18, at 379-80.
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Such proceedings already attract a number of parties, and hence
procedures have been developed which attempt to accommodate them.
The CAB in particular has developed relatively refined rules regarding
intervention which attempt to adjust the degree of permitted participation to the intensity of the applicant's interest and the applicant's
ability to contribute information relevant to specific issues 225 or the
overall decision to be made. These rules are analyzed extensively below,
and an attempt is made to establish more precisely standards that
should guide the Board's discretion in granting procedural privileges to
those whose interest does not seem sufficient to entitle them to intervention with all the rights of original parties. 226 This flexible accommodation is desirable, especially since party status is not normally
necessary to the right to appeal an adverse decision. 22 7 The proposed
addition to the CAB's rule on limited intervention is not aimed at
limiting the Board's discretion, but rather at encouraging the Board to
articulate its reasoning in particular cases more fully. Shapiro's proposed changes to rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, in
contrast, are aimed at broadening a court's authority to grant perThough most agencies already have such
missive intervention.
authority, they have not articulated standards as precise as those
suggested by Shapiro and those adopted by the CAB.
If an applicant for intervention possesses special expertise or information, including opinion and general legal theories, not otherwise
available to the decisionmaker, he should be allowed whatever procedural privileges he needs, to present that information effectively. The
possible range of privileges includes the submission of written statements and factual exhibits,22 oral presentations before the hearing
examiner or the full commission, 229 submission of briefs, 230 the privilege
to comment on the record and the hearing examiner's findings,2 3' the
privilege to present witnesses and to cross-examine, 23 2 and the use of
Often, the grant of privileges much
subpoena and discovery powers.less extensive than those granted full parties would be sufficient to allow
an applicant to present its information effectively. Rules which limit
certain privileges to full parties seem undesirable, to the extent that the
privilege in question might serve the purposes of limited intervention
and to the extent it might induce applicants to insist on full party status.
See notes 658-63 infra & accompanying text.
See notes 510-32, 567-80 infra & accompanying text.
227 Cf. Shapiro, supra note 37, at 767. But cf. notes 682-707, 746-55 infra &
accompanying text.
228 See note 530 infra & accompanying text.
229 See note 527 injra & accompanying text.
230 See note 530 infra & accompanying text.
231 See note 529 infra & accompanying text.
232 See note 662 infra & accompanying text.
233 See notes 616-22, 661 infra & accompanying text.
225
226
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A case like Palisades Citizens Association v. CAB 234 demonstrates
the wise use of agency discretion in granting privileges sufficient to
convey the proffered information.
Quite apart from a petitioning intervenor's ability to present information, another general consideration is the effect a decision may
have on his interest. This consideration may be more binding on courts
than agencies, 23' but Welfare Rights seemed to base the fundamental
right to participate, for purposes of making effective the right of review,
on the fact that the welfare recipients' interest fell within Data
Processing's "zone of interests." Given the potential expansiveness of
that zone, some agencies may well be forced to allow intervention where
previously they had denied it on the ground that the interest asserted
was too remote. -3 6
Must any applicant who alleges an interest within that zone be
allowed to participate, even if it appears that he could adduce no information relevant to the inquiry and that there may be more suitable
representatives of the applicant's interest? 237 The question is far from
academic: in the highly technical context of AEC proceedings, for
example, it has been advocated that intervenors adopt tactics of delay
and outright confrontation rather than undertake the costly burden of
rebutting the evidence introduced in support of license applications. 3 8
If one subscribes to the most pessimistic view of the current state of
affairs within the agencies generally,23 9 perhaps this latter sort of participation-highly political and often disruptive-serves the arguably
valid function of dramatizing administrative failings in order to initiate
changes in agency policy, staff, and attitude.240 There is the possibility,
however, that intervention by a citizens' group might be abused. A
conspiracy by members of a regulated industry to employ the privilege
of intervention as part of a scheme to drive a competitor out of business
234
235

420 F.2d 188 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
See note 114 supra.

See notes 533-66 infra & accompanying text.

236 Reasonable geographic proximity, for example, remains a general requirement
in certain proceedings before the AEC, CAB, and FCC. The fact that petitioner
resided outside the area arguably affected by a proposed site has been a ground
articulated by the AEC in denying a petition to intervene. See notes 869-71 infra
& accompanying text. Similarly, "off-line" cities or cities alleging non-economic
interests do not have a clear right to intervene under present CAB policy, see notes
520-23 infra & accompanying text, and petitioners challenging broadcast license
renewals must reside within the service area. See notes 389-95 infra & accompanying
text.
237 The FCC's treatment of attempts to intervene by an individual, Anthony
Martin-Trigona, illustrates the problems that might confront an individual or a
little-known, poorly-financed group. See notes 389-400 infra & accompanying text.
Gellhorn, supra note 18, at 28-29,
238 See note 877 infra & accompanying text.
minimizes the significance of this point.
239
See notes 17-31 supra & accompanying text.
240 The agency itself might encourage such participation in certain instances
where it would prefer not to advocate a new policy position for fear of more active
initial industry opposition. "Affirmative disclosure," originally proposed by an
intervenor, is now proposed as a remedy by the FTC itself. See note 669 infra &
accompanying text.
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may violate the antitrust laws. 24 ' In the recent case of CaliforniaMotor
Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited,242 the Supreme Court found that,
while "it would be destructive of rights of association and of petition
to hold that groups with common interests may not, without violating
the antitrust laws, use the channels and procedures of . . . federal
agencies and courts to advocate their causes and points of view," 243
"[a] combination of entrepreneurs to harass and deter their competitors
from having 'free and unlimited access' to the agencies and courts [and]
to defeat that right by massive, concerted, and purposeful activities of
the group" "' violates the Sherman Act. Concerted efforts to influence
legislation and law enforcement 245 or perhaps "agency action on broad
policy issues of a quasi-political nature" 246 may be given wide latitude
as protected political expression, but in an adjudicatory forum "a pattern of baseless, repetitive claims may emerge which leads the factfinder
to conclude that the administrative and judicial processes have been
abused." 247 NAACP v. Button.2 48 would appear to protect the
right to advocate vigorously a course of corporate litigation strategy,
except where "substantial regulatory interest, in the form of substantive
evils flowing from [the cooperative] activities" 249 can be shown. Any
special interest group that systematically engages in a program of
opposing a regulated industry by repeatedly and unmeritoriously invoking the legal machinery of the government's adjudicative processes, so
as to delay or impede substantially the easy access to those procedures,
may be enjoined or perhaps assessed for consequential damage.
The adoption of a dilatory or obstructionist strategy may not be
warranted; 250 the more constructive approach would seem to be to seek
greater flexibility in the procedural rules governing intervention and
to provide the public interest intervenor with the financial means to
make an effective case, rather than simply to announce a presence and
to present a general legal argument. 25 ' A number of public interest
241 See, e.g., Slick Airways, Inc. v. American Airlines, Inc., 107 F. Supp. 199
(D.NJ.), appeal disnissed sub now. American Airlines. Inc. v. Forman, 204 F.2d
230 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 806 (1953) ; United States v. Association of Am.
R. Rs., 4 F.R.D. 510 (D. Neb. 1945).
242 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
24

31d. at 510-11.

24 4

Id.at 515.
See UMW v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); Eastern R.R. Presidents
Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
246 Costilo, Antitrust's Newest Quagmire: The Noerr-Pennington Defense, 66
Micii. L. Rsv. 333, 356 (1967).
See Note, The Brakes Fail on the Noerr Doctrine, 57
247 404 U.S. at 513.
CALIF. L. Rxv. 519 (1969).
245

248 371

U.S. 415 (1963).

Id. at 444. Cf. Note, supra note 247, at 536-39.
250 Courts may be inclined in the future to impose more responsibility on the
agencies to explore certain issues. Cf. Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v.
FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965); Committee for Nuclear Responsibility, Inc. v.
Seaborg, No. 71-1732 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 5, 1971).
251 See notes 285-316 infra & accompanying text.
249
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organizations have sponsored a set of model intervention rules which,
although admirable in their emphasis on broader public participation,
fail to distinguish various types of agency proceedings and therefore
provide a uniform standard for all.252
Agencies should, first of all, attempt to improve the mechanisms
whereby notice of contemplated agency activity is given to persons
potentially affected. 53 At present, notice is not calculated to reach all
affected members of the public, is often couched in general terms which
mean little to the inexpert,254 and is not given in time to allow outsiders
to prepare a well-documented case in opposition to the contemplated
action.25 5 A related problem is the timeliness of an application for
intervention. In the past, courts have upheld denials of intervention
for want of a timely application, in the interest of preventing delay. "56
The agencies generally have discretion to grant extensions,25 which in
some instances appears to have been exercised somewhat inconsistently25 . and in others arbitrarily to deny an otherwise meritorious
application. 9 The frequently inadequate notice and the financial constraints under which public interest intervenors operate should be given
much more consideration by agencies and courts in determining what
constitutes good cause shown for failure to meet deadlines.
The denial of intervention or of any procedural privilege the intervenor asserts is necessary for a proper presentation of its case should
be immediately appealable to an intermediate board of appeal (if the
agency has established one 260), to the full commission, and to a court.
261
Stays of proceedings need not be granted in every such appeal.
Denials of intervention potentially affect the reliability of the determination of the issues, 2 s and this consideration should outweigh the
concern for preventing delay occasioned by such appeals.
The value of cross-examination has been questioned in some contexts, particularly where the testimony is of a highly technical nature
which would seem to lend itself equally well to presentation through
252

See note 18 supra.

253

Gellhorn, smpra note 18, at 398-403.

254

See notes 420-21, 685 infra & accompanying text.

Cf. notes 876-92 infra & accompanying text.
notes 412-16, 864-65 infra & accompanying text.
257 See, e.g., note 416 infra (FCC); 18 C.F.R. § 1.8(d) (1972) (FPC).
(intervention
258 Compare Transwestern Pipeline Co., 35 F.P.C. 334 (1966)
denied, but applicant Dep't of Health, Education & Welfare allowed to file brief
amicus curiae), with Columbia Gulf Transmission Co., 35 F.P.C. 642 (1966) (applicant HEW allowed intervention in factually indistinguishable case).
259 See note 415 infra & accompanying text.
260 See generally Gellhorn & Larsen, Interlocutory Appeal Procedures i Administrative Hearings, 70 MicH. L. REv. 109 (1971).
261 Cf. Shapiro, supra note 37, at 748-51, 762-63.
2 62
See note 107 supra & accompanying text.
255

256 See
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written statements and exhibits.2 6 On the other hand, cross-examination may be necessary to prevent broader issues from being obscured
by a narrow focus on technical matters, to prevent factual inconsistencies
from being buried in the record, and to bring out pro-industry orienta26
tion of expert witnesses or staff witnesses.
Discovery of information in the possession of regulated interests
or in the possession of the agency itself should be more widely available
to the public interest intervenor. Possible prejudice to respondents in
enforcement proceedings, protection of confidential information such as
trade secrets or financial data not available to the investing public, and
the possibility of harassing or unduly burdening the party subject to
the order must, of course, be taken into account to limit the scope of
discovery or to form protective orders. "Even though a public intervener is frequently allowed to participate because of its particular information or expertise, discovery may be necessary in order for it to
protect its position or complete its preparation." 265 So long as the
intervenor has raised and carefully framed issues relevant to the proceedings, liberal discovery privileges would facilitate the effective factual
presentation that has too often been lacking in intervenors' appearances
before agencies. 66
The agency must, of course, have discretion to limit the issues considered in any given proceeding. Certain issues may properly be foreclosed as being outside the agency's jurisdiction, but there is a tendency
on the part of Congress and the courts to widen agency jurisdiction."'
In areas within an agency's jurisdiction, the grant of intervention to
address certain issues but not other closely related issues might be difficult to justify.2 6 Most of the cases, however, center either upon
whether the issue sought to be raised falls within the agency's jurisdiction or upon whether an issue clearly relevant to the proceeding was
explored fully enough. The degree of discretion an agency has to limit
intervention to raise issues within its jurisdiction and arguably relevant
to the proceeding awaits judicial clarification.2 69
A further problem which awaits explication is the extent to which
an agency may exclude one applicant for intervention in favor of another which is more "representative" or appears better able to present
information and expertise. In the Palisadescase,2 7° for example, the
263 See text following note 559 infra; Spritzer, Uses of the Summary Power to
Suspend Rates: An Examination of Federal Regulatory Agency Practices, 120 U. PA.
L. Rav. 39, 95 (1971). See also Prettyman, How to Try a Dispute Under Adjudication by an Administrative Agency, 45 VA. L. REv. 179, 190 (1959).
264 Cf. note 886 infra & accompanying text.
265 Gellhorn, supra note 18, at 385.
266 See notes 616-22 infra & accompanying text.
267 See notes 135-55 supra & accompanying text; cf. note 199 supra.
268 See note 662 infra & accompanying text.
269 Cf. Comment, supra note 94, at 576-78.
270 See note 234 supra.
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court seems to have assumed that another intervenor, the Department
of Transportation, adequately represented the interests of the citizens'
group so as to justify the denial of procedural privileges to that group.
Would a similar assumption have been justified if a militant black
power organization had sought to intervene independent of the National
Welfare Rights Organization in Welfare Rights, -' or an organization
like the Ku Klux Klan had sought intervention independent of the
church and the NAACP in United Church of Christ? 272 Finally, if
agencies like the Consumer Protection Agency 273 are established, to
what extent will their participation preclude participation by public
interest organizations ?
Professor Ernest Gellhorn, to some extent reflecting Shapiro's
suggested approach to permissive intervention in court actions," 4 has
recommended that agencies exercise the power to select the most appropriate intervenor by examining (1) the nature of the contested issues;
(2) the intervenor's interest in the outcome; (3) the adequacy of representation of the intervenor's interest by existing parties; (4) the
ability of the intervenor to represent its interest vigorously; and (5)
the cost and delay occasioned by the intervention." 5 Such criteria could
also be employed to apportion procedural privileges among intervenors.176 The criterion requiring some demonstrable interest be advanced "serves to identify not only the contribution which the intervener can make to the administrative hearing, but also the right of those
who will be significantly affected by an agency's decision (even though
the immediate, direct impact may not be significant or distinct) to be
afforded a reasonable opportunity to be heard." 277 This criterion, of
course, finds its antecedents in the private-attorney-general concept,
which looked to a party's interest as a barometer of the intensity and
Whether an interest
reliability of the arguments he would forward."
is adequately represented by an agency depends in part upon the nature
of the proceeding 279and upon the degree to which the agency is thought
to be influenced by the regulated industry. 8s Whether an intervenor
is a "responsible and representative [group] eligible to intervene" 281
may turn on whether it has "by [its] activities and conduct . .

.

ex-

271See notes 94-113 supra & accompanying text; Comment, supra note 94, at
578-80.
272
273

274

See notes 363-76 infra & accompanying text.
See notes 306-21 infra & accompanying text.

See notes 114-20 supra & accompanying text.

275 Gellhorn, supra note 18, at 376-83.
276 Id. 387. Cf. notes 524-32 infra & accompanying text.
277 Gellhorn, supra note 18, at 380.
278 See note 53 stpra & accompanying text.
279 Reasons for limiting public participation in adjudicative proceedings are dis-

below in the context of the FTC.
cussed
280

See note 19 supra & accompanying text.
281 Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d

994, 1005 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
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hibited a special interest" 282 in the contested issues and has the cohesive
organization and resources to present its views effectively. If, however,
this latter consideration is consistently decisive of the choice of an
intervenor, there is the danger that the favored group will establish its
hegemony as the spokesman for a point of view.283 Professor Gellhorn
himself notes that his final criterion, the cost and delay attributable to
intervention, "cannot be legitimately charged as a drawback of public
interest group participation, [if] a prior judgment has been made that
consideration of [the issues raised by an intervenor] is essential to
successful performance of the agency's mandate." 284
E. Proposals to FacilitatePublic Participation
If intervention by public interest groups is to mean anything more
than announcing a presence, presenting general legal arguments without supporting factual data or expertise, and on occasion dramatizing
an agency's inadequate consideration of certain issues, the problem of
funding must be surmounted. "Assuring the legal rights of public
interest representatives to participate in regulatory proceedings is a
vital first step. It is, however, only a first step. Without further
affirmative action to assure that public representatives actually appear,
the legal right to participate will largely be a symbolic-perhaps merely
a cosmetic-advance." 28" The cost of participation-attorneys' fees,
fees for expert witnesses, expenses of marshalling and presenting factual
data, and transcript costs and similar charges-may effectively inhibit
participation by any but the regulated interests. 2 6 The present controversy is whether public interest participation should be financed with
public funds and, if so, what form such financing should take. Resistance to public financing of such participation is evidenced by the controversy over tax exemptions for public interest law firms 287 and the

opposition of groups such as the United States Chamber of Commerce
to the proposed Consumer Protection Agency (CPA).288
Public financing of public interest participation might take many
forms. It has been suggested that the agencies themselves should bear
most of the transcript, multiple copy, and other incidental costs asso282 Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608, 616 (2d Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966).
283 At the Administrative Conference hearing on Recommendation 28, see note
18 supra, Malcolm S. Mason noted the danger that intervention might be limited
"to a single representative of a particular interest, and thus will appear to give
credentials to that group as 'the' representative of . . . [that] citizen interest however
characterized."
284 Gellhorn, supra note 18, at 383.
285 Lazarus & Onek, supra note 19, at 1096.
286 See notes 447-73 (FCC), 708-21 (FTC), 785-91 (FPC) infra & accompanying
text.
287 See Garrett, Federal Tax Limitations on Political Activities of Public Interest
and Educational Organizations, 59 GEo. L.J. 561 (1971); Halpern & Cunningham,
supra note 13, at 1109.
288 See Hearings,supra note 18, at 173.
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ciated with those formal proceedings in which the public may participate 289 and that "in-house" expertise of federal agencies or neutral
experts appointed by the agency deciding the issue should be made
available to public participants.2 90 Certainly, the efforts of an active
investigative staff could alleviate the burden on, and perhaps the need
for, public representatives. 29 '
Numerous solutions have been offered to what is perhaps the most
perplexing problem-financing attorney and expert witness fees. One
approach would create new money-damage remedies, or class actions
permitting the consolidation of small claims, to encourage private practitioners to take cases on a contingent fee basis.292 Assessing the regulated interests for fee awards or the cost of public representation could
also provide an incentive, 2 3 but the dangers of imposing new liabilities
of indeterminate extent on those interests, the inefficiency of the contingent fee system in areas of tort litigation, and the emphasis on litigation, as opposed to participation in agency proceedings, such an
arrangement might encourage, are obvious shortcomings. A foundation for fee shifting in the absence of statutory authority may have been
laid by the Supreme Court's decision in Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite
Co., 29 4 which awarded attorney's fees as well as costs to the plaintiffs

who successfully brought a stockholders' derivative action for the dissemination of misleading proxy statements. 295 Though the action
created no monetary fund, the Court found that the suit "conferred a
substantial benefit on the members of an ascertainable class, and . . .
an award . . . will operate to spread the costs proportionately among

them." 296 Reimbursement of fees for private law enforcement could
conceivably be extended to other areas of social concern, such as enforcement of pollution and consumer protection laws."'T The vague
contours of Mills' benefit rationale, the possibility of numerous, abusive
nuisance suits for relatively minor violations of the law,29. and the
problem of deciding which litigants or participants in an administrative
proceeding have in fact conferred a benefit to a segment of the public,
may inhibit widespread adoption of the fee-shifting principle. Indeed,
289 See, e.g., Gellhorn, supra note 18, at 389-93.

Id. 393-94.
notes 793-99 infra & accompanying text.
292 See generally Dole, Consumer Class Actions Under Recent Consumer Credit
Legislation, 44 N.Y.U.L. REV. 80 (1969).
2993 Lazarus & Onek, stpra note 19, at 1100-02; cf. notes 456-70 infra & accompanying text.
294 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
295 Id. at 390-93. See also Kahan v. Rosenstiel, 424 F.2d 161 (3d Cir. 1970).
296 396 U.S. at 393-94.
297 See Comment, The Allocation of Attorney's Fees After Mills v. Electric AutoLite Co., 38 U. CHI. L. REv. 316, 329-30 (1971).
29
8 See id. 334.
290

291 See
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the Administrative Conference
has refused to endorse reimbursement
299
of incurred legal expenses.

The subsidy approach would permit the agency, in its discretion,
to reimburse public interest participants for legal and witness fees,300
or, in the alternative, to establish within the agency a special office to
provide legal assistance to public interest participants.3"' This approach
assumes, of course, that agencies presently possess statutory authority
to incur such expenses. 0 2 The obvious objections to this suggested
approach are that the agency itself passes on the utility of intervention
and, under the second alternative, has a great deal of control over how
the case will be presented, a factor which would undoubtedly impair a
participant's critical perspective.
A third approach would institutionalize public advocacy, and is
exemplified by the proposed Public Counsel Corporation.0 3 The bill
would have enabled the corporation to
(1) represent, either directly or by contract with appropriate individuals or private organizations, the interests
of the unrepresented public and, where appropriate, separate
interests of distinct groups within the unrepresented public,
in proceedings before regulatory agencies . . . provided that

in carrying out its contracting authority under this section,
the corporation shall give preference to nonprofit organizations with experience in representing the public interest before
Federal agencies;
(2) initiate rulemaking proceedings in any regulatory
agency when otherwise authorized . . . ;
(3) collect and disseminate to all interested organizations and to the general public information concerning rulemaking . . ;
(4) represent, upon request, individuals or private
organizations who seek judicial review of Federal administive actions ....

304

299 Administrative Conference of the United States, Recommendation 28, adopted
Dec. 7, 1971; see note 18 supra.
300 See Lazarus & Onek, supra note 19, at 1009-10; cf. note 713 infra & accompanying text.
301 See note 452 infra & accompanying text.
302 See Lazarus & Onek, supra note 19, at 1100.
303 The Public Counsel Corporation was first proposed in 1970 but was never
reported out of committee. See Hearings on. S. 3434 & S. 2544 Before the Subcomm.
on Administrative Practice & Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). The proposal was recently reintroduced. See Hearings on
S. 1423 Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Practice & Procedure of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). For an earlier recognition of
the possibilities of this approach to increasing administrative accountability, see Cahn
& Cahn, supra note 13.
304 S. 3434, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. § 588(a) (1970)
(referred to the Committee on
the Judiciary, Feb. 10, 1970).
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The bill would thus have authorized the establishment of an agency
staff which could develop its own expertise, policy, and continuity, while
providing, through independent contracts with public interest law
firms appearing before agencies and reviewing courts, a measure of
insulation from the pressures to conform to the norms of its own
bureaucracy. Most important, the corporation would have been enabled
to represent a wide variety of interests."'
In contrast, the Consumer Protection Act, one verson of which
was passed by the House in 1971 30. and another of which is presently
under consideration by the Senate,3" 7 is much less ambitious. It is
directed primarily toward the problems of the consumer and does not
in terms embrace the wide spectrum of problems affecting the environment or the poor and minority groups. The bills authorize the employment of expert witnesses 308 and the appointment of advisory committees, 30 9 but do not authorize contracts with public interest law firms to
provide independent representation. Though they do not purport to
make the CPA the exclusive representative of consumers' interests,
neither do they contemplate the direct financing of public interest law
firms and kindred organizations, as did the Public Counsel Corporation
proposal. The bills provide for the publication and distribution of information of general interest to consumers, 31 0 but the general provisions
do not ensure any improvement in informing the public of the pendency
of specific agency proceedings likely to affect their interests. 1 1
At the heart of both bills are the provisions for representation before agencies and courts. In the House bill the agency has authority
to participate in, but not to initiate, any rulemaking proceeding other
than one "involving solely the internal operations of the Federal
agency," 311 and may intervene in, but may not initiate, adjudicatory
proceedings "other than an adjudication seeking primarily to impose a
fine, penalty, or forfeiture." 313 This latter prohibition, if read broadly,
305 Lazarus & Onek, supra note 19, at 1097, suggest that any scheme should be
judged in terms of the adequacy of financing, its independence from bureaucratic and
industry controls, its accountability to the public, and its expertise.
306 117 Cong. Rec. H9583 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1971); see N.Y. Times, Oct. 15,
1971, at 1, col. 1.
[hereinafter cited as S. 1177]. See
307 S. 1177, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971)
Hearingson S. 1177 & H.R. 10,835 Before the Subcomm. on Executive Reorganization

& Gov't Research of the Senate Comm. on Gov't Operations, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1971).
308H.R. 10,835, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. §202(b)(2) (1971) [hereinafter cited as
H.R. 10,835]; S. 1177 §206(a)(2).
09

H.R. 10,835 §202(b) (3) ; S. 1177 §206(a) (3).
310H.R 10,835 §206; S. 1177 §205.
311 See notes 253-55 supra & accompanying text.
3

10,835 §204(a) (1).
10,835 § 204(a) (2). Section 204(e) provides that the CPA may request
a federal agency to initiate such proceedings, but there is no obligation on the agency
other than to notify the CPA of its reasons for declining to initiate such action;
section 204(d) empowers the CPA to initiate or intervene in judicial review. Id.
§§204(e), (d). The Senate bill, S. 1177 §203(a), does not provide for review of
failures of the agency to act.
312 H.R.
313 H.R.
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might foreclose participation in a variety of proceedings affecting consumers' interests: for example, a proceeding resulting in a cease-anddesist order or in a civil penalty. The Senate bill has no analogous
section though the limitation appears to be implied.3 1 The Moorhead
amendment 315 to the House bill would have permitted the CPA to
participate in such proceedings in the role of consumer advocate, addressing broad issues of policy and the nature of an appropriate civil
remedy, but not in the role of a second prosecutor litigating the guilt
of a respondent or the nature of a criminal sanction.3 16 The amendment
would also have added the following section to the bill:
The Agency, as a matter of right, may undertake reviews and
investigations, and require information from Federal agencies
. . . for the purpose of submitting information, findings, or
recommendations to the Congress regarding any matter affecting the interests of consumers concerning which a Federal
agency has the authority but fails to initiate a rulemaking or
31.7
adjudicatory proceeding ....
The CPA would thus have been permitted to duplicate the factfinding
functions of rulemaking or adjudicatory proceedings affecting consumer
interests which an agency had declined to initiate; the CPA would
arguably have the subpoena power which the agency had refused to use
in declining to initiate.31 The ultimate effect would have been either
to force the agency to initiate proceedings or to have the agency's informal procedures subjected to intense scrutiny.
During the course of the House debate, one commentator felt the
amendment posed a "risk of grave interference with the functioning and
responsibility of Federal agencies." 319 The bewildering variety of informal agency action makes it impossible to define with any particularity what the nature and scope of the CPA's power would have been
under the amendment. That power might permit inquiry into virtually
every exercise of agency discretion in its informal operations. The
defeat of the amendment, however, does not necessarily imply that there
should not be a more narrowly defined power on the part of the CPA
314 See Hearings,mipra note 307, at 156 (staff comparison of the House & Senate
bills), 11 (statement of Representative Holifield).
315 Amendment offered by Representative Moorhead, 117 CoNG. REc. H9503 (daily
ed. Oct. 13, 1971), rejected by the House, 117 CONG. REc. H9571-72 (daily ed. Oct.
14, 1971).

316 117

CONG.

Rac. H9503 (daily ed. Oct. 13, 1971).

One commentator thought

the original language conveyed the same intent. Letter from Roger C. Cramton,
Chairman of the Administrative Conference of the United States, to Representative
Holifield, in 117 CONG. REc. H9484-85 (daily ed. Oct. 13, 1971).
317 117 CoNG,. REc. H9503 (daily ed. Oct. 13, 1971).
318 The Senate bill, S. 1177 § 205(d), provides for greater subpoena power. See
Hearings,supra note 307, at 10 (statement of Representative Holifield).
319 Cramton, supra note 316, at H9485. See Kilpatrick, Coming Up: Super
Consumer Agency, Evening Bulletin (Philadelphia), Mar. 25, 1972, at 10, col 2;
cf. CONSUmER REPORTS, Feb. 1971, at 80.
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to investigate, and perhaps initiate review of, certain classes of informal
agency action. That power might, for example, extend to FTC consent orders or approvals of mergers potentially affecting consumers, or
to agency prosecutorial discretion in similar areas. The intervention
section of the Senate bill provides for easier access to agency proceedings than the House bill. 2 ° The bill passed by the House gives the
CPA essentially no greater right to intervene in or initiate formal
agency action than that of private parties.3 ' As a practical matter, an
agency might be less likely to limit the procedural privileges allowed
the CPA as intervenor, although the agency might feel more justified
in denying such privileges to a public interest group intervening independently in the same proceeding. The CPA, which is Congress' most
adventurous attempt to date to facilitate the representation of unrepresented interests, makes no provision for the public financing needed by
public interest groups to participate effectively, and in some instances
may, paradoxically, tempt agencies to limit the scope of their participation.
Congressional reliance upon independent agencies like the CPA
to achieve the objective of broadened public participation, without supplemental support for independent public interest groups, may mean that
the latter will not advance beyond their present state of effectiveness.
They are assured by Welfare Rights the opportunity to intervene to the
extent necessary to make the expanded right of review under Data
Processingeffective, but are as yet in desperate need of financial support
to enable them to use that opportunity to the fullest.

I.

AN ANALYSIS OF FIVE AGENCIES' EXPERIENCE WITII
PUBLIC PARTICIPATION

A. Federal Communications Commission
The primary responsibility of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) is the regulation of communications common carriers 322 and broadcasting services.323 Demands for public participation
are currently being pressed with most frequency and zeal in proceedings
involving the renewal of broadcasting licenses. Several reasons may
explain this focus: the initial licensing of the more profitable segments
of the radio spectrum allocated to radio and television broadcasting has
320 Compare S. 1177 § 203 with H.R. 10,835 § 204. See Hearings, supra note 307,
at 155 (staff comparison of the 2 bills), 160 (discussion by Representative Rosenthal
of differences between the bills).
321 While the House bill may be less intrusive in this respect, it does provide
broad authority for the CPA to initiate judicial review, whether or not the CPA was
a party to the proceedings below. H.R. 10,835 § 204(d). The Senate bill allows the
CPA to initiate judicial review only if it intervened in the agency proceeding. S. 1177
§ 203(d). See Hearings,supra note 307, at 224 (statement of Roger C. Cramton).

322 47 U.S.C. §§ 201-23 (1970).
323 Id. §§301-99.
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been substantially completed," 4 the licenses must be renewed at threeyear intervals,3 25 and the rules covering contested renewals provide
opportunity for the public to express its dissatisfaction with a licensee's
previous performance 3 26 and, in many cases, to obtain judicial review

of adverse agency determination.3 27
328
A renewal hearing is a serious and costly affair for all concerned,
but one to which only a minute percentage of broadcast licenses are
330
now subjected.3 29 Even though a broadcast license is a privilege
and a public trust subject to revocation,3 31 creating no right "beyond

the terms, conditions, and periods of the license," 332 the broadcast industry regards the failure to renew with terror, calling it a "death
sentence." 13 The FCC itself has viewed the refusal to renew as the
"supreme penalty, one which by custom has been reserved for transgressors whose acts of disobedience or folly have reached major dimensions." "I There are, of course, statutory rules 3' and overtones of
324 At the close of fiscal year 1970, only 82 commercial AM, 134 commercial FM
and 129 commercial television (UHF & VHF) frequencies still were available. See
36 FCC ANt. RFP. 144-46 (1970). Since July 1968, however, the Commission has
refused to accept applications for new AM radio stations. Id. 42. Of the available
FM licenses, most are for low power class A stations which are commercially less
desirable than the higher powered class B and C stations, which have greater coverage
and can therefore demand higher advertising revenues. See id. 43-44. "In many
parts of the country . . . only the class A channels in the smaller cities remain."
Id. 44. Of the remaining television frequencies, the bulk are in the less profitable
UHF band. See id. 41, 159.
In contrast,
325 47 U.S.C. § 307(d) (1970) ; see 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.34, .218 (1971).
the FPC may, for example, grant licenses for terms of up to 50 years. See note 725
infra & accompanying text.
326 See notes 343-400 infra & accompanying text.
327

Id.

See note 466 infra.
329 In 1967, 6 applications for renewal were designated for hearing (0.24% of all
applications renewed) ; in 1968, 15 (0.51%) ; in 1969, 17 (0.62%). Comment, Public
Participation in License Renewals and the Public Interest Standard of the FCC,
1970 UTAn L. REv. 461, 463 n21. In fiscal 1970, 18 renewal applications were
designated for hearing (0.68% of all applications renewed). 36 FCC ANN. REP.
147-48 (1970). About 7700 licenses are renewed every three years. Compare id. 2
with Johnson, A New Fidelity to the Regulatory Ideal, 59 GEo. L.J. 869, 879 (1971).
330 Television licensees recover during their three-year terms an average of from
200% to about 600% of their investment. Fenton, The Federal Communications
Commission and the License Renewal Process, 5 SUFFOLk: U.L. REv. 389, 414 (1971).
331 See Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359
F.2d 994, 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
33247 U.S.C. § 301 (1970) ; see Ashbacker Radio Corp. v. FCC, 326 U.S. 327,
331-32 & n.6 (1945) ; accord, FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 475
(1940). In fact, no license will be granted until the applicant has signed a waiver
of claim to a frequency "because of the previous use of the same." 47 U.S.C. § 304
(1970).
333 See D. GIL 0MR
& J. BARRON, MASS COmmuNIcATioN LAW 711 (1969).
334 Brandywine-Main Line Radio, Inc., 24 F.C.C.2d 18, 26 (1970) ; cf. Comment,
The Fairness Doctrine and Broadcast License Renewals: Brandywine-Main Line
Radio, Inc., 71 COLuM. L. REv. 452, 458 (1971).
335See Administrative Procedure Act §9(c), 5 U.S.C. §558(c) (1970); 47
U.S.C. § 402(a) (1970) (applying the APA to certain FCC appeals); cf. id. §§312
(c)-(e) (requirements of serving of order to show cause, hearing, burden of proof
on Commission, and application of APA in license revocation proceedings).
328
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due process protections in the background 33. suggesting that the refusal to grant another license to an incumbent broadcaster cuts much
closer to the line of a deprivation of property than the denial of a
privilege associated with the initial licensing proceeding.
The determination whether to renew normally focuses on the
licensee's performance during the preceding license period.33 Although
the showing required to warrant renewal is unsettled,3 8 members of
the public within the area served by the licensee are in a particularly
good position to contribute to any inquiry into that history. 339 The
public is faced with the relatively narrow questions of programming
desires and preferences and their allocation within the limits of an
established number of available frequencies. 340 Broader questions concerning, for example, the structure of the broadcasting industry, the
impact of the size, technological operation, and placement of facilities
on the social, economic, and ecological systems, and the economical use
of the total radio band, have either been resolved by arrangement with
336 See Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues,
74 YALE L.J. 1245, 1255 (1965). See also 1 K. DAVIs, supra note 23, § 7.18, at
495-97.
337 See, e.g., Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC,
359 F.2d 994, 1007 (D.C. Cir. 1966) ; cf. W. EAERY, BROADCASTING AND GOVERNMENT:
REsPoNsi3iLrrEs
AND REGuLAToNs 246 (1971).
338
The controversy over this issue and the consequent congressional reexaminatlion of both the Commission's renewal process and substantive criteria for renewal
have been precipitated chiefly by the Commission's first decision not to renew
the license of a broadcaster whose performance was judged only "average" and to
award the frequency to a challenger. WHDH, Inc., 16 F.C.C2d 1 (1969), aff'd
sub nom. Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 402 U.S. 923 (1971). For reaction to WHDH, see S. 2004, 91st Cong., 1st
Sess. (1969); Goldin, "Spare the Golden Goose"-The Aftermath of WHDH in FCC
License Renewal Policy, 83 HARv. L. REv. 1014 (1970); Jaffe, WHDH: The FCC
and Broadcasting License Renewals, 82 HARv. L. REv. 1693 (1969) ; Comment, The
Aftermath of WHDH: Regulation by Competition or Protection of Mediocrity?,
118 U. PA. L. Rxv. 368 (1970); 20 CATHr. U.L. REV. 328 (1970).
The Commission's Policy Statement Concerning Comparative Hearings Involving
Regular Renewal Applicants, 22 F.C.C.2d 424 (1970), which conferred upon an incumbent licensee a controlling preference over another applicant by showing past
performance substantially serving the public, was successfully attacked by the Citizens
Communications Center and Black Efforts for Soul in Television (BEST). Citizens
Communications Center v. FCC, 447 F.2d 1201 (D.C. Cir. 1971). The Policy Statement had "served to deter the filing of a single competing application for a television
renewal in over a year . . . ." Id. at 1206; see Comment, Implications of Citizens
Communications Center v. FCC, 71 CoLum. L. REv. 1500 (1971). The groups had
earlier petitioned for rulemaking proceedings for comparative broadcast hearings.
BEST, 21 F.C.C.2d 355 (1970). But see Moline Television Corp., 31 F.C.C.2d 263
(1971), appeal docketed sub toin. Community Telecasting Corp. v. FCC, No. 71-1741,
D.C. Cir., Sept. 17, 1971 (Commission gave preference in a comparative hearing to
an incumbent whose performance was inferior to its past promises, and renewed
its license). The decision, characterized by Commissioner Johnson as "lawless," id.
at 277, was reported as "being read by legal specialists . . . as evidence that the
F.C.C.'s Republican majority will tend to favor incumbent broadcasters against their
rivals." N.Y. Times, Aug. 24, 1971, at 75, col. 4.
339 It has been observed, however, that "recognizing the standing of members
of the broadcasting audience to challenge renewal applications will not further the
judicial policy of encouraging meaningful public participation in the renewal process
if the Commission at the same time refused to re-evaluate its broadcasting standards"
or leaves the public unapprised of licensing criteria. Comment, supra note 329, at 465.
340 See 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.21-.29, .202, .203, .606, .607 (1971); cf. id. § 2.106.
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other governmental bodies,34' been determined through rulemaking
proceedings,3 42 or not been perceived as problems by anyone with opportunity and sufficient concern to raise them.
1. Standing Before the FCC
Broadcast licenses may be granted or renewed only if the Commission finds that "the public interest, convenience, and necessity would
be served." 343 Anyone may file a petition to deny a license or license
renewal, which "petition shall contain specific allegations of fact sufficient to show that the petitioner is a party in interest and that a grant
of the application would be prima facie inconsistent with" the public
interest, convenience, and necessity. 4 4 If the petition to deny presents
a "substantial and material question of fact," or if the Commission is
unable to find affirmatively that grant of the application would serve
the public interest, 41 the Commission "shall formally designate the
application for hearing." 346 Those who file petitions raising such
questions and satisfy the "party in interest" requirement may participate as full parties to the hearing; 347 other persons "may file a petition
for leave to intervene," and, on a showing of the requisite interest and
of the contribution the petitioner will make to the determination of the
issues, may become parties to the proceeding.348 Furthermore, "[n] o
person shall be precluded from giving any relevant, material, and competent testimony at a hearing because he lacks a sufficient interest to
justify his intervention as a party in the matter." 349
341 For example, the control of government-owned-and-operated stations rests
in the President 47 U.S.C. § 305 (a) (1970), who has delegated that function to the
Office of Telecommunications Policy (OTP), see Exec. Order No. 11,556, 3 C.F.R.
548 (1971), 47 U.S.C. § 305 (1970) ; Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1970, 6 WEEKLY
ComfP. PREs. Doc. 156 (1970), 47 U.S.C. §305 (1970); cf. 3 U.S.C. §301 (1970).
The OTP coordinates its functions with the FCC and the Interdepartmental Radio
Advisory Committee, which is "composed of representatives of those Federal agencies
making extensive use of radio." 36 FCC ANN. REP. 112 (1970) ; see 1971/72 U.S.
GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION MANUAL 556-57 (1971) ; cf. 47 C.F.R. § 0.37 (1971).
In the area of deceptive advertising, the Communications and Trade Commissions
have maintained an arrangement since 1957 "whereby the FTC will advise the FCC
of questionable advertising broadcast over radio and television stations." Liaison
Between FCC & FTC Relating to False & Misleading Radio & TV Advertising, 22
F.C.C. 1572 (1957). For subsequent FCC-FTC agreements, see [CURRENT SERVICE]

P & F RADIO REG.

11 11:401,

:402 (1971); ef. W. EMERY, supra note 337, at 72-82.

342 See, e.g., note 340 supra.
343 47 U.S.C. § 309(a) (1970).
344
Id. § 309(d) (1).
34
5 Id. §6 309(d) (2), (e).
34

GId. § 309(e).
C.F.R. § 1.223 (a) (1971).
See American Communications Ass'n v.
United States, 298 F.2d 648 (2d Cir. 1962) (interlocutory review and reversal of
denial of intervention by a trade union whose status as a party in interest was conceded, but deemed by the Commission not useful).
34847 C.F.R. § 1223(b) (1971).
349Id. § 1.225 (b). Less formal channels for public participation are also available.
"[A]ny person" may submit "informal objections" to the grant, renewal, or assignment of a license, id. § 1.587, and, during a license term, informal requests for Coin34747
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The evolution of the rule that one show that he has an interest,
while not consistent, has been toward complete obliteration of the requirement. Before enactment of section 309(c), the precursor of the
present petition-to-deny section, the Federal Communications Act contained no provision covering intervention."' 0 By the time the section
was added, the Supreme Court had handed down a germinal case on
standing to appeal from administrative decisions. FCC v. Sanders
Brothers Radio Station "I allowed standing to a competitor facing a
direct economic injury by the grant of a license, even though that
interest was not one the agency could have considered in refusing to
grant a license.3 2 The concept of such a "private attorney general" 353
was founded on the rationale that a plaintiff willing to challenge the
agency's effectuation of its statutory mandate, and having sufficient
economic stake in the outcome to litigate seriously, served a useful
function by supplementing the Commission's resources.3 54 As has been
discussed earlier, 355 this concept has been instrumental in greatly
broadening the scope of judicial review over agency decisionmaking.
When enacted in 1952,358 section 309(c)'s "party in interest"
phrase was intended to authorize intervention in FCC proceedings only
to the extent allowed by the Sanders decision for appeals from agency
decisions.3 7 As late as 1959 it was possible for one student commentator, by logically extending the Sanders rationale to include situations in which the intervenor could provide useful factual data for the
Commission, 358 to criticize expansion of the term to include "secondary"
competitors as being unsupported by equity, redundant, because primary
competitors might be found, and unjustifiably burdensome on Commission resources.35 9 Today, however, the interest requirement as
mission action may be submitted, id. § 1.41. See, e.g., Friends of the Earth, 24
F.C.C.2d 743 (1970), rev'd, 449 F.2d 1164 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (fairness doctrine complaint on automobile pollution); San Francisco Women for Peace, 24 F.C.C.2d 156
(1970), aff'd sub nora. Green v. FCC, 447 F.2d 323 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (fairness-doctrine
complaints on military recruitment) ; Boalt Hall Student Ass'n, 25 F.C.C.2d 70 (1969)
(fairness-doctrine complaint on governor's speech). The fairness doctrine of the
FCC ensures "reasonable opportunity for discussion of conflicting views on issues
of public importance." Citizens Communication Center, Primer on Citizens' Access
to the Federal Communications Commission 4 (1971 draft).
350 Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, § 309, 48 Stat. 1085. See 107 U. PA.
L. REv. 551, 552 (1959). See note 405 infra.

351309 U.S. 470 (1940).
352 d.

at 476.

353 The precise phrase, however, was subsequently coined by Judge Frank in

Associated Indus., Inc. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 704 (2d Cir.), vacated as moot, 320
U.S. 707 (1943).
354

107 U. PA. L. REv. 551, 556 (1959) ; see 309 U.S. at 477.

355

See notes 53-54 supra & accompanying text.
Act of July 16, 1952, ch. 879, § 7(e), 66 Stat. 715.

356

357 S.

REP. No. 44, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1951).

358 Sanders itself, however, spoke only to the proposition of presenting errors of
law to appellate courts. See 309 U.S. at 477.
35

9 See 107 U. PA. L. REv. 551, 556-59 (1959).
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interpreted by the courts 360 is so weak that knowledgeable commentators have felt free to state simply that a complaining party who is
responsible for initiating the hearing process with a petition to deny
alleging material issues, "usually has a substantial stake in the proceeding and may be able to make a contribution," 361 which distinguishes
him from the public at large.362
In 1965, a petition to deny the renewal application of television
station WLBT in Jackson, Mississippi, was filed by the Office of Communications of the United Church of Christ, a "national denomination,
with churches and members in . . . the prime service area covered by
WLBT," 363 the local congregation of the church, and two Mississippi
civil rights leaders, asserting that "the station failed to present programing designed to serve the particular needs and interests of the
Negro Community" and did not "give a fair presentation of the
issues." 364 The Commission denied standing to the petitioners, following its established doctrine that
members of the general public who do not show a direct
causal relationship between the action being protested and
some injury of a tangible and substantial nature have no
standing purely as members of the general public.365
The FCC reasoned that minority groups had "no greater interest or
claim of injury than the general public," otherwise "any minority group
based on race, creed, color, or national origins could gain standing as a
representative of the public interest." 366 The United Church of Christ
was therefore not a party in interest within the meaning of section

309(d)

(1).367

On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit, in its landmark United Church of Christ decision, 363 disagreed
and reversed. The court could see no reason to exclude the listening
public, those "most directly concerned with and intimately affected by
the performance of a licensee," 369 from the renewal process. Indeed,
public spokesmen might be the only source from which the Commission
could learn of programming deficiencies or other objectionable prac360 See text accompanying notes 377-95 infra.
361 Shapiro, supra note 37, at 728.
362 Cf. Gellhorn, supra note 18, at 380.
363 Lamar Life Broadcasting Co., 38 F.C.C. 1143, 1143 n.1 (1965).
3641d. at 1148.
365 Id. at 1149 n.11.
366 Id. (emphasis in the original).
367 See note 344 supra & accompanying text. The Commission did, however,
consider the allegations of the Church as set forth in the petition to deny "irrespective
of any question of standing or related matters." 38 F.C.C. at 1149.
368 Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d
994 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
369 Id. at 1002.
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tices ° The court chastised the Commission for rigidly allowing
standing to intervene only to those alleging electrical interference or
71 and for discounting the efficacy of consumer
direct economic injury .
72
participation.
The theory that the Commission can always effectively represent the listener interests in a renewal proceeding without the
aid and participation of legitimate listener representatives fulfilling the role of private attorneys general is one of those
assumptions we collectively try to work with so long as they
are reasonably adequate. When it becomes clear, as it does
to us now, that it is no longer a valid assumption which stands
up under the realities of actual experience, neither we nor the
Commission can continue to rely on it. The gradual expansion and evolution of concepts of standing in administrative law attests that experience rather than logic or fixed rules
has been accepted as the guide.3 73
The court held that "some 'audience participation' must be allowed in
license renewal proceedings," " and remanded the case to the Commission for a hearing, directing that "one or more" of the appellants
be granted standing "as responsible representatives." 375 The court
suggested that the Commission develop standards to determine which
community representatives should participate and how that participation could best be effectuated.37
While the development of standing to intervene in FCC proceedings was left by Congress to the agency and, by virtue of the rules of
standing to appeal, the courts, 3 77 further judicial pronouncements on
370 Id.
371 Id.

372359

at 1004-05.
at 1000-02. See 107 U. PA. L. REv. 551, 555-56 (1959).

F.2d at 1004.

at 1003-04.
3741d. at 1005.
375 Id. at 1006. On remand, standing was granted to all 4 petitioners.
The
Commission expressed a preference for organizations rather than individuals, granting
the individual petitioners standing only because they were represented by the same
counsel as the Church. Lamar Life Broadcasting Co., 3 F.C.C.2d 784, 786 (1966).
376 359 F.2d at 1005-06. For further discussion of the principal case, as well as
commentary on the development of FCC standing prior to 1966, see Keller, The Law
of Administrative Standing and the Public Right of Intervention, 21 FED. CoMa.BJ.
134 (1967) ; Comment, Standing of Television Viewers to Contest FCC Orders:
The Private Action Goes Public, 66 COLUm. L. REv. 1511 (1966) ; Note, 13 WAYNE
L. REv. 377 (1967).
377 359 F.2d at 1001-02; Comment, supra note 376, at 1519 & n.52. (The note
discusses the legislative history of the Federal Communications Act and notes that it
is silent as to the meaning of the phrase "parties in interest." The commentator
concludes, however, on the basis of this silence alone, that the development of standing
was left to the federal courts.) Courts will not, of course, hear the appeal of one
who failed to exhaust administrative remedies as, for example, by failing to seek
party status before the agency or by failing to seek a rehearing, regardless of standing
claims or requests for meritorious substantive relief. See Joseph v. FCC, 404 F.2d
207, 209 (D.C. Cir. 1968); 47 U.S.C. §405 (1970).
3731d.
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the subject have been rare, but have effectively removed viable requirements for standing from the agency's arsenal for the control of hearings.
In Joseph v. FCC,3" ' the court upheld an individual listener's standing
to challenge the assignment of a Chicago fine arts station 371 "as a representative of the listening public." "' Hale v. FCC,3 ' while not squarely
facing the standing issue, lends further support to the granting of intervention to individuals. The Commission avoided the question of the
standing of two individuals who were protesting the proposed license
renewal of station KSL, Salt Lake City, Utah. The petitioners charged
that the station was part of an undue concentration of communications
media and was furthering only its own economic and ideological interests in its programming."' The FCC suggested that, under United
Church of Christ, "petitioners must have a legitimate interest in the
proceedings, by showing that they are responsible representatives of
groups representative of the listening public, rather than speaking for
only individuals." 383 While the agency found that "substantial procedural issues" were raised, it decided not to pursue them as the case
could be disposed of on the merits without a hearing. 38 4 Commissioner
Johnson's dissent strongly rejected the majority's intimation that only
formal organizations could be responsible representatives of the public:
Surely there are few people who do not recognize the ease
by which paper groups can be organized around a few activists.
But does this Commission really intend to sacrifice the public
interest on the altar of such hollow legalism? 383
378

404 F.2d 207 (D.C. Cir. 1968).

379 "No . . . station license . . . shall be . . . assigned . . . except . . .

upon [a] finding by the Commission that the public interest, convenience, and necessity
will be served thereby." 47 U.S.C. §310(b) (1970). The Citizen's Committee to
Save WFMT(FM) also challenged the assignment, but since the Committee had not
taken any action before the FCC, the court held that it had not exhausted administrative remedies and therefore the court could only consider the individual challenger's
contentions. 404 F.2d at 209 & n.4.
380 404 F.2d at 210. The court cited United Church of Christ for the proposition
that "[t]he allegations in the motion . . . demonstrated at least prima facie standing."
Id. at 211. Referring to the argument that the petitioner failed to move for reconsideration as a prerequisite for judicial review, the court reasoned that petitioner's
motion for intervention, which was evidently considered after the initial decision,
served the purpose of the condition for review, especially as a "representative of the
listening public" usually "[does] not have the same sort of Washington representation
to uncover threats to their interest, or deploy apparatus to combat them, as do parties
whose interest is economic." Id. at 210. The decision has been criticized as "[overlooking] administrative requirements in order to reach the merits in an appealing
case," 57 GEO. L.J. 631, 639 (1969), but should properly be praised, as refusing to

insulate the Commission from judicial review because of relatively minor procedural
barriers.
381425 F.2d 556 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
382

KSL, Inc., 16 F.C.C.2d 340, 344 (1969) ; see REsPoNSES, supra note 30, at 61.

383 16 F.C.C.2d at 344.

384 Id.
385 Id.at 349.
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On appeal,3" 6 the court apparently agreed with Commissioner Johnson,
noting that
[KSL], but not the Commission, urges upon this appeal that
appellants are without standing to complain, either before
the Commission or in this court, of the license renewal. We
think the Commission's position here reflects the more
prescient reading of our opinion in [United Church of
Christ].387
The court found, however, that the petitioner's generalized complaint
about unfair programming and concentration of media control was more
appropriate for rulemaking and that the Commission was undertaking
a review of its policies concerning those issues. 3 s
There may remain a rudimentary requirement of interest, but any
hypothetical function it might serve in ensuring that a party litigate
either well or energetically is doubtful. In Martin-Trigonav. FCC,-"'
the court denied a petition to review the Commission's denial of standing to an Urbana, Illinois, resident who had challenged the renewal of
the licenses of the three major television networks' New York "flagship" stations. The FCC had determined that petitioner's complaints
about excessive commercialization should have been directed at the
local stations in his area rather than at the New York network stations.3"" The court, questioning "[w]hether the matter is best approached analytically in traditional standing terms," dismissed on the
merits without attempting to formulate standards for intervention
before the FCC.391 Citing Hale, the court said that petitioner's concerns raised broad policy issues more pertinent to the broadcasting
industry as a whole than to the renewal of the individual licenses and
were therefore more appropriately explored in rulemaking.30 2 MartinTrigona also challenged the renewal of station WRC-TV in Washing386 Appeals from decisions and orders of the FCC may be taken to the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit "by any . . . person who is aggrieved
or whose interests are adversely affected . . . ." 47 U.S.C. § 402(b) (6) (1970).
Intervention in an appealed case is limited to "any interested person," defined as
"[a]ny person who would be aggrieved or whose interest would be adversely affected
by a reversal or modification of the [FCC] order .

.

.

."

Id. §402(e).

That the

same standard is applied to determine a "party in interest" for standing purposes
before both Commission and court is supported by the courts and legislative history.
Comment, supra note 377, at 1514 n.18. The reason is to allow persons who have a
right to challenge FCC orders in court to first present their claims before the Commission. Id.; cf. Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359
F.2d 994, 1000 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
387 Hale v. FCC, 425 F.2d 556, 558 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
3881d. at 560.
389 432 F.2d 682 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
390 National Broadcasting Co., 20 F.C.C.2d 58, 59 (1969).
391 Martin-Trigona v. FCC, 432 F.2d 682, 683 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
392 Id.

760

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol.120:702

ton, D.C., 3' and petitioned for the revocation of the licenses of all
Metromedia television stations.394 Twice again he was denied standing.
In the latter case, the Commission spoke of "viewer status" conferred
by United Church of Christ but found "no decision extending 'viewer'
standing to a non-resident transient who may occasionally watch a television station in a community he visits." "' The negative pregnant
implicit in this statement is that responsible resident non-transient individuals may have standing to intervene.
Sheer aggregation of individuals without more, it should be noted,
may not guarantee standing. A short time after Martin-Trigona,the
Commission, while examining the questions raised in a petition to deny
the assignment of the licenses of WCTW-AM and WCTW-FM, New
Castle, Indiana, denied the standing of "a former corporate applicant,
composed of over 100 citizens of New Castle, Indiana, representing a
cross-section of community leaders," 396 saying in a footnote:
The fact that Petitioner is a former applicant does not entitle
it to standing and the mere fact that over 100 citizens may be
involved does not entitle it to standing.3 97
Petitioner, which filed in its corporate capacity, did not oppose the assignment because it objected to programming changes; its goal was the
acquisition of a frequency for its own economic gain. 3' 9 The line is a
close one, however, but neither Commissioner Johnson's "paper groups"
nor the individuals representing them appear to be having difficulty
obtaining standing by alleging that they represent a "substantial portion
of the listening audience." 39
It seems doubtful that any person or organization wishing to contest a license renewal could fail to find someone within the licensee's
broadcast area willing to be represented so long as he is not required
to bear the cost of the participation. Martin-Trigona, one is inclined
to suspect, could have so presented himself to the Commission, and thus
defeated the application of the standing requirement ° ° Even if not
393

National Broadcasting Co., 20 F.C.C.2d 167 (1969).

394 Petition of Anthony Martin-Trigona, 18 P & F RADIO REG. 2D 581 (1970).

The Commission is authorized to revoke any station license "because of conditions
• . . which would warrant it in refusing to grant a license . . . on an original
application . . . ." 47 U.S.C. § 312(a) (2) (1970).
395 Petition of Anthony Martin-Trigona, 18 P & F RADio REG. 2D 581, 582 n.1
(1970).
396 WCTW, Inc., 26 F.C.C.2d 268, 269 (1970).
397 Id. at 269 n.2.
398 See id. at 269.
399 Radio Station WSNT, Inc., 27 F.C.C.2d 993 (1971) (standing granted to
2 petitioners as individuals and as agents of organizations that "represent the interest
of a substantial portion of the listening audience of WSNT" and that have "significant
roots in the community," upon a showing of individual residency in the community);
see Brandywine-Main Line Radio, Inc., 24 F.C.C.Zd 18 (1970).
400 Alternatively, it may have been possible to allege that the major networks,
which control a disproportionate share of the television market, see Variety, Sept.
15, 1971, at 29, cols. 1-5, so affected local programming as to provide a basis for
standing.

1972]

PUBLIC PARTICIPATION

dead, standing to intervene based on a requirement of an "interest" is
both easily defeated as a barrier and useless as a means for assuring
either a responsible or an energetic litigator. "Responsibility" is a
loaded term, as Judge Burger must have realized in United Church of
Christ, and energy or effort is supplied by the litigator, not the nonpaying "party-in-interest."
2. The Discretionary Hearing
Had Martin-Trigona met the Commission's standing requirements,
the court nevertheless would have supported the denial of the hearing
he requested, and on grounds which have replaced the use of standing
as a control of the major cost factor-whether to hold, rather than how
extensive to make, a hearing. Limiting the total number of renewal
hearings is both one of the Commission's most powerful tools for allocating its scarce resources efficiently and one of the tightest constraints
on wider and more piercing examination of licensee practices. Fewer
than one percent of renewal applications now go to hearing,40 1 and a
hearing is a condition precedent under statute to the denial of renewal. 4 2
As has been shown, the FCC has where possible rested denials on the
lack of an "interest," a term the courts have now emasculated with the
effect of opening completely the class of parties and thus the kinds of
issues likely to be raised. 0 3 The courts have been quicker than the
Commission to perceive that control of the number of hearings must
now be accomplished under the other allegation required of a petition
to deny-a substantial and material question of fact raising a prima
facie case that immediate grant of an application for renewal would not
serve the public interest, convenience, and necessity.4" 4 This limitation
on a petitioner's ability to initiate a hearing was deliberately added to
the Federal Communications Act by Congress to give the Commission
the "authority to curb the abuses of the protest procedure through the
power, in appropriate cases, to dispose of protests without holding a
full evidentiary hearing."40 5 The requirements of substantiality and
401

See note 329 supra.

U.S.C. §309(e) (1970).
403 Petitioners still must allege facts with sufficient specificity to substantiate
that they are parties in interest. 47 U.S.C. §309(d) (1) (1970). This requirement
leaves some discretion in the Commission to verify that status. See NBC v. FCC,
362 F.2d 946 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Vermont New York Television, Inc., 6 F.C.C2d 830
(1967).
40447 U.S.C. §§309(d) (2), (e)(1970).
405 S. REp. No. 1231, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1955). The protest procedure,
operative when the Commission granted an application without a hearing, was first
enacted in 1952. Act of July 16, 1952, ch. 879, § 7, 66 Stat. 715. In 1956 the protest
procedure was amended to eliminate hearings where only inconsequential facts were
alleged, but the Commission was required to find affirmatively that the public interest
demanded a grant of a license. Act of Jan. 20, 1956, ch. 1, 70 Stat. 3. In 1960 the
pre-grant procedure was changed to its present form. Act of Sept. 13, 1960, Pub. L.
No. 86-752, §4, 74 Stat. 889. The legislative history provides nothing but a tautologi40247
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materiality obviously refer to the seriousness and relevancy of disputed
factual allegations that should be resolved by full inquiry, but the
content of those terms is as variegated as the number of possible factual
situations. Alleged violations of Commission rules or standards would
seem to establish materiality, but whether or not a hearing is compelled
usually depends upon the quality of the accompanying facts." 6 Whether
alleged facts sufficiently meet the legal standards so as to make a hearing necessary would appear to be a mixed question of fact and law. As
such, the standards of judicial review have been inconsistently applied. 7
Courts reviewing summary dispositions have ordered hearings where
the licensee's alleged past performance would preclude renewal as a
matter of law, 08 where the Commission failed to substantiate its action
with affirmative findings that the public interest, convenience, and necessity would be served, 0 9 where the courts have ruled that the Commiscal explication of the standards implied by the language "substantial and material
questions of fact" or "consistent with" the public interest, convenience, and necessity.
See H.R. RaP. No. 1800, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960) ; S. Rm. No. 690, 86th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1959).
406 Compare Louisiana Television Broadcasting Corp. v. FCC, 347 F.2d 808 (D.C.
Cir. 1965), with Andy Valley Broadcasting System, Inc., 12 F.C.C2d 3 (1968), and
WGN of Colorado, Inc., 31 F.C.C.2d 413 (1971). Compare Retail Store Employees
Local 880 v. FCC, 436 F.2d 248 (D.C. Cir. 1970), with Anti-Defamation League of
B'nai B'rith v. FCC, 403 F.2d 169 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 930 (1969).
Compare Brandywine-Main Line Radio, Inc., 24 F.C.C.2d 18 (1970), with Taft BroadThere is a possibility that the Commission
casting Co., 8 F.C.C.2d 19 (1967).
will soon be forced to articulate more precisely the standards incorporated in the
term. See Brief for Appellee, Stone v. FCC, appeal docketed, No. 71-1166, D.C.
Cir., Mar. 8, 1971 (argued Feb. 25, 1972), appeal from Evening Star Broadcasting
Co., 27 F.C.C.2d 316 (1971).
Compliance with Commission regulations would appear to immunize a renewal
applicant from the threat of a hearing. See Midwest Television, Inc., 17 F.C.C.2d
739 (1969). Allegations in a petition to deny of matters outside the jurisdictional
ambit of the Commission's authority cannot be grounds to compel a hearing. See
2
Black Identity Educ. Ass'n, 21 P & F RADio Rao. D 746 (1971).
407 4 K.
DAvIs, supra note 23, § 30.07. Professor Davis has advocated that
courts use a practical approach to determine whether agency decisions of mixed law
or statutory interpretation and fact should be reviewed with a "rational basis" test
or a stricter "substitution of judicial judgment" standard. Id. §§ 30.03-.06. Davis
views the discretion to choose between the two tests as being influenced by a number
of unarticulated considerations, including the court's attitude toward the agency, the
degree of thoroughness and impartiality of the agency's performance, the importance
of the subject matter, and the comparative qualifications of the court and the agency
to decide the issue. Id. § 30.14. Professor Jaffe, on the other hand, would limit the
judicial power to review incidental agency lawmaking where there is a statutory
purpose to confer upon the agency a policymaking function. L. JAFFE, supra note 33,
at 573. Professor Jaffe, examining judicial review of FCC procedural decisions, has
criticized the extent to which courts have substituted their judgment for the Commission's in instances where license applications have been granted, despite protests,
without a hearing. "Whether the allegations present a matter upon which the Commission should expend its resources is par excellence a matter for the Commission,
subject to review only for error of law or a grossly mistaken judgment." Jaffe,
Judicial Review of Procedural Decisions and the Philco Cases: Plis Ca Change?,
50 GEo. L.J. 661, 680 (1962).
408 Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d
994, 1007 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
409
See Joseph v. FCC, 404 F.2d 207 (D.C. Cir. 1968) ; cf. Hudson Valley Broadcasting Corp. v. FCC, 320 F.2d 723 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
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sion misconceived its mandate, 410 and where issues felt by the courts to
be consequential and controverted were not comprehensively considered.4 11
One further obstacle, deadlines for filing petitions to deny, limits
the opportunity of those opposing the renewal of a license, whether competitors or those without an economic interest, to obtain a hearing.
Current regulations prohibit the filing of petitions to deny renewal
requests after the first day of the last full month of the expiring license
term,4 1 giving the petitioner up to several months to respond to the
licensee's renewal application. 3
[T]he Commission does not condone the practice of community groups waiting until long after an application for renewal
. . . has been filed before raising any complaints they may
have concerning a station's policies or program practices.
. . . [This practice] is disruptive of the Commission's
processes.4 14
Following this policy, the FCC, in a decision criticized by dissenting
Commissioner Johnson as appearing to be the work of an "anti-citizen,
anti-audience body," 415 denied a time extension for filing a petition to
deny sought by the St. Louis Chapter of the Congress of Racial
Equality. On March 5, 1971, the Commission announced, upon granting the Colorado Committee on the Mass Media and the Spanish Surnamed, Inc., a one week extension, that "[i]n the future . . . we shall
simply deny these 'last-minute' requests, made without supporting

basis."
410

411

1970).
412
413

416

See Citizens Comm. v. FCC, 436 F.2d 263, 269 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
See Retail Store Employees Local 880 v. FCC, 436 F.2d 248 (D.C. Cir.

47 C.F.R. §§ 1.580(i), 1.516(e) (1) (1971).
See id. § 1.539(a).

414 WSM, Inc., 24 F.C.C.2d 561, 563-64 (1970) (request for 30-day filing extension by a coalition of Nashville black community groups granted because coalition
had been negotiating with the licensees; similar request by Memphis groups denied
because they had not been negotiating with, and offered no reason for their delay in
contacting, the licensees); cf. Renewal of Licenses of Chicago Stations, 20 P & F
RADIo RaG. 2D 594 (1970).
4135 Congress of Racial Equality, St. Louis Chapter, 27 F.C.C.2d 353, 354 (1971).
Commissioner Johnson found "no sound reason why this complaint [alleging violations
of the fairness doctrine and requesting a time extension to file a petition to deny]
cannot properly be prosecuted in the pending . . . renewal proceeding," citing United

Church of Christ for the proposition that the FCC should "welcome the voices of
opposition." Id. The FCC did, however, assure CORE that it would accord full
consideration to all additional information that CORE would file to supplement its
fairness complaint. Id.
Stating that
416 Colorado Broadcast Stations, 28 F.C.C.2d 375, 377 (1971).
"[s]ound regulation . . . has procedural as well as substantive elements, and the
public interest comprehends both," the Commission subsequently dismissed the group's
petition to deny filed four days after the extension. WGN of Colorado, Inc., 31
F.C.C.2d 413, 413 (1971); cf. Time-Life Broadcast, Inc., 29 F.C.C2d 991 (1971).
See also Triangle Publications, Inc., 27 F.C.C.2d 1019 (1971). The Commission may
grant extensions for petitions to intervene for good cause shown. 47 C.F.R. § 1.223 (d)
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The FCC is currently considering revising its policies on broadcast
license renewals in an attempt to balance public participation and fairness to the renewal applicant.417 The proposed rules, reflecting the
impact of public interest groups, were prompted by the "significant
increase in the number of petitions to deny or complaints directed to
license renewal applications." 418 The purpose of the new rules is to
encourage a continuing dialogue between the public and the licensee
throughout the license period to "ensure [that] licensees remain conversant with and attentive to community problems throughout the
license period and to promote resolution of complaints as they arise at
the local level through discussion between complainant and the licensee
(rather than through Commission inquiry) . .

"'

*.."

The licensee

would be required to broadcast, at least once every eight days during
prime time, a short notice informing the public of the appropriate manner in which to "express their satisfaction or complaints with station
operation" 420 and, for a period preceding the time for renewal of its
license, a notice calculated to solicit participation in the renewal
process. 2'
Deadlines for filing renewal applications would be shifted from
ninety days to four months before license expiration, and the period for
filing petitions to deny would in effect be extended by one month.42 2
No extension of time to file petitions would be granted without the
consent of all parties, including the renewal applicant. 423 This consent
requirement is consonant with a policy of encouraging negotiations
between the licensee and those opposing renewal with a view to settling
differences and obtaining promises from the licensee to alter criticized
practices without requiring resort to the Commission. If a licensee
were engaged in good faith negotiation, it might be expected to consent
to a time extension; if instead the licensee is not negotiating or is stalling with the intent of running the complainant past the filing deadline,
the complainant would have ample time in which to file.424
(1971). See Council on Radio & Television, 23 P & F RADIo REG. 2D 185 (1971)
(extension granted where licensee frustrated petitioner's attempts to examine copy
of renewal application).
417See Formulation of Rules and Policies Relating to the Renewal of Broadcast
Licenses, 27 F.C.C2d 697 (1971). See also Geller, Professor Elinan's Suggestions
and the Federal Communication Commission: A Comment, 59 GEo. L.J. 865, 866

(1971).

418

27 F.C.C.2d at 697.

419

Id. at 700.

Id. at 708. During the period from 6 months prior to expiration of a license
to 30 days prior to expiration, a renewal notice must be announced. Id. at 709.
421
1d. at 709-11.
422 Id. at 704. The extended filing period was in part a recognition that many
community groups do not have legal counsel to prepare efficiently and file effective
petitions. Id. at 706.
423Id. at 706-07.
420

424 Id.

at 707 n.4.
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3. The Procedural Rights and Bargaining Power of
the Intervening Listener
It thus appears that responsible public interest groups or individuals residing within the service area of a station whose license renewal is contested will be allowed to participate as parties in a renewal
hearing if a petition to deny alleging adequate questions is seasonably
filed.425 But an expanded definition of "interest" only increases the
number of parties who may appear in a hearing. Although, by increasing the potential for large hearings, the expanded interest definition
injects pressure to reduce the scope of participation of some or all
participants, it neither requires such a result nor suggests how that
result could be accomplished. At one point it appeared that the party
status of a public interest complainant was to be inferior to that of the
renewal applicant. On remand of the United Church6of Christ case, for
2
example, the FCC indicated that it was by statute 4 and precedent 427
permitted to place the burden of proof on the public interest group as
to the issues of presentation of opposing views on important public
questions and accessibility to the airways.4 2' The FCC felt that the
intervenors were in at least as good a position as the applicant to know
the facts relating to the charges of discriminatory broadcasting, and
perhaps in a better position, since the applicant kept records of what it
had presented, but not what it had not presented, for broadcast. 429 The
intervenors failed to meet this unrealistic burden, and all issues were
resolved in the licensee's favor.430
In what has been described as "one of the most scathing opinions
ever delivered against a federal agency," 431 the same three-judge panel
that decided the first United Church of Christ appeal again reversed the
FCC. 432 While the decision has been thought to be procedurally
"puzzling," 133 the opinion is an impassioned plea to a deaf Commission
to listen:
425 Telephone interview with Henry Geller, Special Assistant to the Chairman,

FCC, Aug. 26, 1971.
426 47 U.S.C. § 309(e) (1970) ("[Tjhe burden of proof shall be upon the applicant, except that with respect to any issue presented by a petition to deny . . . such
burdens shall be as determined by the Commission.").
42
The burden of proof is
7D & E Broadcasting Co., 1 F.C.C.2d 78 (1965).
generally upon the party charging serious misconduct, but if no petition to deny is
filed, the burden shifts to the applicant with regard to such other issues as may be
delineated by the FCC. Id. at 80.
428 Lamar Life Broadcasting Co., 3 F.C.C.2d 784, 786-87 (1966).
429
Lamar Life Ins. Co., 5 F.C.C.2d 37, 39 (1966).
430 Lamar Life Broadcasting Co., 14 F.C.C2d 431, 433, 437-38 (1968).
431 Comment, The Aftermath of WHDH: Regulation by Competition or Protection of Mediocrity?, 118 U. PA. L. REv. 368, 377 (1970).
432 Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 425 F.2d
543 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
433 83 HARv. L. REv. 1412, 1413 (1970).

766

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol.120:702

The Commission and the Examiners have an affirmative duty
to assist in the development of a meaningful record which
can serve as the basis for the evaluation of the licensee's performance of his duty to serve the public interest. The Public
Intervenors, who were performing a public service under a
mandate of this court, were entitled to a more hospitable reception in the performance of that function. As we view the
record the Examiner tended to impede the exploration of the
very issues which we would reasonably expect the Commission itself would have initiated; an ally was regarded as an
opponent.
The Examiner and the Commission exhibited at
best a reluctant tolerance of this court's mandate and at worst
a profound hostility to the participation of the Public Intervenors and their efforts. 43 4
Finding "[tlhe administrative conduct reflected in [the] record . . .
beyond repair," "' the court ordered yet a new hearing, directing the
FCC to invite new applications for the license, and pronounced that a
public intervenor should be regarded not as a plaintiff, but "more nearly
like a complaining witness who presents evidence to police or a prosecutor whose duty it is to conduct an . . . investigation . . . and to
pursue his prosecutorial or regulatory function if there is probable cause
to believe a violation has occurred." 436
As late as 1968, Commissioners Cox and Johnson were able to
comment that "[g] rass-roots organizations from the communities themselves rarely participate; what efforts have been attempted in this vein
have not been welcomed by the Commission or its staff." 41 Participation has increased since that time, and has expanded as well into the
area of informal settlements.438 The cost and time entailed by a hearing
434

425 F.2d at 548-50 (footnotes omitted).

The court apparently agreed with

the dissent of Commissioners Cox and Johnson:
The Commission today shows its strong distaste for the presence of a complaint . . . . The record reveals that the United Church of Christ and its
allies apparently have been regarded within the Commission as a kind of
unfamiliar pestilence, to be scourged through harassment, the piling up of
procedural obstructions, and the denial of rights clearly granted them by a
reviewing court in this very same case.
Lamar Life Broadcasting Co., 14 F.C.C.2d at 464.
435 425 F.2d at 550.
4
36 Id. at 546.
437 Renewal of Standard Broadcast & Television Licenses for Oklahoma, Kansas
& Nebraska, 14 F.C.C.2d 2, 9 (1968).
438 Interviews with Henry Geller, Special Assistant to the Chairman, FCC, in
Philadelphia, Aug. 26, 1971, Feb. 3, 1972. Although "[lut is impossible, or at least
unlikely, that there would ever be a sufficient number of public organizations to
contest each of the . . . licenses in this country," Policy Statement Concerning
Comparative Hearings Involving Regular Renewal Applicants, 22 F.C.C.2d 424, 431
(1970) (Comm'r Johnson, dissenting), use of the settlement procedure may allow
further increases. See text accompanying notes 441-42 infra.
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have made informal settlement of differences between the licensee and
protesting community groups an attractive alternative.
The Commission possesses statutory authority to approve a settlement agreement whereby a competing applicant in a comparative hearing situation withdraws his application.4 39 In the recent case of KCMC,
Inc.,440 the Commission extended its power to include approval of an
agreement effecting the withdrawal of a petition to deny renewal of a
license. The petition, prepared by twelve local associations with the
assistance of the Office of Communication of the United Church of
Christ, alleged that television station KTAL, Texarkana, Texas, failed
to serve the substantial black minority in its service area. The Commission assented to the withdrawal of the objections and granted renewal after a settlement between the station and the complainants, commenting that "[s]uch cooperation at the community level should prove
to be more effective in improving local service than would be the imposition of strict guidelines by the Commission." 441 Commissioner
Johnson, concurring in the approval of the settlement agreement "as an
experimental gesture," 442 expressed concern that the agreement would
herald future abdication by the Commission of its statutory duties:
A license renewal proceeding is . . . a matter between

the broadcaster-licensee and all the people in the community,
a matter to be resolved by the FCC according to the statutory
standard of the "public interest." The Commission can utilize
the services of volunteer local groups. Indeed, it is so woefully understaffed that any thorough review of broadcaster
performance simply must depend upon an aroused and involved citizenry.
But just as licenses should not wrongfully be withheld,
revoked or denied in response to unwarranted citizen protest,
so they should not be granted automatically because a certain
citizens has for some reason withgroup of once-protesting
44 3
drawn its objections.

Settlement agreements may expeditiously correct operating deficiencies
alleged in a petition to deny, but, because they provide no assurance
that other important issues will be considered by the Commission, there
inheres the risk that those issues may not be "simply resolved by finding
that certain complaints have been settled." ' In KCM1;C Commissioners Johnson and Lee were disturbed by the media concentration in
439 47 U.S.C. § 311(c) (1970).
44019 F.C.C.2d 109 (1969).

44Id. at 109.
442 Id. at

112 (separate statement of Comm'r Johnson).

443Id. at 110.

444 Id. at 114 (Comm'r Lee, concurring).
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KTAL's service area, an issue which "does not disappear merely by
withdrawing a complaint." "'
Insofar as the desires of a single group or individual do not necessarily express, and indeed might be adverse to, the ideal of the public
interest, other difficulties appear. One petitioning group might settle
on terms either more or less exacting than, or different from, those
another group or the Commission itself might demand. Furthermore,
a potential party might hesitate to file a petition to deny in reliance on
the prospect of a full hearing, only to find subsequently that a settlement
has closed the door. Some control of the settlement process is clearly
desirable. Representatives of the affected community and perhaps the
Commission could be made indispensable or optional parties to any
proposed negotiations, or settlement agreements might be publicized so
as to allow opportunity for comment and modification, as is the case
with provisionally accepted consent orders in the FTC.446
4. Financing Public Advocacy
It is said that although "the doors to greater citizen participation
in the affairs of the broadcast media have been opened slightly," a "bias
against citizen-initiated criticisms of the broadcasting industry has . . .
remained within the structure, procedures and predispositions of the
Commission." 117 The inadequacy of the investigatory staff 4S and the
passivity of the Commission in encouraging general citizen involvement 449 make independent presentations of views by the affected public
important. Various arrangements have been suggested to remedy this
state of affairs. Input could be increased "by forging a connection between concerned citizen groups and the competent professional assistance required for more effective participation." "' Former Commissioner Cox has urged that a "federation of citizens groups" establish a
Washington office to inform constituent groups and act on their be5

44 Id.
Nevertheless, the announced policy of the Citizens Communications Center, "a Washington public interest law firm, which has been representing citizens
groups in [FCC] license renewal hearings to assure that broadcasters fulfill their
public service obligations," News from the Ford Foundation, Apr. 26, 1972, at 1, is
"to negotiate where possible and to withdraw from a proceeding once a licensee has
agreed to improve its service." Id. 4.
446See notes 614-15 infra & accompanying text; cf. 47 C.F.R. §1.525(b)(2)
(1971) (provisions for publication of notice by applicant withdrawing its conflicting
application for a construction permit after a private agreement).
447 REsPoNsEs, supra note 30, at 61 (statement of Comm'r Johnson) ; cf. id. 64.
448 Id. 63-64, 70. In fiscal 1968 the FCC received 67,000 complaints, comments,
and inquiries, but very few were ever investigated due to limited staff manpower
and funds. Id. 23 (statement of Chairman Hyde), 54 (statement of Comm'r Cox).
449 Id. 63 (statement of Comm'r Johnson).
4
50 Id. 20 (statement of Chairman Hyde).
The Commission's position generally is to favor representation by counsel of
[local groups] which participate in agency proceedings to the end that their
presentations may be helpful and effective in making public interest determinations rather than disruptive of [FCC] processes.
Letter from Richard E. Wiley, FCC General Counsel, to the University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Sept. 20, 1971.
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half. 1 The Commission has debated whether to establish an "Office
of Public Counsel" to advise and, in limited circumstances, represent
groups. Envisioned as an entity separate from the FCC staff, it would
"operate as a private law firm . . . solely as the attorney for citizens'
organizations." 452 Privately endowed institutions such as the United
Church of Christ and the Citizens Communications Center (CCC) ...
do act to fulfill this function, but both they and smaller local groups lack
adequate resources to obtain professional assistance skilled in the intricacies of454
FCC procedure and to present able arguments for their
viewpoints.

Commissioner Johnson recognized several years ago that both the
Commission's disinclination to admit representatives of the public interest and economic constraints acted to disenfranchise many groups
from participation in FCC proceedings. 5 A similar observation may
obtain in the settlement area. Several months after approval of the
agreement in KCMC 456 the licensees agreed to reimburse the Office of
Communication for expenses in the amount of $15,137 incurred in
assisting the local associations.45 7 The Commission, though finding
no explicit statutory guide, adhered to the proposition "that in no petition to deny situation, whatever the nature of the petitioner, will we
permit payment of expenses or other financial benefit to the petitioner." 41 Though the Commission admitted that the filing of petitions
to deny should be facilitated and that settlement of issues is desirable,
it nevertheless was of the opinion that payment of expenses was not
necessary. The Commission, moreover, found clear detriments to the
public interest in the "possibility of abuse-of overpayments . . . or
451 RESPONSES,

supra note 30, at 51 (statement of Comm'r Cox).

452Landauer, FCC Weighs Proposals to Give Legal Aid to Public Groups on
Commission Matters, Wall St. J., June 29, 1971, at 6, col. 2. Prospects for its
establishment, however, seem dim. "'We've got enough trouble in court already,'
one insider contends." Id. col. 3.
453See Citizens' Communications Center, Primer on Citizens' Access to the
Federal Communications Commission (1971 Draft). Perhaps one of the most significant activities of the CCC has been to open up private policymaking meetings.
See Citizens' Communications Center, Progress Report ii-viii (1971).
454 See Landauer, supra note 452, col. 3. The Ford Foundation has, however,
recently announced a grant of $400,000 to CCC, intended to cover the salaries of the
executive director and 3 attorneys, administration and office expenses, and litigation
costs for a period of 2 years. The grant supplements those from a number of smaller
foundations such as the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, the Midas International Foundation, and the Stern Family Fund. News from the Ford Foundation, Apr. 26, 1972,
at 1, 3.
455 R sPoNsEs, supra note 30, at 64 (statement of Comm'r Johnson).
Cf.
N. JOHNSON, How To T.r~x BACK To YOUR TELEVIsioN SET 74 (1970).
456 See note 440 supra & accompanying text.
457 KCMC, Inc., 25 F.C.C.2d 603 (1970), rev'd sub norn. Office of Communication
of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, No. 24,672 (D.C. Cir., Mar. 28, 1972)
(KCMC 11).
458 25 F.C.C.2d at 605. The FCC does, however, have broad powers to "perform
any and all acts . . . as may be necessary in the execution of its functions." 47
U.S.C. § 154(i) (1970); see Reply to Opposition to Request for Reimbursement of
Legitimate & Prudent Expenses at 6, Radio Station WSNT, Inc., 31 F.C.C.2d 1080
(1971).
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even opportunists motivated to file insubstantial petitions in order to
obtain substantial fees" and in the "possibility that settlement of the
merits of the dispute might be influenced by the ability to obtain reimbursement of expenses from the licensee." 459
The court of appeals, in reversing the Commission and approving
the payment of such fees as the Commission would find "legitimate and
prudent," took a different view of the public interest, saying:
[T] he public interest standard cannot mean that the Commission may totally prohibit reimbursement in all petition to
deny situations.
When such substantial results have been achieved,
as in this case, voluntary reimbursement which obviously
facilitates and encourages the participation of groups like the
Church in subsequent proceedings is entirely consonant with
the public interest.46 °
The Commission, in a case decided prior to the reversal in KCMC
II, has also refused to compel reimbursement. In Radio Station
WSNT, Inc.,461 the Black Youth Club of Sandersville, Georgia, the
Southern Christian Leadership Conference, and several individuals incurred expenses in prosecuting a petition to deny alleging that the
licensee had discriminatory programming and hiring practices. The
Commission had previously designated WSNT's application for a hearing and had made the petitioners parties to that proceeding. 462 The
licensee and the intervenors subsequently settled, but, unlike KCMC II,
there was no voluntary agreement by the licensee to reimburse expenses.
459 Id. at 604. Conversely, the entire renewal process has been characterized as
"a burden on broadcasters and a boon for the . . . communications bar." Renewal
of Standard Broadcast & Television Licenses for Oklahoma, Kansas & Nebraska,
14 F.C.C.2d 2, 9 (1968).
460 Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, No. 24,672,
at 11, 18 (D.C. Cir., Mar. 28, 1972) (footnotes omitted). In responding to the
FCC's fear of abuse of reimbursement, the court could not find, nor could the
Commission demonstrate, any reason why a greater potential for abuse existed in a
petition-to-deny situation than in the case of competing applications. Id. at 16.
It continued:
[T]he public interest is likewise protected from abuse by the Commission's
determinations that the public group seeking to withdraw is bona fide, and
that the terms of its settlement with the local broadcaster serve the public
interest. Once these determinations are made, voluntary reimbursement of
legitimate and prudent expenses of the withdrawing group cannot be forbidden.
Id. at 16-17 (footnotes omitted). The court considered the Commission "fully
equipped" to make these determinations. Id. at 16 n.35.
The court's decision has been reported "as possibly having a far-reaching beneficial effect on the public-interest law movement and its ability to finance its lawsuits."
N.Y. Times, Mar. 29, 1972, at 87, col. 3.
46131 F.C.C.2d 1080 (1971), appeal docketed sub nom. Turner v. FCC, No.
71-1800, D.C. Cir., Oct. 7, 1971.
462 Radio Station WSNT, Inc., 27 F.C.C.2d 993 (1971).
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The intervenors argued that the policy of KCMC 1I, which was then
awaiting disposition on appeal, should not be dispositive of this case,
because "the act of designating a renewal application for hearing constitutes a finding that the petition to deny was meritorious and was not
frivolous [and because] the question of reimbursement would be beyond
the control of the intervenors or the licensee." 403 The Commission
rejected the contention that a rule requiring a licensee to bear petitioners' costs when agreement is reached after designation of a hearing
would provide the antagonists an incentive to settle quickly; indeed,
such a rule could provide a disincentive for petitioning groups to settle
prior to designation. 4
In view of the usual licensee's fundamental aversion to having
his renewal application designated for hearing, we are convinced that . . . lack of reimbursement [has] not deterred

listener groups from filing petitions to deny or licensees from
participating in discussions to resolve their differences ... 405
Since the cost of actively participating in the renewal process is
almost prohibitively high,4"' the WSNT decision may discourage the
filing of further petitions to deny and inhibit the competent negotiation
of settlements, "mak[ing] it much more difficult for citizens' groups
to become active participants in the regulation of .

.

.

broadcast

licenses," 467 unless the public intervenor is confident that the licensee
is willing to reimburse expenses which will make possible the initiation
of subsequent suits. In a renewal process which is "heavily dependent
on local residents to call deficiencies to [the Commission's] attention," 4' the court's decision to permit at least a voluntary payment of
reasonable costs, particularly where the FCC has found that a hearing
46331 F.C.C.2d at 1082.
464

Id. at 1083.

465

Id. at 1083-84.

The Commission had debated only a few months earlier

whether to ask Congress to appropriate funds for the payment of expenses to volunteer
counsel representing public interest groups. Landauer, supra note 452, col. 3. It
seems unlikely that the FCC, after refusing to allow individual licensees to reimburse,
would itself assume that responsibility.
466 The cost of challenging renewal is extremely high. The first United Church
of Christ proceeding, for example, cost the complainant funds running into six figures.

Hearings on S. 2004 Before the Communications Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on
Commerce, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 121 (1969). The New York Times estimated the cost of a proceeding to defeat license renewal at $250,000.

Id. 124. See

also Fenton, supra note 330, at 412. Today, $350,000-$400,000 would be a fair estimate
for a467
full scale renewal hearing. See note 425 supra.
Radio Station WSNT, Inc., 23 P & F RADIO REG. 2D 53, 58b (Comm'r Johnson
concurring in part & dissenting in part) ; see Brief for Petitioner at 16, Office of
Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, No. 24,672 (D.C. Cir.,
Mar. 28, 1972).
468 KCMC, Inc., 25 F.C.C.2d 603, 609 (1970) ; see Brief for Petitioner at 13-14
Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, No. 24,672 (D.C.
Cir., Mar. 28, 1972); Reply Brief for Petitioner at 16, Office of Communication of
the United Church of Christ v. FCC, No. 24,672 (D.C. Cir., Mar. 28, 1972) ; cf. note
339 supra & accompanying text.
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would have been required on the basis of the complainant's petition and
settlement results in improved service, does not appear inequitable. 6
A rule this narrow, or even the broadest possible reading of KCMC
II-that "when the settlement of issues and termination of a petition
to deny . . . is in the public interest, voluntary reimbursement of the

public group may be allowed" 4 7 -- may, however, have limited value,
and the question of voluntariness may ignore the public interest and
469 See Brief for Petitioner at 30, 37, Office of Communication of the United
Church of Christ v. FCC, No. 24,672 (D.C. Cir., Mar. 28, 1972) ; Reply Brief for
Petitioner at 5,Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC,
No. 24,672 (D.C. Cir., Mar. 28, 1972).
That voluntariness will long remain a condition precedent to the repayment of
expenses is questionable. First, it is clear that the court of appeals in KCMC II
specifically rejected the FCC's "principle of general application-namely, that in no
petition to deny situation, whatever the nature of the petitioner," would payment be
allowed, KCMC, Inc., 25 F.C.C.2d 603, 605 (1970), by stating that "[t]he public
interest . . . requires that the Commission's per se rule prohibiting reimbursement
be overturned." Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC,
No. 24,672, at 17 (D.C. Cir., Mar. 28, 1972). Further, to the extent that KCMC II
and the policy considerations expressed therein were the precedent governing WSNT,
a precedent considered by the FCC's Broadcast Bureau as "dispositive of petitioners'
request for reimbursement," Broadcast Bureau's Comment on Comments in Support
of Petition for Reconsideration at 4, Radio Station WSNT, Inc., 31 F.C.C.2d 1080
(1971), KCMC II's reversal has left WSNT without support in precedent. New
criteria for reimbursement must now be articulated.
Concern that "it would be inappropriate . . . to compel reimbursement of expenses in the absence of a voluntary agreement," WSNT, Inc., 31 F.C.C.2d at 1084,
a factor regarded by the Commission as "a separate and independent ground . . .
for the denial of the . . . request," id., and "the foremost distinction between the
two cases," id. at 1083, thus becomes the only possible line of distinction, as it indeed
was for Chairman Burch, who dissented in KCMC II,but who voted with the
majority in WSNT. See id. at 1084 (Chairman Burch, concurring).
Several arguments have been advanced in support of involuntary reimbursement:
1. Public intervenors, as owners of the airwaves seeking to preserve their
equity interest, may recover their costs where substantial benefits are realized.
Comments in Support of Petition for Reconsideration at 8A, Radio Station
WSNT, Inc., 31 F.C.C.2d 1080 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Petitioner's
Comments].
2. Where litigation is initiated in response to the misconduct of the
licensee, who is trustee of the airwaves, he must bear the expenses of that
litigation. Id.; 3 A. ScoTT, THE LAw OF TRuSTS § 245 (1967).
3. Fears that questions of reimbursement will influence settlements ostensibly on the merits will be assuaged if the Commission requires and regulates
reimbursement, objectively evaluating the reasonableness of the claims. Motion for Remand to the Federal Communications Commission at 5, Turner
v. FCC, appeal docketed, No. 71-1800, D.C. Cir., Oct. 7, 1971.
4. If reimbursement is compelled, licensees will be encouraged to negotiate
in good faith so as to minimize expenses while also relieving potentially
substantial burdens from the administrative machinery. Petitioner's Comments at 12-13.
5. Perhaps the most important, the statutory scheme of communications
regulation requires the facilitation of citizen participation, an objective that
reimbursement will surely encourage. Id. 8; see Office of Communication of
the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
The conclusion thus appears inevitable that, whether dictated by established trust
principles to which questions of voluntariness do not apply, or by simple adherence
to the mandate of protecting the "public interest, convenience, and necessity" despite
malaise about the "inappropriateness" of coercing the communications industry, compulsory reimbursement will be established shortly, either by the court or the FCC
itself.
470 Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ, No. 24,672, at 18
(D.C. Cir., Mar. 28, 1972) (emphasis added).
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present potentially burdensome, but not insurmountable, requirements
of verification. Furthermore, private settlements without close Commission supervision do present the risk that petitioners may abuse the
renewal process in order to exact concessions from licensees anxious to
avoid a hearing or other impediment to renewal. Petitioning groups,
for example, could make demands extraneous to the proper regulation
of the broadcast industry4 71 or attempt to induce a licensee to pay for a
promise not to file a petition to deny.472 The Commission's general
reluctance to allow reimbursement to consumer intervenors unless
forced by the courts neglects the rational alternative of formulating
viable rules which could simultaneously encourage citizen participation
and prevent possible abuses of the regulatory processes. 473
5. Conclusion
Urged by the courts, the FCC has responded to new definitions of
interest, so that virtually any local group or individual residing within
a broadcaster's service area is a party in interest competent to compel a
renewal hearing upon a proper showing of substantial and material
questions about a licensee's past performance. Indeed, the Commission
relies upon local reaction as the keystone to effective and continuous
regulation. This reliance and the easy access to regulatory processes,
while encouraging fuller presentation of substantive issues, does present
a potential danger that some individuals or groups will negotiate inequitably with licensees eager to avoid a costly hearing where they risk
the loss of a license. The settlement process promises to be an expedient
and beneficial mode of regulation, but, like any private regulation, presents risks as well as advtanages. The Commission, which has yet to
follow the early suggestion in United Church of Christ that rules for
public participation be formulated,474 must face these problems realistically and formulate procedures to encourage the broadest public participation consistent with reasonable agency control over the determination and enforcement of the public interest.
B. Civil Aeronautics Board
Private litigants, usually airlines, cannot be expected to represent
any but their own economic interests in CAB proceedings. Nor does it
47 1

See Black Identity Educ. Ass'n, 21 P & F RADIo REG. 2D 746 (1971) (demand
that licensee channel money into the black community, provide scholarships for
minority group youths, and employ minority group members on board of directors).
(demand of con472 See WGN of Colorado, Inc., 31 F.C.C.2d 413, 416 (1971)
tribution of $15,000 to petitioning group in consideration of promise not to press
petition to deny).

473 See KCMC, Inc., 25 F.C.C.2d 603, 605-06 (1970)
(dissenting opinion of
Chairman Burch) ; id. at 611 (dissenting opinion of Comm'r Cox) ; Brief for Petitioner at 42-43, Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC,
No. 24,672 (D.C. Cir., Mar. 28, 1972).
474 Interview with Henry Geller, Special Assistant to the Chairman, FCC, in
Philadelphia, Feb. 3, 1972. See text accompanying note 376 supra.
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seem that the Bureau of Air Operations, which "has the responsibility
for developing and presenting the public's position" "' at CAB hearings, has concerned itself with more than those same economic considerations.4 76 Since other considerations thus normally lack spokesmen, the provisions made in CAB procedures for public participation
become important and it is to be expected that some changes in the
CAB's heretofore restrictive intervention policy

477

will be forthcoming.

This section will examine the probable impact of active public participation upon the CAB's present intervention mechanisms and will
suggest an accommodation between the liberalized concepts of standing
increased participation could debilitate the
and the fears that greatly
478
administrative process.
1. Modes of Participation
Three types of CAB proceedings are most likely to attract significant numbers of public interest intervenors. These are route certification proceedings to determine whether, in the interest of the "public
convenience and necessity," 41' an airline should be permitted a particular freight or passenger route, rate proceedings to ascertain whether
fares charged or proposed by aircarriers are "just and reasonable," 480
and proceedings to approve mergers and acquisitions of control "consistent with the public interest." 48148 Except in the case of ratemaking, 8 2
hearings are generally mandatory.
475 E. RDFORD, THE REGULATORY PROCESS 169 (1969).
476
See generally W. FISK, ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE IN A REGULATORY
AGENCY: THE CAB AND THE NEW YORK-CHICAGO CASE (1965).
477 See, e.g., Fugazy Travel Bureau, Inc. v. CAB, 350 F.2d 733, 738 (D.C. Cir.

1965) ("[I]t must be shown that the claimant will be adversely affected in a legal or
property right.").
478 Writers advocating a liberalization of CAB intervention rules have not given
due consideration to the validity of some of the objections to such liberalization.
See, e.g., Boros, Intervention in Civil Aeronautics Board Proceedings, 17 AD. L. REv.
5, 37 (1965).
47949 U.S.C. § 1371(d) (1) (1970).
See generally W. JONES, THE LICENSING
OF DOMESTIC AIR TRANSPORTATION BY THE CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD (1962).
480

See 49 U.S.C. § 1374(a) (1970).
U.S.C. § 1378(b) (1970).
Mail-rate proceedings, see 49 U.S.C. § 1376 (1970), are generally conducted
through informal negotiations and will not be dealt with in this Comment. Enforcement actions, see id. §§ 1487-89, certainly involve the public interest, but, given their
quasi-criminal nature, it may be that the Board itself represents the public interest
in that type of proceeding. Cf. notes 644-57 infra & accompanying text. Furthermore, CAB regulations do provide for informal participation by an "interested person"
as well as the formal complainant. See 14 C.F.R. §§ 302.201, 301.214 (1971). For a
discussion of the special considerations relating to third party intervention in mailrate and enforcement proceedings, see Boros, supra note 478, at 27-36.
482 See notes 489-93 infra & accompanying text.
483 Applications for route certification "shall be set for public hearing."
49
-U.S.C. § 1371 (c) (1970). Applications for approval of mergers, consolidations, and
acquisitions must also be set for a hearing, except where "the Board determines that
the transaction . . . does not affect the control of an air carrier directly engaged
. . . in air transportation, does not result in creating a monopoly, and does not tend
to restrain competition, and determines that no person disclosing a substantial interest
then currently is requesting a hearing . . . . " Id. § 1378(b) (emphasis added).
48149
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The provisions of the Federal Aviation Act governing public participation in CAB hearings do not differ radically in wording-or in
vagueness-from the statutory language governing access to other
federal agencies. 4 " The pertinent statutory provisions do not describe
those persons who may actively participate in hearings. They only
direct that "[a]ny interested person may file . . . a protest or memorandum of opposition to or in support of" a carrier's route application 4 5 and that "persons known to have a substantial interest" must
be notified of a hearing on a merger proposal. 4 6 Subject to the strictures of the APA, the Board has broad latitude to "conduct [its] proceedings in such manner as wil be conducive to the proper dispatch of
business and to the ends of justice." 487 While the absence of statutory
standards has permitted the CAB to devise its own methods of accommodating or foreclosing public participation in a scheduled hearing," 8
where a hearing is not mandatory, as in the case of ratemaking, the
Board is not faced with merely calculating the incremental costs of additional participation but has the opportunity to avoid altogether the
public scrutiny of a hearing.
a. JudicialReview and Evasion of Public Participation
The interest of the ratepaying public in achieving meaningful participation in CAB fare proceedings is self-evident. Existing rates may
49
be changed in several ways. An aircarrier may file a tariff proposal,
which automatically will become an effective rate unless the Board,
acting upon a complaint or upon its own initiative, suspends and investigates the tariff.9 0 The Board's decision to use or not to use its sus484 See Note, The Law of Administrative Standing and the Public Right of
Intervention, 1967 WASH. U.L.Q. 416, 433 & n.102 (collecting regulatory statutes
using the terms "party in interest," .persons aggrieved," and the like).

4

8549

4 8 61d.
4
87MId.

U.S.C. § 1371(c) (1970).

§ 1378(b).

§ 1481. Cf. City of San Antonio v. CAB, 374 F2d 326, 329 (D.C. Cir.
1967) ("Consolidation, scope of the inquiry, and similar questions are housekeeping
details addressed to the discretion of the agency and, due process or statutory considerations aside, are no concern of the courts.") (footnotes omitted).
488 The failure to promulgate effective agency standards has been called the
"malaise of the administrative process." City of Lawrence v. CAB, 343 F.2d 583,
587 (1st Cir. 1965).
489
49 U.S.C. §1373 (1970).
4
90Id. § 1482(g). Any person may attempt to initiate a CAB proceeding by
filing a complaint. "If the person complained against shall not satisfy the complaint
and there shall appear to be any reasonable ground for investigating the complaint,
it shall be the duty of . . . the Board to investigate the matters complained of.
Whenever . . .the Board is of the opinion that any complaint does not state facts
which warrant an investigation or action, such complaint may be dismissed without
a hearing." Id. § 1482(a). The Bureau of Enforcement has a consumer complaint
section that receives complaints about unsatisfactory service; the complainant does not
actively participate in the investigation of alleged violations but does become a
formal party to any proceedings that may be instituted. Refusals to institute formal
complaint proceedings may be reviewed by the full Board. See REsPoxsEs, supra
note 30, at 7. A dismissal of a complaint without a hearing and the refusal to
investigate is reviewable by courts only for an abuse of discretion. See Transconti-
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pension power is not judicially reviewable.4 9' The Board may itself
prescribe rates by proceeding to a hearing,49 2 considering a set of statutory criteria, 493 and formulating a final order, which may be judicially
contested "by any person disclosing a substantial interest in such
order." '9'

The difficulty encountered by representatives of the public seeking
an opportunity to participate in ratemaking proceedings may be seen in
Moss v. CAB.49 In Moss several trunkline carriers filed for an increase in passenger fares after meeting informally with the Board.
Having been denied access to a private conference, thirty-two congressmen complained "about the Board's continued ex parte meeting and
rate practices and urged the Board to suspend the tariffs, to institute a
general passenger fare investigation to define more clearly the statutory
rate-making standards, and finally to set reasonable rates based on these
more precise standards." "' The petitioners refused, however, to engage in an oral argument on the advisability of the use of the agency's
investigatory and suspension powers "on the ground that the Board's
decision on the rate increases had already been made." "' The Board
thereafter did suspend the proposed tariffs but, on its own initiative, set
forth its own fare formula "and announced its decision to 'permit tariff
filings implementing' that formula to be filed without suspension, thus
assuring almost immediate effectiveness." 498 The carriers of course
adopted the proposed rate formula, and the congressmen's subsequent
request that the CAB suspend and investigate these new rates was,
predictably, denied.499
On appeal the narrow issue was whether the Board effectively determined the rates and thus should have followed the statutory procedures of notice and hearing required for Board-made rates. 500 The
broader issue framed by Judge Wright of the District of Columbia
Circuit was "the recurring question which has plagued public regulation
of industry: whether the regulatory agency is unduly oriented toward
nental Bus Sys., Inc. v. CAB, 383 F.2d 466, 478 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
390 U.S. 920 (1968); Flight Engineers' Int'l Ass'n v. CAB, 332 F.2d 312, 314
(D.C. Cir. 1964); Pan American-Grace Airways, Inc. v. CAB, 178 F.2d 34, 36
(D.C. Cir. 1949). Cf. notes 404-11 supra & accompanying text. See also Jaffe,
The Iindividual Right to Initiate Administrative Process,25 IowA L. REv. 484, 512-13,
520-21 (1940).
491 See Spritzer, supra note 263, at 97-100. See also Arrow Transp. Co. v.
Southern Ry., 372 U.S. 658 (1963).
49249 U.S.C. §§ 1482(d), (g) (1970).
4 3
9 Id. § 1482(e).
494
Id. § 1486(a).
495 430 F.2d 891 (D.C. Cir. 1970). See Note, Some Observations on Moss v.
CAB, 23 STAx. L. REv. 833 (1971); Project, Federal Administrative Law Developments-1970, 1971 DuKE L.J. 149, 200-09.
496 430 F.2d at 894.
497 Id.
498 Id. at 894-95 (footnote omitted).
499 Id.at 895.
50 0
d.
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the industry it is designed to regulate, rather than the public interest
it is designed to protect." '01 The Moss court found that "[t] he Board
did all it could, short of formally styling its order as rate-making, to
induce the carriers to adopt the proposed rates," 50' that the exclusion
of the public from the ratemaking process in these circumstances was
contrary to the governing statute, and that "observance of safeguards
designed to protect the public before the rates are imposed is imperative." 03 Preeminent among those safeguards is the necessity of a
hearing record considering all relevant variables, so that a reviewing
court can determine whether the statutory ratemaking criteria have been
met. 04
The full implications of Moss have not yet been made clear, but
the court "emphatically [rejected] any intimation by the Board that its
responsibilities to the carriers are more important than its responsibilities to the public." 505 The court's admonition and its insistence that
the Board remain faithful to the procedures of its organic statute may,
however, alter little in substance if the Board is equally persistent in its
industry orientation."' The extent of agency-industry negotiation and
collaboration in the formulation of rates 50 and the fine, almost imperceptible line between carrier-made and agency-made fares 5 0s make
judicial intervention an uncertain curative. 0 9
b. Participationas Parties
Rule 15 of the CAB's rules of practice governs "formal" intervention in hearings as a full party. 510 Though full party status must
be accorded anyone found to have a "statutory right to be made a
party," "' there is no helpful definition of such a right and the Board,
5ol Id.at 893. Judge Wright in large measure echoed the sentiments of a former

chairman of the Board who felt "that there has been an undue shift of emphasis from
public convenience and necessity to the seeking and protection of private carrier
rights."

Rizley, Some PersonalReflections After Eight Months as Chairman of the

Civil Aeronautics Board,22 J. AIR L. & Com. 445, 450 (1955) (emphasis in original).
502430 F.2d at 898.
503 Id. at 902 (emphasis in original).
504
See id.
505Id. While the court intimated that it would be sympathetic to the use of
relaxed procedures in emergencies, even those rates cannot be set without a public
hearing. Id. at 901-02.

The Board has "consistently refused to permit intervention

in temporary rate proceedings." Northwest Airlines, Inc., Mail Rates, 12 C.A.B.
838, 839 (1951).
506 See Note, supra note 495, at 841-45.
507 See Spritzer, supra note 263, at
AMERICA: EFFECTS AND ImPERFEcToNs 71

77; W.
(1970).

JORDAN, AIRIN
REGuLATioN IN
Cf. E. REDFORD, supra note 475,

at 148-49, 246-47.
508 See Spritzer, supra note 263, at 82-83.
509 See 430 F.2d at 900; Project, supra note 495, at 208.
51014 C.F.R. §302.15 (1971).
5i Id. §302.15 (a).
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at least prior to 1965, never encountered a petitioner with one.512 Rule
15 further provides that "[a] ny person whose intervention will be conducive to the ends of justice and will not unduly delay the conduct of
[a hearing] may be permitted to intervene." 5" The rule also sets
forth criteria to guide the exercise of the discretionary power to grant
or deny formal intervention.51 4
In terms of the number of attempted interventions, members of the
regulated industry, 515 affected unions, 5 16 and civic intervenors 517__.
cities, states, and other political subdivisions-are the most noticeable,
particularly in route and merger proceedings. The criterion governing
intervention has generally been whether the petitioner possesses a substantial economic interest that might be affected by a decision. 518 The
economic interest of an "on-line" city, one within the area of service
under consideration, is so apparent that such cities formerly encountered
512 See Boros, .supra note 478, at 16; cf. American-Western Merger Case, Order
Granting and Denying Petitions for Leave to Intervene, No. 71-3-42, Docket 22,916
(CAB, Mar. 5, 1971) (denying formal intervention to a group of law students designating themselves as FLITE [Future Lawyers Investigating Transportation Employment] because they failed to establish a statutory right to be made a party and had
no other interest).
51314 C.F.R. §302.15 (a) (1971). The courts have approved this rule, specifically rejecting the assertion that interested persons have a right to participate as
full parties in CAB proceedings and holding that rule 15 intervention remains within
an examiner's and the Board's discretion. See Palisades Citizens Ass'n v. CAB,
420 F.2d 188, 193 (D.C. Cir. 1969); City of San Antonio v. CAB, 374 F.2d 326,
331 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
514 14 C.F.R. § 302.15(b) (1971). The seven considerations relevant to a determination of the merits of a petition to intervene are:
(1) the nature of the petitioner's right under the statute to be made a party
to the proceeding;
(2) the nature and extent of the property, financial or other interest of the
petitioner;
(3) the effect of the order which may be entered in the proceeding on petitioner's interest;
(4) the availability of other means whereby the petitioner's interest may be
protected ;
(5) the extent to which petitioner's interest will be represented by existing
parties ;
(6) the extent to which petitioner's participation may reasonably be expected
to assist in the development of a sound record; and
(7) the extent to which participation of the petitioner will broaden the issue
or delay the proceeding.
515 See, e.g., Caribbean-Atlantic Airlines, Inc.-Eastern Air Lines, Inc., Acquisition
Case, Order Granting and Denying Petitions for Leave to Intervene, No. 70-12-153,
Docket 22,690 (CAB, Dec. 30, 1970).
516 See, e.g., id.; American-Trans Caribbean Merger, Intervention Order, No.
70-4-33, Docket 21,828 (CAB, Apr. 8, 1970).
51
See, e.g., City of San Antonio v. CAB, 374 F.2d 326 (D.C. Cir. 1967) ; City
of Houston v. CAB, 317 F.2d 158 (D.C. Cir. 1963); Southern Transcontinental
Serv. Case, 39 C.A.B. 896 (1964) ; Eastern-Colonial, Acquisition of Assets, 18 C.A.B.
453 (1954) (43 civic bodies intervened).
51
8 See City of Houston v. CAB, 317 F.2d 158, 160 (D.C. Cir. 1963) ; ChicagoAcapulco Nonstop Serv. Investigation, Order Granting Intervention, No. 71-3-26,
Docket 22,956 (CAB, Mar. 4, 1971) ; On-Route Charter Authority of Foreign Air
Carrier Permits, Intervention Order, No. 71-3-22, Docket 22,362 (CAB, Mar. 3,
1971).
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little difficulty in securing full party rights. 19 In the case of "off-line"
cities and, of late, even cases involving on-line cities, however, the CAB
has been more restrictive, denying intervention either because civic
intervenors can utilize alternative means of participation 520 or because
their interests in the proceeding are too remote. 21 Though to date no
political subdivision has sought intervention on strictly noncommercial
grounds, it is conceivable that, in this time of growing concern with the

environment, a municipality, county, or state may attempt to put in
issue the impact of a merger or route certification upon population congestion or noise pollution. The clear trend of recent federal decisions
is to confer standing in such situations, 22 but, in light of the CAB's
heavy reliance on finding a financial or property interest as a basis for
formal intervention, it is not clear that it would readily acknowledge a

noneconomic interest. 2 3
c. Informal Participation
Rule 14 of the CAB's principles of practice, -4 which governs participation by non-principals in hearings, states in part that
[a]ny person, including [political units of a state], may
appear at any hearing, other than in an enforcement proceeding, and present any evidence which is relevant to the issues.
With the consent of the examiner or the Board . . . such
person may also cross-examine witnesses directly. Such persons may also present to the examiner a written statement on
the issues ....
Persons granted intervention under rule 14 are not parties but are more
properly termed "informal" intervenors. There was little difference
between the rights of informal and formal intervenors until 1961, when
the regulations were changed to their present form, resulting in the

extinguishment of a rule 14 participant's rights after the hearing before
519 See W. FisK, supra note 476, at 35

(noting that 30 intervenors, mostly

"on-line" cities, were granted intervention in a 1953 route proceeding).
520 See Boros, supra note 478, at 26 (noting that petitions to intervene in the
United-Capital Merger case were denied on the ground that the communities could
protect their interests as "informal" participants).
521 See American-Eastern Merger, 36 C.A.B. 874, 875 (1962) (denying the city
of Houston permission to intervene based upon a finding that the city "failed to
disclose a property, financial, or other substantial interest in the proceeding"), rev'd
per curiam, Houston v. CAB, 317 F.2d 158 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (holding Houston did
have "substantial interest" since, though not served by the merging carriers, it had
a competing interest with Dallas, which was so served).
522 See notes 33-120 supra & accompanying text.
523 See note 518 supra & accompanying text. Certainly where the civic party
is geographically remote from the affected area of the proposed action, intervention
may be denied.
524 14 C.F.R. §302.14 (1971).
525 Id. § 302.14(b).
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an examiner.5 26 Formal parties now have significant advantages, particularly in terms of their ability to appear before the Board itself. Only
full parties have a right to request oral argument before either the
Board or the examiner,52 7 to petition for discretionary review by the
Board of an examiner's initial decision, 528 and to file exceptions to the
examiner's recommended decision or to a tentative decision by the
Board. 29 Whereas rule 14 intervenors must file written statements on
the issues before all of the evidence is received, full parties may file
briefs with the examiner or the Board after the hearing record is complete. 3 ° Full party status, however, is not a prerequisite to judicial
review, which is available to "any person disclosing a substantial interest" in the subject matter of an order. 3' That the extent of participation by an intervenor under rule 14 is confined to the initial hearing
and largely turns upon the will of the examiner is of unquestionable
significance.5 2 Relegation to rule 14 status might deprive a public
intervenor of the important ability to fully pursue its interest through
both the hearing and appeal process to the Board.
In Palisades Citizens Association v. CAB,533 several associations of citizens, styling themselves "Concerned Citizens," sought
formal or, alternatively, informal intervention in a certification hearing
on a proposed helicopter route in the Baltimore-Washington area. The
Citizens alleged in substance that their participation would help insure
that the record would reflect the environmental impact of the proposed
service. The petitioners did not seek to introduce their own evidence
on the adverse environmental consequences of certification but, rather,
demanded that the carrier applicants be compelled to make studies and
Considering the criteria provided by rule
adduce such evidence.5 3
Boros, supra note 478, at 16.
14 C.F.R. §§ 302.25, 302.32 (1971).
id. § 302.23.
id. § 302.30.
id. §§ 302.26, 302.31.
531 Compare 16 U.S.C. § 8551(b) (1970) (Federal Power Act) and 15 U.S.C.
§717r(b) (1970) (Natural Gas Act) with 49 U.S.C. § 1486(a) (1970) (Federal
Aviation Act). See Brief for Respondent at 24, Palisades Citizens Ass'n v. CAB,
420 F.2d 188 (D.C. Cir. 1969) [hereinafter cited as Brief]; Shapiro, supra note 37,
at 767. On the other hand, the grant of formal intervention is "for administrative
purposes only, and no decision granting leave to intervene shall be deemed to constitute
an expression by the Board that the intervening party has such a substantial interest
in the order that is to be entered in the proceeding as will entitle it to judicial review
of such order." 14 C.F.R. § 302.15(d).
532 See Comment, Adequacy of Domestic Airline Service: The Community's Role
in a Changing Industry, 68 YALE LJ. 1199, 1218 n.93 (1959) (quoting address by
Perry H. Taft, National Airport Conf., Nov. 3, 1957, indicating that a community,
to be successful before the CAB, must participate in all stages of the proceedings).
The advantages inherent in the opportunity to argue orally before the Board, as
opposed to simply participating before the examiner, are suggested by the description
or oral arguments in the New York-Chicago case. See W. FISK, supra note 476,
at 75.
See
See
528 See
529 See
530 See
526

527

533 420 F.2d 188 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
534 Id. at 190.
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the Board affirmed the examiner's denial of formal intervention
in favor of rule 14 participation. The Board found that, though "interested persons" have a right to file written position statements," 6 the
petitioners had no statutory right to actively participate in the proceedings,537 that the petitioners' interest was not uniquely identifiable apart
from the general public's,53 that the Department of Transportation,
which was allowed party status, would be the principal public spokesman for representing the petitioners' concerns, 39 that the petitioners
would not themselves affirmatively offer any evidence concerning environmental impact,5 40 and that if the Citizens were allowed to participate as parties the proceedings would be "nearly uncontrollable." 541
The Board concluded that informal rule 14 participation "strikes the
practical balance between the general public's interest in viable administrative proceedings and the private interests of individual members
of the general public." 542
The court on appeal recognized the relevance of environmental
concerns and acknowledged the Citizens' "keen interest" in the proceedings, but sustained the Board's denial of formal intervention.5 43 The
Palisadescourt's reasons for upholding the denial of intervention brings
into relief perhaps the major difficulty that will confront public interest
groups attempting to intervene as parties in Board hearings. The
Citizens were not denied all opportunity to participate in the route proceeding; rather, they were granted quite generous privileges as informal
intervenors. In this capacity they were allowed to present exhibits, to
file a written statement of their position, to cross-examine extensively,
and to argue orally before the examiner.544 In light of these privileges,
the court felt that the Citizens' role "amounted to a reduction of [their]
status in form only, rather than in substance." "' The salient question
raised by this decision is whether the informal status afforded the
Citizens, readily accepted by the court as a representative environmentalist group, 46 adequately protects the public's interest in the en5 47

vironment.
535 See
536 See
537See

note 514 supra.
note 485 supra & accompanying text.
Brief, supra note 531, at 26-27; cf. City of San Antonio v. CAB, 374
F.2d 326, 331 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
538 Brief, supra note 531, at 27-28.
539 Id. 30-31.
Cf. American-Trans Caribbean Merger, Intervention Order, No.
70-4-33, Docket 21,828 (CAB, Apr. 8, 1970).
540 Brief, stpra note 531, at 31.
541 Id. 33; 420 F.2d at 191.
542 Brief, supra note 531, at 33; 420 F.2d at 191.
543 420 F.2d at 193.
544 Id. See Brief, supra note 531, at 11.
545 420 F.2d at 193.
546 Although the Concerned Citizens were private property owners, the court
largely ignored that fact, choosing to look upon the group as a potential representative
of the public interest in the environment. See id. at 190.
547 See Brief, supra note 531, at 35-38 (statement of the Department of Justice
to the effect that the petitioners should have a legal right to intervene as parties).
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To the extent that Palisades sanctions a general Board policy of
denying rule 15 rights to public intervenors, 5 4 thereby foreclosing
direct access to the Board, it effectively accommodates some of the
concerns which led to the 1961 rule change.5 49 One of the objections
to full participation by third party groups centered upon the tendency
of often inept civic intervenors to encumber the hearing and review
procedures with poorly prepared presentations. 50 Another frequently
encountered objection has been that full intervention by such parties
tends to protract and enlarge hearings to unmanageable proportions. 551
The likelihood of such time consumption is substantiated by the fact
that ninety-five percent of CAB hearing time is consumed by crossexamination and re-cross-examination,5 52 and an increase in the number of full parties possessing the right to cross-examine might well lead
to a geometric increase in expended hearing time.
The considerations against allowing public interest groups full rule
15 intervention are not to be taken lightly. Numerous civic parties or
548 The Board policy on allowing intervention has been restrictive.
"Perhaps,
this [1961] rule change would not have been so unfortunate had the Board adopted
a more liberal approach to permitting intervention under Rule 15. It has not done
so. Intervention has been more sparingly granted than formerly." Boros, supra
note 478, at 17 (footnote omitted). The Board itself, however, has said that its
"regulations and its generally liberal approach in their administration have encouraged
citizen-group input." RESPONSES, supra note 30, at 5-6.
549 One of the chief reasons for the 1961 rule change, not applicable to the broad
question of public interest group intervention, was CAB concern over frequent appearances at Board hearings by congressmen, senators, and state officials seeking to place
overt political pressure upon the decisionmaking process. See Boros, supra note 478,
at 16-17. See also Rizley, supra note 501, at 450.
550 See Boros, supra note 478, at 21. But cf. W. Fisx, supra note 476, at 41
(recounting the preparation of a "fairly typical civic intervenor" in the 1953 New
York-Chicago route certification case).
551 See, e.g., SENATE SUBCoMr. ON ADIiN. PRAcTICE & PRocEDuRE, 89TH CONG.,
2D SESS., QUESTIONNAIRE SURVEy ON DELAY IN ADMINISTRATIVE PRocEEDINGs 32
(Comm. Print 1966) [hereinafter cited as QUESTIONNAIRE] ; City of San Antonio v.
CAB, 374 F.2d 326, 332 (D.C. Cir. 1967) ("[T]he Board found that there were already
at least 65 parties to the proceeding, and to allow petitioners and cities similarly
situated to intervene would in effect defeat the very purpose of the consolidation order
which, of course, was to keep the proceeding within manageable limits."). In Riddle
Airlines, Inc., 28 C.A.B. 15 (1958), the Board allowed the L.B. Smith Aircraft Corp.
oral argument to protest the granting of a subsidy to a competitor, but denied a
petition to intervene, stating that "lilt does not appear that Smith's participation may
reasonably be expected to assist in the development of a sound record, nor does it
appear that Smith has an interest which could not adequately be served by participation
in the proceeding pursuant to rule 14 of the Board's rules of practice. Moreover,
Smith's participation as an intervenor would broaden the issues herein and delay the
proceeding." Id. at 21. The view that a liberal intervention policy will unnecessarily
delay proceedings has been called "one of the most oft-repeated myths" in the CAB.
Boros, supra note 478, at 21. The Board itself feels that its "decision-making procedures operate with reasonable speed considering the breadth and complexity of the
issues involved." RESPONSES, supra note 30, at 11.
552 Pfeiffer, Shortening the Record in CAB Proceedings Through Elimination of
Unnecessary and Hazardous Cross-Examination,22 J. AmR L. & Com. 286, 287 (1955).
Cf. W. JONES, supra note 479, at 122 ("Everyone seems to agree that crossexamination often is excessive . . . ."). The procedural rules require that direct
evidence be presented in written form whenever feasible. See 14 C.F.R. § 302.24(b)
(1971). This is in harmony with the APA, which compels only "such cross-examination as may be required for a full and fair disclosure of the facts." 5 U.S.C. § 556(d)
(1970).
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more than one environmentalist group can be expected to adduce repetitive and often immaterial evidence. A right of cross-examination is
also subject to abuse, and the more parties possessing the right, the
more potential for dilatory abuse exists. Furthermore, the necessity
of wading through the additional briefs and a copious hearing record,
which would result from the granting of full intervention to third
parties, would add to the delay plaguing CAB proceedingsY5 3 It certainly must be conceded that to have fewer parties in any particular
proceeding will, to some degree, expedite the disposition of the matter
at hand, 5 4 but expediency in itself should not be a legitimate ground
for foreclosing participation. 555
In addition to these considerations, the evidence an environmentalist group can be expected to introduce at a hearing will often fall within
the ambit of what Professor Davis calls "legislative fact" or "general
facts which help the tribunal decide questions of law and policy and
discretion." "6 In Palisades, for example, the Concerned Citizens
argued that investigation would prove "that helicopters pollute the air
far more per passenger mile than automotive vehicles." 557 The advisability of allowing cross-examination of evidence bearing on such
Such policy matters involving
issues has been seriously questioned. 5
legislative fact may be better decided through the rulemaking than the
adjudicatory process.' 9 Even in those situations where the environmental considerations introduced are clearly adjudicatory in nature, the
vast majority of such facts would seem to lend themselves well to presentation by exhibits, statistics, and written statements. It is, therefore,
at least questionable whether cross-examination and other procedures
attendant to full party status need be universally available.
55
3 See

Boros, supra note 478, at 22 (indicating that in excess of 1 year generally
expires between the examiner's initial decision and the Board's decision in certification
cases).
554 It is impossible to say with certainty just how much effort the Board typically
expends in going through the hearing record, as very little is known about the internal
workings of the Board itself. See W. Fisx, supra note 476, at 76 (referring to the
deliberations of the Board as "the most important, the most interesting, and the most
obscure" aspect of a CAB proceeding) ; cf. RE PONSES, supra note 30, at 10.
555 See Boros, supra note 478, at 22; Virginia Petroleum Jobbers Ass'n v. FPC,
265 F2d 364, 367-68 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
556 1 K. DAvis, supra note 23, § 7.02, at 413.
557 See Harkaway, Air Pollution--The Federal Power Commission and Other
FederalAgencies, 3 NAT. REs. LAw. 66, 71 (1970). The Board rejected the contention, but there will undoubtedly "be considerably more air pollution evidence offered
into its proceedings in the future." Id. 72.
5ss See Pfeiffer, supra note 552, at 296-97; W. JoNEs, supra note 479, at 122.
559 But cf. Robinson, supra note 191, at 521. See also Clagett, supra note 198,
at 77-80 (suggesting flexible procedural devices).
The problem of policy-oriented cross-examination will not normally arise in the
rulemaking context, inasmuch as the Administrative Procedure Act's rulemaking
provisions do not require the holding of a full evidentiary hearing. See 5 U.S.C.
§§553(c), 556(d) (1970). Where the Board's order has "'future effect' . . . of
both general and particular applicability," only the opportunity to submit written data
and argument by the interested parties is required. Law Motor Freight, Inc. v.
CAB, 364 F.2d 139, 143 (1st Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 905 (1967).
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Notwithstanding the foregoing conclusion, it is possible that, in
particular circumstances, participation limited by the strictures of rule
14 will not adequately air the public interest before the Board. In
Palisadesthe Board did weigh the question of environmental impact
against the need for helicopter service, finding the latter consideration
persuasive.6 60 The Board's final decision undertook a discussion of
each point raised by the Citizens, disposing of each in a reasonable
fashion.5"' The Palisades court seemed to think that the Department
of Transportation, as a formal intervenor, actively represented environmental concerns throughout the certification proceeding. 562 There is
no assurance, however, that future Boards will treat public interest
groups as fairly or that there will be existing adequate representation
as a matter of course, 56 3 especially as economic considerations dominate
Board and examiner hearings. In light of governmental opposition to
environmentalist groups in other agency proceedings, 56 4 the most vigorous, effective, and faithful representation of the environmentalist position can hardly be expected over a range of cases. The notion that the
agency charged with conducting a hearing adequately protects the
public interest has been rejected. 6 5 Relegation to rule 14 status without a discretionary broadening of the party's rights may not provide for
a fair and full appraisal of significant aspects of the public interest.
Rationalization about surrogate representation and concern with unduly
extended proceedings cannot obscure the possibility that rule 14 could
be employed to circumvent the broad purpose of Moss by effectively
excluding the public from the CAB decisional process. 6 6
2. A Proposal
Against the backdrop of these competing considerations-the desirability of expeditious procedure and the need for full consideration
560 420 F2d at 193. See also Glass, Planning for Suburban Heliports, 22 J. AI
L. & Com. 271, 281 (1955) (including among the factors to be considered in selecting
heliport sites the "[p]ossible effect on use of neighboring property as a result of
noise of helicopter operations and air blast effects.").
561420 F.2d at 193 n.7.
562 See id. at 193. The Department of Transportation had, however, no "scientifically acceptable basis for estimating the extent of helicopter air pollution."
Harkaway, supra note 557, at 71-72.
563 The Board has not appointed any citizen advisory groups, but trade and
industry groups do advise the Board on their special fields of interest. "The information derived through exchanges with such groups provides the Board with an informed
basis for carrying out policy-making and decision-making functions." Furthermore,
the Board does not "seek out the views of persons who would not otherwise be likely
to present their views to the Board." REsPoxsEs, supra note 30, at 6. The Board
does claim, however, "that those persons that are affected by the Board's activities
know enough about them" by means of notice and distribution of information. Id. 8.
564 See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Hickel 433 F.2d 24 (9th Cir. 1970), aff'd sub nor.
Sierra Club v. Morton, 40 U.S.L.W. 4397 (U.S. Apr. 19, 1972) (action for declaratory
judgment and injunction against Secretaries of Interior and Agriculture brought by
environmentalist group).
565 See, e.g., Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC,
359 F.2d 994, 1003-04 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
566 See notes 495-509 supra & accompanying text.
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of the public interest-Palisadessuggests an intervention scheme that
may effectively accommodate the broad spectrum of interests affected by
CAB activity. The court in that case did not approve the simple consignment of the Citizens to a status strictly limited by the language of
rule 14, for the petitioners enjoyed more rights than rule 14 minimally
confers. 67 In addition to the presentation of exhibits and a written
statement of the issues, the Citizens were granted the discretionary
privileges of cross-examination and oral argument before the examiner."' In light of those privileges, the court's statement that the
Citizens' position under rule 14 was "a reduction of . . . status in form

only" 569 is more convincing. When compared, for example, with restrictive limitation on participation allowed nonparties in AEC proceedings,5 7 ° it is apparent that rule 14, as employed in Palisades,does
not preclude a reasonable solution to the problem of public interest
intervention.
If rule 14 status was indeed a handicap in form only, the question
remains whether there was any reason not to grant the Citizens rule 15
status. The obvious answer is that there was. Even if the court's
assertion that "that which might have been accomplished under Rule 15
was, in fact, effected through Rule 14" 571 cannot be taken as wholly
true, the court did lend its imprimatur to the flexibility shown by the
examiner and the Board in that particular case in conferring upon the
Citizens privileges not even mentioned in rule 14.572 The court unfor5
5 8

See text accompanying notes 544-45 supra.
See 420 F.2d at 193.

569Id.
570 See

text accompanying notes 851-52 infra.
571420 F2d at 193.
572
The Board recently denied a petition to intervene as a party filed by the
Aviation Consumer Action Project (ACAP) but, in addition to permitting rule 14
participation, "determined to permit ACAP to file a post-hearing brief or statement
of position w'vith the examiner and in the event of further proceedings to file a brief
or statement of position with the Board and to participate in any oral argument
which may be ordered." American-Western Merger Case, Order at 1, No. 71-11-43,
Docket 22,916 (CAB, Nov. 11, 1971). The Board thought that its unusual action
would not unduly burden the proceedings and "could, moreover, prove helpful in this
case since . . . ACAP is the only participant of its type in the proceeding. [The
Board emphasized], however, that this limited permission (which does not constitute
formal intervention) is being granted solely as a matter of grace, and is not to be
taken as a precedent, either under Rule 15 or otherwise." Id. at 3. The Board warned
that "neither the Federal Aviation Act nor the courts have placed on the Board the
requirement of permitting formal intervention . . . to groups which have no direct
and substantial economic interest in the proceeding at hand and which may in reality
turn out to consist of no more than one or a few individuals." Id. at 3 n.6. Commenting upon ACAP's failure to show that it would be a responsible spokesman for
"a broadly based organization representing a significant segment of the public," the
Board said that it would "expect future petitions to intervene from this and other
such groups to provide more detailed information to permit us to ascertain whether
formal intervention, as opposed to Rule 14 participation, is appropriate." Id.
ACAP had filed an untimely petition, but claimed that it was entitled as a "public
body" to a more lenient filing deadline. See 14 C.F.R. § 302.15(c) (2) (iii) (1971).
The Board rejected this contention, stating that the filing exception was intended to
benefit local government bodies which "frequently find it difficult to meet the generally
applicable deadline because of lack of familiarity with federal agency procedure, lack
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tunately evinced no apprehension that this flexibility might not be so
wisely utilized in future cases. Unlike rule 15, whose seven criteria 573
at least provide a skeletal guide to the exercise of the examiner's discretion in weighing a petition for formal intervention, rule 14 does not
indicate what factors should determine the scope of the privileges, if any,
to be accorded a rule 14 intervenor. The court's opinion in Palisades
concludes with the hedging assertion that "[i]t is for the Board to
determine who will best serve to amplify the facts pertinent to [the
public] interest ....

""

Given the absence of standards to guide

that determination, there is no assurance that the relatively equitable
solution reached in Palisadesoften will be repeated.
The APA provides that the reasons underlying an agency's findings or conclusions shall be shown on the record,5 7 and any failure to
do so may constitute reversible error.576 At a minimum, rule 14 should
contain a set of criteria similar in purpose to those found in rule 15.
The grant or denial of an informal intervenor's privileges could be
weighed against these standards, and the scope of any grant could be
tailored to the needs of the intervenor in each particular case. To facilitate review of contested denials of privilege and to insure that each
intervenor is dealt with as flexibly as were the Citizens, the reasons
underlying the examiner's or Board's action should be articulated. As
presently drafted, rule 14 invites a stream of Palisades-like appeals
attacking Board action as arbitrary or as lacking articulated reasons.
Intelligible standards controlling the evidentiary and appellate "77 privileges granted the rule 14 intervenor can insure fairness with some
regularity.
To achieve this result, rule 14 could be restructured by adding a
subsection (c) providing that:
1) After determining that the facts do not warrant a person's
formal intervention as a full party under rule 15 but that
limited participation under this rule is warranted, the examiner (or the Board) may, in the exercise of discretion, allow
the person so participating under this rule one or more of the
following privileges:
of information about prehearing conferences in proceedings in which they might have
an interest, the frequent need to locate and employ special legal counsel for the
purpose, and other similar factors." Order at 2. The Board found that ACAP
was a national organization with knowledgeable counsel, but intimated that other
local nongovernmental groups might be eligible for the relaxed filing requirements
in the future. Id. at 2 & n.3.
573 See note 514 supra.
574 420 F2d at 193. Cf. City of San Antonio v. CAB, 374 F2d 326, 329 (D.C.
Cir. 1967) ; Frontier Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 349 F.2d 587, 591 (10th Cir. 1965).
5755 U.S.C. §557(c) (1970).
576 See, e.g., City of Lawrence v. CAB, 343 F2d 583, 588 (1st Cir. 1965);
Northeast Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 331 F.2d 579 (1st Cir. 1964).
577 "Appellate" here refers to those stages of a Board proceeding occurring after
an examiner's initial decision.
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i) the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses;
ii) the opportunity to argue orally before the examiner
and/or the Board;
iii) the opportunity to file exceptions to one or more
findings of fact or conclusions of the examiner or
the Board; and
iv) the opportunity to present to the examiner and/or
to the Board a brief prepared after the termination
of the examiner's hearings.
2) In passing upon petitions by persons seeking these privileges, the following factors, among others, will be considered:
i) the necessity of balancing the considerations to be
advanced by the person participating under this rule
with those advanced by other participants;
ii) the possibility that the Board may not be as familiar
with the hearing record as with the factual and
policy considerations presented directly by means of
brief and/or oral argument;
iii) the presumption in favor of non-duplicative testimony, argument, and cross-examination, provided
that relevancy to the issues at hand has been established; and
iv) the extent to which formal parties to the proceedings
can reasonably be expected to represent adequately
the interests of the rule 14 participant at each and
every stage of the proceeding.
Given the CAB's widespread use of the prehearing conference,57 S the
examiner has the opportunity, by fixing the "ground rules" of the impending hearing, to make a fair and thorough determination of which
privileges to grant. Certainly much can be done at the conference to
ascertain what evidence will be cumulative or irrelevant, where the
examiner might benefit from cross-examination by the various parties,
and which issues might be fully presented only by brief and oral argument. 7 Since the fear of reversal often prevents an examiner from
making an exclusionary ruling in the midst of a hearing,5 0 the compulsion to list reasons for a prehearing or midhearing ruling would
seem to substantially lessen the possibility of Board or judicial reversal.
578See
14 C.F.R. §302.23 (1971); QUESTIONNAImE, supra note 551, at 28, 31.
See also W. JONES, supra note 479, at 45, 140-41.
579 See Westxvood, Administrative Proceedings: Techniques of Presiding, 50

A.B.A.J.
659 (1964).
58 0

See PRESIDENT'S CONFERENCE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, REPORT OF THE

CONFERENCE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PRoCEDURE 53-54

(1955).
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Rather than allowing a hobbling influx of public interest litigants at
every stage of every proceeding, a case-by-case method of giving the
public a forum while preserving the independence and flexibility of the
administrative process may thus be developed.
Increased public participation before the CAB and other federal
agencies demands recognition of an agency's "basic right to limit the
scope of its inquiries" 58' through the judicious employment of efficient
procedure. As "[a]dequate protection for interests obliquely affected
may often be afforded through limited participation," "82 the embryo
of a reasonable, flexible intervention scheme may be found in the present
CAB rules. With the modification suggested above, those rules, when
generously applied, are capable of accommodating all interests and may
well prove the prototype of fair public participation for all federal
regulatory agencies.
C. Federal Trade Commission
Perhaps the most difficult conceptual and practical problems with
public interest intervention arise in the context of the Federal Trade
Commission. While the other agencies considered serve the primary
function of allocating resources and privileges, the primary role of the
FTC, as it is presently constituted, 8 3 is to prosecute parties who violate
federal statutes, 4 particularly those who engage in unfair trade prac581 Frontier Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 349 F.2d 587, 591 (10th Cir. 1965).
582 3 K. DAVIs, supra note 23, § 22.08, at 241. See Shapiro, supra note 37, at

752-56.
583 Former FTC Commissioner Elman has recently suggested that "Congress
should transfer the FTC's adjudicative function either to the district courts or,
preferably, to a new Trade Court, which would be decentralized and hold hearings
in every state, thus bringing the judicial phase of the regulatory process much closer
to the people. The Trade Court could be given jurisdiction not only of complaints
prosecuted by the agency, but also private class action suits brought by consumers
and competitors injured by the same alleged unfair trade practices." The FTC's
remaining functions would be "vested in a single commissioner serving at the pleasure
of both the President and Congress and removable by either," in order to increase
the FTC's accountability and therefore its responsiveness to the public and to enable
it to pursue "a single central objective: the development and enforcement of regulatory policies carrying out the statutory mandate" through special investigations and
expanded use of trade regulation rules and similar policy statements. Elman, A
Modest Proposal for Radical Reform, 56 A.B.A.J. 1045, 1048-49 (1970) ; cf. ABA
[hereinCOMMISSION TO STUDY THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, REPORT 90 (1969)
after cited as ABA REPORT] (concurring statement of John D. French suggesting
the transfer of prosecutorial functions to the Department of Justice, leaving the FTC
to function as "a trade regulation court, commentator, and rulemaker") ; PRESIDENT'S
ADVISORY COUNCIl. ON EXECUTIVE ORGANIZATION, A NEW REGULATORY FRAMECIEWORK:
(the "Ash
REPORT ON SELECTED INDEPENDENT REGULATORY AGENCIES 87 (1971)
Council Report," recommending abolition of the FTC and transfer of its antitrust
OF
ABA
SEcand consumer protection functions to separate new agencies) ; REPORT
TION OF ANTITRUST LAW TO STUDY THE ASH COUNCIL REPORT (1971) (rejecting the
report and recommending instead the transfer of adjudicative functions to a new administrative court).
584 For a survey of the FTC's statutory authority and responsibilities, see ABA
REPORT, supra note 583, at 6-7.
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tices 5"5 or conspire to lessen competition."' The Commission employs
a range of enforcement techniques varying with the seriousness of the
offense, the need for prompt compliance with the law, the probability
of winning the case if the Commission were put to its proof in a formal
adjudicatory proceeding, and competing demands placed upon its resources. The Commission may seek an assurance of voluntary compliance or of informal corrective action, or it may negotiate a consent
order with a party suspected of violating the law. If such negotiations
fail, or if the Commission feels the issues cannot be satisfactorily resolved through such negotiation, it may initiate formal adjudicative
proceedings against such a party.
1. Informal Proceedings
Informal proceedings, which dispose of the bulk of the Commission's cases, 58 7 can commence in several ways. The Commission may
negotiate directly with the party suspected of violating the law to effect
an informal corrective action, which may consist of nothing more than
an oral promise or exchange of letters, or it may secure an assurance of
voluntary compliance.r s In such cases the proceeding never goes beyond the stage of informal discussions. In informal corrective actions,
the assurances of voluntary compliance are not reported by the Commission; they remain confidential, putatively to protect the reputation
of the complying party. The legal effect of such assurance is unclear
for, unlike a consent order,56 9 it does not contain an admission of jurisdictional facts and waivers of procedural steps, of the requirement that
the Commission state its findings of fact and conclusions of law, and
of rights of judicial review and other challenges to its validity. Presumably, if the assurance is violated, the Commission's recourse is to
seek a consent order or to institute a formal proceeding.
Under the consent order procedure, the Commission may notify a
party of "its intention to institute a formal proceeding" "0 against that
party. The proposed respondent may then "file . . . a reply stating
whether or not he is interested in having the proceeding disposed of by
5 5

See 15 U.S.C. §45 (1970).

86 The FTC and the Department of Justice have concurrent jurisdiction to
enforce §§ 2, 3, 7 & 8 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 13, 14, 18-19 (1970). See
15 U.S.C. §21 (1970).
Tele687 Approximately 90% of FTC cases are disposed of by consent orders.
phone interview with Joachim Volhard, Office of FTC Commissioner Maclntyre,
Aug. 1971. This estimate does not take into account assurances of voluntary compliance or informal corrective actions. Cf. ABA REPO T, supra note 583, at 16-26.
The ABA Report detected a trend toward greater reliance on informal proceedings,
and concluded that "the de-emphasis of formal enforcement has gone too far." Id. 25.
Undoubtedly, however, "the Commission would not be able to function without a
system of consent settlement." Auerbach, The Federal Trade Commission: Internal
Orgaization and Procedure, 48 MiNN. L. REV. 383, 424 (1964).
For a statistical analysis of recent assurances,
58S See 16 C.F.P,. § 2.21 (1971).
see ABA REPoRr, sipra note 583, at 22-23.

58916 C.F.R. §2.33 (1971).
590 Id.§ 2.31.
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the entry of a consent order." "' The proceeding is not adversary; it
is a bargaining session conducted in confidence by parties both of whom
have an interest in avoiding formal adjudication.5 92 The proposed
respondent does not admit to a violation of law (thus preventing private suitors from using the order as evidence in a damage suit) but
merely agrees to comply with Commission requirements. As the
Supreme Court has recently noted of consent orders obtained by the
Department of Justice:
Consent decrees are entered into by parties to a case after
careful negotiation has produced agreement on their precise
terms. The parties waive their right to litigate the issues involved in the case and thus save themselves the time, expense,
and inevitable risk of litigation. Naturally the agreement
reached normally embodies a compromise; in exchange for
the saving of cost and elimination of risk, the parties each
give up something they might have won had they proceeded
with the litigation ...
[T]he scope of a consent decree must be discerned within its
four corners, and not by reference to what might satisfy the
purposes of one of the parties to it.593
What of those who are not party to a consent order but whose
interests are affected by it? If agreement is reached, the Commission
will provisionally accept it and
will place the order contained therein on the public record
for a period of thirty (30) days, during which it will receive
and consider any comments or views concerning the order
that may be filed by any interested persons. Within ten (10)
days thereafter, the Commission may either withdraw its acceptance of the agreement and so notify the other party, in
which event it will take such other action as it may consider
appropriate, or issue and serve its complaint (in such form
as the circumstances require), and decision, in disposition of
the proceeding. 594
591 Id. § 2.32.
592 One former official of the Department of Justice has expressed concern that

the Government's interests in avoiding litigation-the efficient allocation of enforcement resources and the immediate procurement of relief as contrasted with obtaining
compliance only after protracted litigation-might be jeopardized by allowing intervention as of right by private parties in consent decree proceedings. "Where the
Government has concluded that the added amount of relief which might theoretically
be obtained would involve protracted litigation and use of enforcement resources
which could be put to better use elswhere, the private intervenor would rarely if
ever be in a position to second-guess that judgment." Letter from Donald F. Turner
to Representative Emanuel Celler, Mar. 17, 1967, in BNA ANTITRUST & TRADE REG.
REP., Mar. 21, 1967, at X-1, X-2 to -3.
593United States v. Armour & Co., 402 U.S. 673, 681-82 (1971).
594 16 C.F.R. § 2.34(b) (1971). This provision for public comment took effect
on July 1, 1967, 4 years after the Department of Justice had adopted a similar policy.
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Comments may be received from a variety of sources. Because the
proposed orders are published in the Federal Register, however, only
well-organized interests are likely to be fully informed of their significance and have the resources to present cogent commentary in the
limited time available. 95 Other concerned parties must generally rely
on the limited coverage given FTC activities by the press, which alternative the Commission has made little effort to improve.5" 6 There is,
of course, no assurance that any comments received will have any effect;
in fact, there have been very few cases in which a proposed consent
order has been withdrawn or modified because of public comment."'
This is in no way surprising. By the time the Commission issues a
provisional consent order, it has, for all practical purposes, made up
its mind.
That current informal enforcement procedures insufficiently allow
significant participation by third parties is being urged by a group of
George Washington University law students incorporated as Students
Opposing Unfair Practices, Inc. (SOUP), in their appeal of the Commission's acceptance of a consent agreement with the Campbell Soup
°8 Campbell had been charged with placing marbles in a
Company.'
The FTC had previously opposed such disclosure. See Auerbach, supra note 587,
at 445-49. Cf. 16 C.F.R. § 1.4 (1971) (public comment on limited class of FTC
advisory opinions).
595 See notes 253-55 .supra & accompanying text.
596 See RESPONSES, supra note 30, at 195 (statement of FTC Comm'r Mary Gardiner Jones); cf. id. 116 (statement of former Comm'r Paul R. Dixon).
597See Chrysler Corp., 4 CCH CoxsumER CREDIT GuzuE 99,596 (FTC 1971);
Hemphill Enterprises, Inc., [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 18,524
(FTC 1969). Eric Schnapper, of the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund,
Inc., New York City, had submitted comments suggesting stricter disclosure requirements in the Chrysler consent order. Although the staff initially disapproved
Schnapper's recommendations, the commissioners subsequently accepted them. Telephone interview with Chris White, Office of FTC Commissioner Mary Gardiner
Jones, Aug. 1971. Of the Fund's efforts in general before the FTC, Mr. Schnapper
has noted:
Over the past two years, I would estimate, the Legal Defense Fund . . .
has sought modifications of perhaps half a dozen orders, sought half a dozen
trade regulations and filed half a dozen complaints against specific merchants. I have not fully resolved in my own mind whether this is worth continuing. Where it felt it had jurisdiction, the FTC has agreed to investigate
the complaints but I have yet to see the results. None of the requested regulations has been promulgated. They aren't so much killed as just missing in
action. Requests for modifications of [consent] orders have been rejected
for a variety of reasons.
Letter from Eric Schnapper to the University of Pewsylvania Law Review, Sept. 13,
1971, on file in Biddle Law Library, Univ. of Pa. Law School. Cf. Letter from
Joachim Volhard, Office of FTC Commissioner Maclntyre, to the University of
PennsylvaniaLaw Review (undated), on file in Biddle Law Library, Univ. of Pa. Law
School: "Very rarely is a consent order which has been provisionally accepted by
the Commission re-executed upon receipt of comments."
598 SOUP, Inc. v. FTC, No. 24,476 (D.C. Cir., filed July 24, 1970). For a
discussion of the availability of judicial review for parties other than respondents,
see notes 698-706 infrn & accompanying text.
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bowl of its soup depicted in advertisements to create the illusion that
the soup contained more solid ingredients than it actually did.599 The
Commission had negotiated and provisionally accepted a consent order
prohibiting Campbell from further engaging in such practices." ° During the thirty-day period when the order was of public record, SOUP
filed motions "' for disclosure, for an extension of time in which to
comment, for leave to file one copy of documents rather than the twenty
required by the rules," 2 for withdrawal of the provisional acceptance,
and for intervention, none of which is contemplated by the rules for
informal enforcement procedures.
The Commission, however, granted the extension, permitted filing
of one copy of SOUP's documents, and provided for oral argument on
the issues of the need for an evidentiary hearing to determine the appropriateness of the remedy SOUP urged and of SOUP's right to
intervene in such a hearing. 60 3 After oral argument, the Commission
granted SOUP discovery of some of the documents it had requested
and permitted it to submit further written statements. 604 In the end,
the Commission accepted the agreement as negotiated, denied the request for an evidentiary hearing, and granted SOUP a free copy of the
transcript."0 5 SOUP had urged throughout that only the additional
remedy of affirmative disclosure of prior deceptive advertising-forcing
the respondent to wear a "scarlet letter"-would dissipate residual deception resulting from Campbell's misrepresentation. 60 6 Petitioning for
review of the order, SOUP argued that, although it had been allowed
to raise the question whether the corrective remedy it proposed was
necessary to protect the public, the Commission erred in not holding an
evidentiary hearing, or, in the alternative, in not withdrawing the order
599 Campbell Soup Co., [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] TRADE RFG. REP. 19,261,
at 21,422 (FTC 1970).
600 Id. at 21,421.
60
1 Id. at 21,422.
602 16 C.F.R. § 4.2(c) (1971).
603 Brief for Petitioner at 14, SOUP, Inc. v. FTC, No. 24,476 (D.C. Cir., filed
July 24, 1970). Commissioner Elman pointed out strikingly the conceptual difficulties
such concessions presented under the current rules:
If the Commission should approve the consent order [in the Campbell case]
which is now under consideration we would simultaneously issue that order
with the issuance of a formal complaint. . . . That is the procedure. The
proposed complaint would become a formal complaint, and at the precise
moment that it was issued, the Commission would also be issuing a final
order. So that if you have any standing to intervene, it would be in that
flicker of a second between the issuance of the complaint and the issuance

of a cease and desist order.
Transcript of hearing on motion by SOUP to intervene, File 69-2-3061, Feb. 5, 1970,
at 11.
604 Brief for Petitioner at 14, SOUP, Inc. v. FTC, No. 24,476 (D.C. Cir., filed
July 24, 1970).

See Letter from Joseph W.

Shea, Secretary, FTC, to Aaron

Handleman, member, SOUP, Inc., Feb. 24, 1970, copy on file in Biddle Law Library,
Univ. of Pa. Law School.
605 Brief for Petitioner at 14, SOUP, Inc. v. FTC, No. 24,476 (D.C. Cir., filed
July 24, 1970).
606 See note 669 infra.
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and initiating formal adjudicative proceedings.60 7 Dissenting from the
Commission's disposition of the case, Commissioner Elman noted:
Issues of such large importance to the public should not be
"settled" on the basis of respondents' acceptance of a consent
order whose adequacy has been seriously challenged by responsible representatives of the public interest.6"'
That the issue raised by SOUP was indeed of large public importance is suggested by the Commission's subsequent experiments with
the affirmative disclosure remedy. 609 An agency necessarily has broad
discretion in choosing the type and scope of remedial orders, but that
choice is reviewable for an abuse of discretion or for the failure to consider relevant policy issues. 10 The question raised in the petition for
review is the degree of control third parties should have over informal
proceedings once such issues arise. The Commission's apparently unprecedented grant of privileges to SOUP was certainly adequate to
bring the issue into sharp relief, but should groups like SOUP be allowed extensive privileges whenever such issues are present in consent
order negotiations, and should SOUP in Campbell have been allowed
to do more? SOUP did not purport to challenge the Commission's
discretion to determine ultimately the adequacy of the order to protect
the public interest; rather, it argued that the Commission had not built
a sufficient factual basis upon which to exercise an informed discretion .11 and that only an evidentiary hearing or formal adjudicative
proceeding would supply that basis. Its attack went primarily to the
adequacy of the procedure by which the order was accepted, not the
substance of the order itself, thus avoiding the question who may seek
review of such an order. 12 Subtle though that argument be, the obvious
result would be to set aside or at the very least delay the effectiveness
of the negotiated order. SOUP's petition for review of the Campbell
order raises the question whether that order is currently enforceable;
ordinarily, only a final order is enforceable, and an order does not become "final" if a timely petition for review is filed.6 13 The answer may
depend upon whether third parties may seek review at all of enforcement orders, either in the informal or adjudicative context. Unless the
607 Brief for Petitioner at 19-20, SOUP, Inc. v. FTC, No. 24,476 (D.C. Cir.,
filed July 24, 1970).
608 Campbell Soup Co., [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 19,261, at
21,425 (FTC 1970).
609 See note 668 infra & accompanying text. Cf. RESPONSES, supra note 30, at
133-34 (statement of Comm'r Philip Elman).
61o See Jacob Siegel Co. v. FTC, 327 U.S. 608 (1946). Cf. Magnaflo Co. v.

ir

FTC, 343 F.2d 318 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
611 Brief for Petitioner at 19-20, SOUP, Inc. v. FTC, No. 24,476 (D.C. Cir.,
filed July 24, 1970).
612 See notes 698-706 infra & accompanying text.
01315 U.S.C. §45(g) (1970).
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Commission's prosecutorial discretion-its control over the allocation
of prosecutorial resources throughout the enforcement program-is to
be curtailed to the extent of requiring an evidentiary hearing or formal
adjudication whenever such issues arise and of permitting judicial review of the outcome, it must be left to the Commission to decide whether
additional or alternative proceedings are desirable.
Participation in the consent order procedure, even to the extent
allowed SOUP in the Campbell case, might significantly reduce one
important incentive for prospective respondents to participate in that
procedure-the confidentiality and protection from injurious publicity.
The prospect of extensive public discussion of the adequacy of the provisionally accepted order may be just as distasteful to a prospective respondent as the prospect of trial publicity, and he may therefore be less
hesitant to put the Commission to the delay and expense of proving its
case. A partial solution to the problem of maintaining confidentiality
while encouraging public comment might incorporate the following
procedure: the Commission might make public a statement of its intention to issue a complaint regarding a specified practice without
identifying the prospective respondent, or, in the alternative, issue the
actual complaint. Bargaining over the order could still proceed in confidence, while third parties could make general comments on the complaint, proffer special expertise, and propose remedies appropriate to
614
the specified practice, prior to the issuance of the provisional order.
Information obtained in this manner would be made available to the
bargaining parties during negotiations and would be more likely to
influence the formulation of the order. After the prospective respondent
has made its final offer of an order, the Commission might hold confidential hearings similar to those utilized in its investigative proceedings 615 to permit third parties to present evidence and argument regarding the adequacy of the order. Third parties participating in such
hearings would, of course, have to respect their confidentiality.
These methods of supplementing the existing provision for public
comment on provisional orders would still not provide the discovery
and evidentiary hearing requested by SOUP in Campbell. Presumably,
much of the information SOUP desired would have been found in the
Commission's investigatory file on the prospective respondent and therefore would have fallen within the exemption of the Freedom of Information Act for "investigatory files compiled for law enforcement purposes except to the extent available by law to a party other than an
agency." "' The classification may not be used indiscriminately to
614 "[Plre-order citizen participation would be more meaningful in the shaping
of an order. As far as I can see, there would be no compelling reason why such a
procedure could not be instituted." Letter from Joachim Volhard, Office of FTC
Commissioner Maclntyre, to the University of Pennsylvania Law Review (undated),
on file in Biddle Law Library, Univ. of Pa. Law School.
6
O See 16 C.F.R. § 2.8 (1971).
616 5 U.S.C. §552(b) (7) (1970).

See generally Davis, The Information Act:
A Preliminary Analysis, 34 U. CHI. L. REv. 761, 799-800 (1967).
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conceal information, but an adjudicative proceeding need not be "imminent" for the exemption to become operative.6117 While it is debatable
whether the threat of an adjudicative proceeding is "imminent" after
the issuance of a provisional consent order, "the prospect of enforcement proceedings" might be "concrete enough to bring into operation
the exemption for investigatory files." 618 Indeed, that prospect would
be heightened by allowing greater participation by third parties in the
negotiation and acceptance of consent orders. In general, the FTC
has not liberally permitted discovery.61 9 Such discovery may be vitally
needed by a third party who wishes to challenge the adequacy of a
consent order (or, for that matter, a cease and desist order resulting
from an adjudicative proceeding) on other than broad policy grounds.
Even if the third party claims expertise or a novel legal theory as a
ground for intervention, he may yet require data available only from
the files of the Commission or the proposed respondent to support his
arguments. The Commission's rules for investigations 620 and for adjudicative proceedings 621 provide adequate protection against abuse of
discovery and could easily be adapted to consent order proceedings.
Although the Commission's grant of discovery in Campbell was characterized by one of SOUP's advocates as niggardly,121 it apparently
presented no conceptual difficulties despite the absence of a rule providing for discovery in that context. There would seem no reason, apart
from the concern for maintaining confidentiality and avoiding adjudication, to deny discovery limited to the grounds on which a provisional
consent order is challenged.
SOUP's request for an evidentiary hearing does, however, create
conceptual difficulties. Certainly there is no provision for such a hearing in the current rules. Presumably, the particularity of inquiry of
such a hearing would approach that of an adjudicative proceeding.
While the confidential pre-order hearing on the complaint and the range
of possible remedies suggested above would focus on broad policy issues,
an evidentiary hearing would arguably focus upon the conduct of the
individual respondent. To the extent that this is true, the proposed
respondent would likely demand the full procedural rights of a party to
an adjudicative proceeding. The prospect that such an evidentiary
617 Bristol-Myers Co. v. FTC, 424 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
618Id. at 939; see Project, supra note 495, at 180-81.
619 See Fellmeth, The Freedom of Information Act and the Federal Trade Commnission: A Study in Malfeasance, 4 HARv. Civ. RIGHTS-Civ. Lm. L. Ryv. 345 (1969) ;
Gellhorn, The Treatment of Confidential Information by the Federal Trade Commission: Pretrial Practices, 36 U. CH. L. REv. 113 (1968); cf. Lewis, Discovery
Techniques and the Protection of Confidential Data in FTC Proceedings, 21 AD. L.
REv. 457, 460-64 (1969). See generally Tomlinson, Discovery in Agency Adjudication,
1971 DUKE L.J. 89.
620 16 C.F.R. §§2.7-.12 (1971).
621 Id. §§ 3.32-.37.
622 Interview with Geoffrey Cowan, Center for Law and Social Policy, in
Washington, D.C., Sept. 27, 1971.
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hearing might be held after the prospective respondent had made its
final offer of a consent order, but before the Commission had accepted
it, might lead the respondent to forego informal negotiations in favor
of adjudication.
The privileges granted SOUP in the Campbell case might be
viewed as the logical concomitants of the privilege to comment upon
provisional consent orders. The suggestions above for expanding that
privilege to include pre-order comment and a confidential hearing are
intended to provide the Commission with more information on broad
issues of policy without encroaching upon its prosecutorial discretion.
To allow third parties or an independent agency 623 to challenge consent

orders by initiating an evidentiary hearing or an adjudicative proceeding, however, might effectively curtail that discretion and make the
Commission's allocation of enforcement resources even less efficient.624
A similar problem arises in the enforcement of the Clayton Act by
the Department of Justice. Formal intervention by third parties to
challenge consent decrees in those antitrust enforcement proceedings
had been fairly consistently denied.6 25 The one important case which
reached a contrary result was Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. El Paso
Natural Gas Co. 626 In an earlier related case, the Supreme Court found
that an acquisition by El Paso violated section 7 of the Clayton Act
and ordered divestiture.6 27 When the relief subsequently framed by the
Department of Justice and El Paso did not include the divestiture contemplated by the Court, a major consumer, a competitor, and the State
of California all sought intervention in the proceeding. The Court
held intervention should have been granted as of right. Subsequent
cases have tended to limit the holding of El Paso to its facts. 628 In
623 See notes 319-20 supra & accompanying text.
624 Cf. ABA REPORT, supra note 583, at 27-28:
[I]n terms of a percentage of its total budget, the FTC was spending in 1968
and 1969 about one-half as much on merger enforcement as it had been
spending in 1959. This reduction took place during a period when the United
States . . . was undergoing the greatest surge of merger activity in its
history.

Similarly . . . the FTC has not seen fit to divert resources from other
uses in order to carry out effective monitoring [of mass media advertising]
or compliance [by firms that had previously entered into assurances of
voluntary compliance or informal corrective procedures].
See generally Elman, supra note 29.
625 See Shapiro, supra note 37, at 743-44 (1968) ; Kaplan, Continuing Work of
the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (I),
81 HARv. L. Rxv. 356, 403-07 (1967).
Bank & Trust Co.,
626 386 U.S. 129 (1967); cf. United States v. First Nat
280 F. Supp. 260, 263 (E.D. Ky. 1967), aff'd mnem. sub nom. Central Bank & Trust
Co. v. United States, 391 U.S. 469 (1968) (antitrust case granting intervention to a
stockholder and a competitor after Government failed to appeal; district judge found
"about a ninety per cent capitulation" by the Government in its role as defender of
the public interest).
627 United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651 (1964).
628 See, e.g, United States v. Automobile Mfrs. Ass'n, 307 F. Supp. 617 (C.D.
Cal. 1969), aff'd mnem. sub nom. City of New York v. United States, 397 U.S. 248
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United States v. CIBA Corp.,6 29 Judge Frankel, reviewing these cases,
noted that "the fact that a mandate of the Supreme Court had been
disregarded was a matter of consequence in [El Paso]," "' and suggested the following test for intervention: "the interest justifying intervention as of right in an antitrust suit brought by the United States
must be substantial, must lie at the center of the controversy, and must
be shown clearly, in the language of the Rule, to be less than 'adequately
represented' by the Department of Justice." 631
Of course, El Paso involved a proceeding to frame relief and was
decided under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and not section
11(b) of the Clayton Act 632 or section 5(b) of the Federal Trade
Commission Act,6 33 which govern formal FTC adjudicative proceedings. Furthermore, the FTC employs consent orders in many enforcement proceedings unrelated to the Clayton Act.6 34 Despite these distinctions, the underlying problem remains: what of cases where an FTC
consent order fails to implement, not a previous holding of the Supreme
Court, but the clear mandate of a statute or Commission rule, and
where the interests affected are not those of major utilities, corporate
consumers, and competitors, but those of individual consumers? Perhaps the short answer is that, if El Paso is not an aberration, the present
concern for conserving enforcement resources through use of informal
proceedings should give way to a recognition that more resources should
be provided, so that formal adjudication of matters affecting the interests of large segments of the public or matters involving broad issues of
policy may be obtained.635
A recent comment 636 has explored the role of nonparty participation in antitrust proceedings brought by the Department of Justice to
frame consent decrees. The comment concludes that nonparties "are
(1970) (intervention denied where main goal was to compel litigation of the case to
judgment, which then might be used as a basis for intervenors' private treble damage
actions) ; United States v. Western Elec. Co., 5 TRADE REG. REP. (1968 Trade Cas.)
172,415 (D.N.J. 1968), aff'd mem. sub nom. Clark Walter & Sons, Inc. v. United
States, 392 U.S. 659 (1968) (motion to intervene filed 12 years after entry of consent
decree denied) ; United States v. Blue Chip Stamp Co., 272 F. Supp. 432 (C.D. Cal.
1967), affd mnem. sub nom. Thrifty Shoppers Scrip Co. v. United States, 389 U.S.
580 (1968) (motions to intervene denied as untimely); United States v. Aluminum
Co. of America, 41 F.R.D. 342 (E.D. Mo. 1967), appeal dismissed mem. sub nom.
Lupton Mfg. Co. v. United States, 388 U.S. 457 (1967) (motion to intervene filed
over 2 years after final order of divestiture denied).

629 50 F.R.D. 507 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).

630 Id. at 512.
631 Id. at 513.
632 15 U.S.C. § 21(b) (1970); see notes 682-90 infra & accompanying text.
633 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (1970).
634 Cf. notes 584-88 supra. & accompanying text.
635 Cf. note 624 supra; E. Cox, R FELLMETH & J. SCHULz, THE NADER REPORT
ON THE FEDER. TRADE CommissioN 57-71 (1969). See also REsPoNsEs, supra note
30, at 122, 129, 135-36 (Statement of Comm'r Phillip Elman criticizing the secrecy
of consensual agreements).
636 Comment, Private Participationin Department of Justice Antitrust Proceedings, 39 U. CHI. L. REv. 143 (1971).
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able to direct successful challenges to substantive shortcomings of these
decrees and, in effect, to take appeals from adverse rulings-all while
remaining technically outside of the litigation." 637 It notes that nonparties participated often in the role of amicus and that therefore granting formal intervention would not contribute to delay or prejudice to
the original parties, and would not generate additional litigation."'8 It
analyzes a number of procedural devices the courts have devised to accommodate the special nature of the judicial proceedings with such
participation that are not directly relevant to the procedures the FTC
employs, but which do demonstrate the ingenuity that can be brought
to bear "to produce a thorough examination of the issues without impairing the utility of the consent decree for the parties." 639 The comment approves of such devices, but proposes as an alternative the following scheme for formal intervention:
Leave to intervene would be granted at the discretion of the
court and would be limited to as narrow a substantive compass as possible. Procedural rights would be afforded as required for a full examination of the underlying controversy,
including if necessary the right to discovery and compulsory
process, subject in turn to the litigants' alternative right to
withdraw their consent from the settlement. The power to
block entry of a consent decree or other settlement agreeable
to the original parties and the court would be withheld, but
the right to appeal from such a judgment would be retained. 40
The FTC in the Campbell case indicated little willingness to experiment
with informal participation in its consent order program. While the
procedural mechanisms the federal judiciary has developed are not
directly apposite, the underlying attitude toward the potential contribution of nonparties clearly is, especially in light of the fact that public
interest groups have not yet been among the nonparties participating.
How public interest representation may be procedurally implemented
in the context of FTC consent orders is one question awaiting resolution in the pending Campbell appeal.
2. Formal Adjudicative Proceedings
Formal adjudicative proceedings are essentially adversary in
nature and may lead to the imposition of substantial penalties. 641 To
the extent that the two-party contest sharpens presentation of the issues
637

Id. 169.

638 Id. 153.

639 Id. 160.
640 Id. 176.
641 See ABA REPORT, supra note 583, at 8 & n20. These civil penalties may be
imposed by a court for violation of a final FTC order.
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and thereby makes decision easier, and that intervention by third parties
delays enforcement and unfairly subjects the respondent to different and
perhaps conflicting lines of attack, such intervention should be limited.
Formal adjudicative proceedings, however, serve also as vehicles for
the formulation of Commission policy. 42 Although there have been
indications of increased reliance on trade regulation rules, 43 redefinitions of unlawful conduct and appropriate remedies are most likely to
be made in the adjudicatory context. To the extent that broad questions of policy are decided in that context, intervention by parties affected by these policies should be allowed and encouraged.
The Federal Trade Commission Act makes the following provision
for intervention:
Any person, partnership or corporation may make application,
and upon good cause shown may be allowed by the Commission to intervene and appear in said proceeding by counsel or
in person. 44
The Commission's procedural rules themselves provide no more explicit standard for "good cause shown":
The hearing examiner or the Commission may by order permit the intervention to such extent and upon such terms as
are provided by law or as otherwise may be deemed proper.645
Motions to intervene in adjudicative proceedings have been viewed
with disfavor by the Commission. Potential intervenors have sought,
but have been denied, intervention on a number of grounds: the existence of a similar case on the docket involving the potential intervenor
See Robinson, supra note 191, at 490-96.
See 16 C.F.R. §1.12 (1971); cf. K. DAVis, DiscETIoNARY JUSTICE 74-77
(1969) (FTC "Cigarette Rule" on hazards of smoking) ; Shapiro, supra note 198, at
964-67 ("Cigarette Rule").
Problems associated with intervention might conceivably arise in the context
of a trade regulation rule hearing. The FTC usually commences such hearings on a
complaint, although it may act sua sponte. Any interested person may give oral
evidence; only the Commission staff, however, may cross-examine. Because one purpose of such hearings is to build a record that can withstand possible judicial scrutiny, interested persons might argue for cross-examination privileges to augment
their impact on the record. Telephone interview with FTC Commissioner Mary
Gardiner Jones, Aug. 1971. The hearings themselves, of course, are not required by
§4(b) of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §553(c) (1970). For proposals to make the FTC's rulemaking authority more explicit, see SENATE COMM.
oN COMMERCE, CONSUMER PROTEcTION ACT: REPORT ON S. 3201, S. REP. No. 91-1124,
91st Cong., 2d Sess. 13, 22, 51 (1970). As Chairman Weinberger noted, "the Commission believes that its power to issue substantive rules should be made more explicit.
Any doubts about its rulemaking authority should be clarified and removed. Any
possible ambiguity in its present rulemaking authority between its Labeling Acts and
the Federal Trade Commission Act should be eliminated." Id. 51.
This development may well have been halted, at least within the existing statutory context, by the recent and surprising holding that the FTC has no statutory
authority at all to issue trade regulation rules. See National Petroleum Refiners
Ass'n v. FTC, 40 U.S.L.W. 2671 (D.D.C. Apr. 4, 1972).
64415 U.S.C. §45(b) (1970). See 15 U.S.C. §21(b) (1970).
645 16 C.F.R. § 3.14 (1971).
642
643
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as respondent; 646 involvement of the potential intervenor in a similar
proceeding currently pending; 647 the suffering of injury from unfair
competition; 646 and the fact that the potential intervenor proposed to
advance legal theories not raised by the Commission's complaint counsel or the respondent.649 It has long been clear that private injury per
se confers standing neither to initiate nor to intervene in an adjudicative
proceeding.65 ° Underlying the reluctance to grant intervention is the
theory that the Commission
acts only in the public interest, any protection afforded private
persons being only incidental, and it must be ever vigilant
against the possibility of its processes being used to further
the private interests of any party.651
Because the Commission itself acts as prosecutor, the need for allowing
"private attorneys general" 652 to initiate actions would seem to be substantially diminished, although not obviated altogether. The need to
prevent the Commission from becoming a forum for private damage
suits by competitors, which seems the policy behind the restrictive provisions for judicial review,65 should not lead to the exclusion at the
Commission level of groups asserting "private" interests held by large
segments of the public. The legislative history may disclose an intent
to foreclose judicial review to certain classes of parties, but that does
not necessarily imply the intent to foreclose participation in the proceedings themselves. If it did, why was any provision at all made for
intervention? Even if the DataProcessing-WelfareRights rationale 654
646 Max Factor, Inc., No. 7717, Order Denying Motion to Intervene (FTC,
May 11, 1970).
647 Berger Watch Co., 56 F.T.C. 1655 (1969) (application denied as "untimely").
648 Grand Caillou Packing Co., No. 7887, Order Denying Motion to Intervene
(FTC, Nov. 8, 1962).
649 Kennecott Copper Corp., 3 TRADE REG. REP. 1 19,281 (FTC 1970) ; see notes
682-90 infra & accompanying text.
650 FTC v. Klesner, 280 U.S. 19, 25-26 (1929). See notes 682-707 infra &
accompanying text. On the other hand, states and other governmental units have
occasionally been allowed limited intervention, often on behalf of respondents representing industries of economic importance to their particular regions. See, e.g.,
Florida Citrus Mut., 53 F.T.C. 973 (1957); Soap Lake Prods. Corp., 33 F.T.C. 999
(1941). Such intervention is possibly allowed merely as a matter of political accommodation, for trade associations seeking to advance similar arguments have been
denied intervention. See, e.g., Campbell Taggert Associated Bakeries, Inc., 62 F.T.C.
1494 (1963) ; Florida Citrus Mut., supra.
Compare the
651 Wilson Tobacco Bd. of Trade, 52 F.T.C. 1148, 1151 (1956).
role of a private person filing an unfair labor practice charge under the National
Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1970), and 29 C.F.R. §§ 102.9-.59 (1971). The
NLRA recognizes the existence of private rights within the statutory scheme. Local
283, UAW v. Scofield, 382 U.S. 205, 218 (1965). If a complaint is issued on the
basis of such a charge, the charging party may participate in the hearings as a
"party." If the Board dismisses the complaint, he may obtain judicial review and
may intervene in appellate review of an NLRB order initiated by the unsuccessful
party. Id. at 219-21.
652 See note 53 supra & accompanying text.
653 See notes 692-706 infra & accompanying text.
654 See notes 7-12, 57-70, 94-113 supra & accompanying text.
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for requiring participation below to the extent necessary to make the
right of review effective does not apply, a court might still require participation on the ground, for example, that some important policy position had not been adequately represented and that the determination
was not therefore based upon substantial evidence.
This Comment previously outlined some reasons why agencies
might not adequately represent each of the interests held by large segments of the public affected by its decisions.65 5 The adversary nature
of FTC adjudicative proceedings heightens that problem: complaint
counsel may well lack the time, resources, and tactical flexibility to
assess fully the impact of challenged conduct on consumers, the economy,
or the environment and to develop, accordingly, new theories of liability
or appropriate remedies on a case-by-case basis." 6 These are areas in
which participation by third parties, including public interest groups,
could contribute most. Informal methods of participation in adjudicative proceedings by third parties are not unusual. Trade associations
apparently have close ties with the Commission and complaint counsel.657
Nothing prevents third parties from working informally with counsel
for the FTC or respondent in the preparation of its case. This channel
is open to a public interest group in those instances where it might wish
to aid or oppose a respondent by furnishing suggestions, theories, or
factual data.
The FTC has recently experimented with expanding the scope of
formal participation in adjudicative proceedings. In Firestone Tire &
Rubber Co.,s SOUP was allowed to intervene in forma pauperis in an
adjudicative proceeding charging Firestone with deceptive advertising
regarding the pricing and safety of its tires. In granting SOUP's request to file an interlocutory appeal 659 from the hearing examiner's
denial of intervention, the Commission stressed that, by allowing limited
intervention, it was "beginning a delicate experiment, one requiring
caution and close observation" and that its action "should [not] be
construed as a permanent or irreversible policy decision." 660 The Commission directed the hearing examiner to permit intervention for the
purposes of
(1) presenting, at the conclusion of complaint counsel's casein-chief, relevant, material, and non-cumulative evidence on
the issue of whether the proposed order to cease and desist
adequately protects the public interest;
655 See notes 157-60 supra & accompanying text.
656 Cf. ABA REPORT, supra note 583, at 12-15, 78-80.

657 See, e.g., Whiting, The Role of a Trade Association When the Government
Looks to Its Industry, 13 ANTITRUST BULn 567, 586-87 (1968); cf. notes 683-87
infra & accompanying text.

6583 TRADE REG. REP. 1 19,373 (FTC 1970).
228-38.
6 59
See note 260 supra & accompanying text.
660 3 TRADE REG. REP. 1 19,373, at 21,502.

See Project, supra note 495, at
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(2) presenting, with respect to said issue, briefs and oral
argument in such manner and to such an extent as the examiner may deem reasonable; and
(3) exercising, with respect to said issue, such discovery
rights as the examiner shall deem reasonable and necessary. 6 '
In the course of the subsequent hearing, SOUP was not allowed to
address the issues of deceptive advertising and pricing; its intervention
was limited to the appropriateness of the proposed remedy, although on
that issue it was apparently allowed to cross-examine witnesses. 62
Soon after the Commission granted SOUP limited intervention, the
examiner granted similar privileges to the Association of National
Advertisers, Inc., (ANA) to address the same issue. SOUP argued,
as it had in the Campbell case, that "affirmative disclosure" should be
part of the remedy in order to counteract the residual effects of Firestone's advertising. The examiner concluded that affirmative disclosure
was inappropriate, 663 and an appeal is presently before the Commission.
Despite its failure to convince the examiner, SOUP did have a
significant opportunity to supplement the record. In granting intervention the Commission suggested five criteria that should be considered in future cases: (1) the applicant's "desire to raise substantial
issues of law or fact which would not otherwise be properly raised or
argued"; (2) the nature of the issues (that they be "of sufficient importance and immediacy to warrant an additional expenditure of the
Commission's limited resources on a necessarily longer and more
complicated proceeding") ; (3) the applicant's potential contribution to
a just resolution of the issues; (4) the need for expedition in obtaining
compliance with the law; and (5) "the possible prejudice to the original
parties." 664 At the same time, the Commission emphasized that no
precise standard could be formulated but that, because "the FTC has a
built-in public interest prosecutor in all of its proceedings," there must
be a "substantial showing of special circumstances justifying intervention." 66 The adversary nature of FTC proceedings and special
661

Id.

Interview with Geoffrey Cowan, Center for Law and Social Policy, in Washington, D.C., Sept. 27, 1971.
6633 TRADE REG. REP. 1119,373.
664 Id. at 21,501-02 (emphasis in original).
6
65 Id. at 21,502. For a recent case in which intervention seems to have been
granted in disregard of the tentative guidelines established in Firestone, see American
Gen. Ins. Co., 3 TRADE REG. REIP. 1 19,915 (FTC, Feb. 11, 1972). In dissent, Commissioner Mary Gardiner Jones noted:
It is obvious that the factors enumerated in the Commission's Firestone
opinion are not ones for determination by its hearing examiners and quite
clearly do not simply involve housekeeping matters associated with the
conduct of the hearings. The addition of a party is and always has been
662

regarded as an issue on which only the Commission can finally rule. Moreover, so long as rulings on intervention embrace in some significant respect
issues of resource allocation and delicate weighing of priorities and long range
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problems concerning the reviewability of FTC decisions .66 make the
argument from Data Processing and Welfare Rights-that one within
the zone of interests sought to be protected by the relevant statute has a
right to participate in agency proceedings to the extent necessary to
make the right of review effective 6 T--of limited applicability.
In Firestone the Commission indicated interest in exploring "affirmative disclosure" in a case that involved a "public safety danger"
because "this issue and this type of case is high on the list of our own
priorities." 668 Perhaps its willingness to allow intervention to SOUP,
and the examiner's extension of similar privileges to ANA, reflected a
realization that the issue, despite the adversary context in which it
arose, would be more properly decided in the rulemaking context, and
that wider participation by third parties should be permitted in recognition of that fact. On the other hand, perhaps the Commission sought
to forestall industry opposition by allowing the issue to be raised in this
more indirect manner. Whatever the Commission's motives in Firestone, the remedy originally urged by SOUP has subsequently been
obtained in other cases by complaint counsel without participation by
third parties.6" 9 It remains to be seen whether future intervention will
require the presence of and be limited to similar issues arguably more
appropriate for rulemaking. Allowing intervention limited to such
issues in the adjudicative context may be a compromise, however inadequate, between the Commission's desire to retain the flexibility in
formulating policy and the control complaint counsel has over the issues
that the adjudicative context affords, and its apparent recognition of the
value of broadened participation. The Commission has not yet clarified
the functions it thinks intervention should serve, nor has it provided
more precise standards for its grant or denial.
Since intervention in Firestone was granted, the Commission has
referred the problem of formulating more precise standards to an advisory committee on rules and practices 67 0 which has not yet made its
benefits to the public interest, the Commission cannot duck responsibility

for the ultimate decision by hiding behind its examiner's ruling as it has tried
to do in the instant case.
Id. at 21,931.
666 See notes 692-699 infra & accompanying text.
667 See notes 7-12, 57-70, 94-113 supra & accompanying text.
668 3 TRADE REG. REP. 19,373, at 21,502.
669 See Note, "Corrective Advertising" Orders of the Federal Trade Commission,
85 HARv. L. REv. 477 (1971).
670 See Resolution authorizing an Advisory Council on FTC Rules of Practice
and Procedure, 36 Fed. Reg. 4728 (1970); FTC News Release (May 27, 1970).
The Commission invited public comment on the proposed revision, FTC News Release
(July 15, 1970). In response, Bruce Terris, a Washington, D.C., attorney, submitted
"without success" proposed revisions which would (1) provide intervention with full
party status as of right in adjudicative proceedings to any person or competent
representative of a class which meets the Data Processing test; (2) provide public
disclosure of assurances of voluntary compliance, see notes 587-89 supra & accompanying text, and opportunity for public comment and for a hearing if a substantial
question of fact as to the appropriateness or adequacy of the assurance is raised by
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recommendations. 671 The proposed model intervention rules 672 and
rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which grants intervention as of right to private parties whose interests may be affected by
the proceeding and who are otherwise unrepresented, 673 are overly broad
and therefore unhelpful in formulating a standard that takes into account the prosecutorial role of complaint counsel and the jeopardy that
attaches to respondents in FTC enforcement proceedings.
Even if the tautology that complaint counsel represents all affected
interests because he acts in the "public interest" can be broken, there
remain further objections to allowing intervention by parties whose
interests are potentially affected but arguably unrepresented. Former
Commissioner Elman and the ABA Commission to Study the Federal
Trade Commission have strongly criticized the FTC for failure to establish priorities, consistent with its limited resources, among the many
types of industry activity it has authority to regulate and the many
statutory prohibitions it is charged to enforce.6 74 If third parties were
given the power to override the Commission's discretion in choosing
which cases to prosecute, or, when adjudication has commenced, to usurp
complaint counsel's control over trial tactics, the Commission's attempts
to establish and implement such priorities might be seriously impaired,
to say nothing of the potential increase in delay, which even now is
one of the Commission's major problems.6 75 On the other hand, once
adjudication has commenced and substantial questions of policy or fact
are raised, there would seem to be no policy reasons against the approach suggested in Firestone. Intervention before the hearing examiner limited to those questions should be allowed, with appropriate
procedural privileges, including the presentation of witnesses, crossexamination, and discovery, necessary to address those questions adequately. Some questions of policy, where underlying facts are not in
dispute, might be effectively addressed through the presentation of an
amicus brief; where facts are in dispute, however, intervenors must be
allowed procedural privileges sufficient to enable them to present their
evidence bearing on those facts.
While it might be adequate for the presentation of general legal or
policy arguments, intervention before the Commission without previous
participation before the hearing examiner would not present the opportunity for the participant to contribute to the record evidence or
a party who would have the right to intervene in an adjudicative proceeding; and
(3) provide a similar hearing when a substantial question as to the appropriateness
or adequacy of a proposed consent order is raised. Letter with copy of proposed
rules from Bruce J. Terris to University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Sept. 14,
1971, on file in Biddle Law Library, Univ. of Pa. Law School.
671 Telephone interview with Theresa Schwartz, Office of FTC Commissioner
Jones, Apr. 6, 1972.
672 See note 18 stpra.
673 FED. R. Crv. P. 24; cf. notes 114-20 supra & accompanying text.
674 See sources cited note 624 supra.
675 See, e.g., ABA REPoRT, supra note 583, at 28-32.
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expertise not otherwise available. Intervention before the Commission
itself presents no great mechanical problems: at most, extra time would
be expended for oral argument and consideration of additional briefs
and other written submissions. This form of participation, though the
easiest for the Commission to grant, may not permit the fullest possible
contribution by the intervenor. Allowing intervention before the hearing examiner might, however, aggravate existing problems of delay and
manageability if the privileges granted intervenors-and particularly
the privilege of cross-examination-are not carefully tailored to the
purposes of their participation.
Firestone leaves a number of troublesome questions unanswered.
Assuming broad questions of policy or fact are raised in an adjudicative
proceeding, what qualifies applicants for intervention to speak to those
matters? The possession of unique expertise or access to facts not
otherwise available to the Commission, such as that claimed by
SOUP 676 and the ANA

677

in Firestone, might in itself qualify a party

to intervene. Many groups whose interests may be vitally affected by a
proceeding, however, may well lack expertise. The only organizations
which currently could meet this requirement are trade organizations
such as the ANA or broadly based public interest groups such as Consumers Union.67 Similarly, the desire to advance a legal theory which
complaint counsel, for whatever reason, chooses not to utilize might be
urged as a ground for intervention.679 The obvious dangers in allowing
intervention on this ground are the potential unfairness to the respondent and the potential tactical restrictions on complaint counsel.
It has been suggested above that certain issues raised in the adjudicative context might more properly be treated in the rulemaking
context. With respect to such issues, the objective should be to ensure
representation of all interests affected by the decision, and intervention
should therefore be granted more liberally. Should the sole criterion
for intervention in such instances be whether the applicant's interest is
676 Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., FTC No. 8818, Motion of SOUP, Inc., for
leave to intervene, for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, and for disclosure, July 29,

1970, at 2.

677 Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., FTC No. 8818, Motion of Association of
National Advertisers, Inc., for leave to intervene, Nov. 24, 1970.
678 Consumers Union, a nonprofit organization chartered in 1936 under New
York law, derives its income from the sale of its publications, the chief of which is
Consumer Reports. Its purposes are "to provide consumers with information and
counsel on consumer goods and services, to give information and assistance on all
matters relating to the expenditure of family income, and to initiate and to cooperate
with individual and group efforts seeking to create and maintain decent living standards." EDITORS oF CONSUMEcR REPORTS, THE MEDICrcNE Sow 4 (1970). Consumers
Union supported SOUP's motion to intervene in the Campbell case. Brief for
Petitioner at 3, SOUP, Inc. v. FTC, No. 24,476 (D.C. Cir., filed July 24, 1970).
679 SOUP's legal theory in Campbell and Firestone was affirmative disclosure
or "corrective advertising." See notes 668-69 supra & accompanying text. The United
Steelworkers of America, in Kennecott Copper Corp., 3 TRADE REG. REP. U19,619
(FTC 1971), appeal docketed, No. 71-1371, 10th Cir., Mar. 31, 1972, urged that the
enhancement of the acquired coal company's position in the industry effected by the
addition of the acquiring company's resources threatened to weaken competition in
the industry. See note 689 infra & accompanying text.
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adequately represented by existing parties? In some cases that standard
would permit intervention by numerous parties who would appear to
assert similar interests, but who, as a practical matter, would advance
different policy positions formulated to advance those interests. Broadly
based groups such as the NAACP or Consumers Union may not, because of their size and diversity of membership, reflect the interests of
groups like the Black Panthers and SOUP. One criterion the Commission might use, therefore, is the "adequacy of representation" standard suggested by rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 8 0
An applicant whose policy position relative to his interest is already
adequately represented should be denied intervention. The Commission
might require applicants to submit an explanation why they are not
adequately represented or why their positions cannot be adequately
represented simply by submitting an amicus brief and perhaps presenting oral argument. Where factual questions are intertwined with policy
issues, as in the Firestonecase, fuller procedural privilege will probably
be required for adequate representation.
A related problem is the extent to which a broad policy issue appropriately addressed by otherwise unrepresented intervenors may be
broadened still further. In Firestone,for example, should the issue of
the appropriate remedy have been broadened if, independent of SOUP's
contentions, another group had proposed restitution as a remedy, and
still another had proposed that respondent never again be allowed to
advertise the product in question? To what extent should priority in
time of request for intervention or the degree to which the applicant
group is established, well-organized, and well-funded be considered?
Priority in application should be persuasive but not a controlling factor;
otherwise, the Commission might deny participation to latecomers or
poorly financed applicants in favor of better established groups like
Consumers Union. To what extent could consolidation procedures
such as those utilized in complex or multidistrict litigation be adapted
to the agency proceeding to allow the maximum number of parties to
enter with a minimum of confusion, while preserving the ability of each
party to present the unique aspects of its position? 81.
3. Appeals of Commission Orders
No party denied intervention in an adjudicative proceeding had
sought judicial review of that denial, before the United Steelworkers of
America did so in 1970.68 The Steelworkers attempted to intervene
in a proceeding against the Kennecott Copper Company for violating
680 See notes 115-20 supra & accompanying text.
681 See generally Comment, Observations on the Manual for Complex and Multidistrict Litigation, 68 MICH. L. REv. 303 (1969).
682 United Steelworkers v. FTC, No. 24,629 (D.C. Cir., filed Sept. 15, 1970),

petition for review withdrawn without prejudice (May 28, 1971). Such a development
is undoubtedly related to the emergence of the Data Processing-Welfare Rights
rationale. See notes 7-12, 57-70, 94-113 supra & accompanying text.
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section 7 of the Clayton Act 683 by acquiring Peabody Coal Company."'
The union was influential in calling into question the legality of the acquisition, 8 5 and appears to have had a fairly close working relationship
with complaint counsel during the trial and before the hearing examiner
issued his initial decision dismissing the complaint, 86 although it did
not participate in the trial in any formal capacity. After the examiner
had issued his opinion, the Steelworkers filed a motion to intervene as a
party before the Commission in support of the complaint. The union's
grounds for intervention were that it represented the interests of its one
and one-quarter million members as consumers of electricity which
might be impaired by a lessening of competition in the coal industry,
that it was a "responsible party to assert the interest of the public in
preserving full and free competition," that acquisitions such as the one
it opposed had an adverse effect on labor relations (though concededly
an effect outside the jurisdiction of the FTC), and, most important,
that if it were denied intervention and if Kennecott won before the
Commission, complaint counsel would be bound by that decision and
there would be no other party to seek judicial review.68 7 The Commission denied the Steelworkers party status but granted permission to file
a brief and present oral argument on the merits.688 The Steelworkers
urged a legal argument not pressed by complaint counsel, that the acquisition would in effect combine Kennecott's resources with Peabody's
and thereby enhance Peabody's relative position in the coal industry to
the detriment of competitors. 8 9 Ultimately this argument contributed
to the reversal of the initial decision: the Commission ordered divestiture, 9 and the Steelworkers' petition for review of the denial of intervention was mooted.
683 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970).

684 Brief for Petitioner at 2, United Steelworkers v. FTC, No. 24,629 (D.C. Cir.,
filed Sept. 15, 1970).
685 FTC pre-merger clearance procedures were conducted in confidence, as are
negotiations for informal corrective actions, assurances of voluntary compliance, and
consent orders, and were strongly criticized by Professor Davis. K. DAvIs, DiscREIn 1969, the FTC adopted a procedure whereby
TIOIARY JUSTICE 113-16 (1969).
provisional approvals or disapprovals of mergers or similar transactions were made
public and opportunity given for submission of objections or comments. FTC News
Release (May 23, 1969), discussed in 3 TRADE REG. R P. 19738 (Packet No. 445,
at 14-15 dated Dec. 22, 1969) (subsequently deleted). Without such a procedure,
it would be very difficult for third parties who lack the investigative resources of
groups like the Steelworkers to object effectively.
686 Telephone interview with Harold D. Rhynedance, Jr., Assistant General
Counsel, FTC, Aug. 1971.
687 Brief for Petitioner at 4, United Steelworkers v. FTC, No. 24,629 (D.C.
Cir., filed Sept. 15, 1970).
6881d. 5.
689 Complaint counsel argued against the acquisition on the ground that it would
eliminate Kennecott as a potential entrant into competition in the coal industry.
Id. 5-6.
69
0Kennecott Copper Corp., 3 TRADE REG. REP. ff 19,619 (FTC 1971), appeal
docketed, No. 71-1371, 10th Cir., Mar. 31, 1972. The political pressure generated by
the Steelworkers arguably had as much influence on the result as the legal argument
they advanced.
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The question left undecided is, who may seek judicial review of the
Commission's issuance of, or failure to issue, a cease and desist order,
consent order, divestiture order, or other enforcement order. SOUP in
Firestoneand the Steelworkers in Kennecott had, in effect, all privileges
necessary to advocate their positions effectively. Such informal participation, often by way of amicus briefs, is quite common. The Steelworkers in particular consulted with complaint counsel when the case
was before the examiner, and, though complaint counsel chose not to
press one legal argument they favored, they themselves urged that argument before the Commission. If intervention implies, in practical terms,
that a party has an adequate opportunity to be heard, then, with the
exception of procedural privileges at the initial hearing which they did
not seek, the Steelworkers may be said to have, in effect, intervened.
In their petition for review, however, they argued that intervention implies the right to review and that the denial of intervention in their case
was not a denial of any right to be heard, but rather a denial of a right
to appeal; they implied, in other words, that the only functional value
of formal intervention is that it carries with it the right to appeal.
Though the right to appeal or otherwise seek review of agency
action may carry with it the right to intervene, 691 the grant of intervention cannot in itself create a right to judicial review. The fundamental question in the Steelworkers' petition for review was not, therefore, only whether an intervenor may appeal, but whether any party
other than one subject to an enforcement order may appeal.
Jurisdiction to review FTC orders is conferred by section 5 (c) of
the Federal Trade Commission Act 692 and the virtually identical section
11(c) of the Clayton Act. 93
Section 11(c), which governed the
Kennecott proceedings, provides:
Any person required by such order of the commission or
board to cease and desist from any such violation may obtain
a review of such order in the court of appeals of the United
States for any circuit within which such violation occurred or
within which such person resides or carries on business
694

In the Senate debate on the FTC Act, it was twice proposed that
section 5 be amended to allow a complaining party to obtain judicial
review of dismissal of his complaint,695 but the amendment was ex691 See notes 39-44 supra & accompanying text.
692 15 U.S.C. § 45(c) (1970). The provision has been characterized as one of
the narrowest provisions for review of administrative action. 3 K. DAvis, supra
note 23, § 22.03, at 214.
693 15 U.S.C. §217(c) (1970).
694

Id.

695 See 51

CONG.

REc. 13,045, 13,053 (1914).
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presssly rejected in favor of the present provision. 9 s Senator Cummins, an opponent of the more liberal provision for review, summarized
his objections as follows:
The commission is intended to enforce the law for the public
welfare. It is not intended to try cases between individuals
engaged in business. If you make the commission simply the
original trial court as between individuals who may be interested in unfair practices in trade, you will have destroyed, in
my judgment, absolutely its usefulness as a public instrumentality for the purposes of correction."' 7
It would appear, then, that the restrictive provision for review was intended to prevent the Commission from becoming a forum for private
disputes largely involving competitors. It was early held that review
of an enforcement order under the FTC Act and the Clayton Act was
available only to a party subject to the order.09 8 Recourse to the legislative history does not resolve the question whether the intent to deny
review extended beyond private parties engaged in competition with
respondents to encompass groups which, like SOUP and the Steelworkers, assert the interests of large segments of the public. Congress
in 1914 apparently assumed that the Commission would adequately
represent the interests of the public, the sort of assumption courts today
are increasingly willing to question. 699 The recent phenomenon of
public interest intervention could hardly have been foreseen in 1914,
nor, for that matter, could a case like Kennecott, where the "private"
party asserting a right to review dismissal of a complaint was a union
representing the interests of its one and one-quarter million members.
An explicit grant of review to one class, without more, does not
imply denial to all other classes."' 0 The Supreme Court has stated that
"only upon a showing of 'clear and convincing evidence' of a contrary
legislative intent should the courts restrict access to judicial review. " 701
Absent such evidence, the provisions for review under the Administrative Procedure Act 702 would apply to any third party not clearly
denied review. 7 ° ' The vagueness of the legislative history will, of
696 Id. 13,318. In the subsequent debate on the Clayton Act, a similar amendment was offered, id. 14,223-24, but replaced at once with the present provision. Id.

14,224.
69Id. 13,316 (emphasis supplied).
698 Wholesale Grocers' Ass'n v. FTC, 277 F. 657 (5th Cir. 1922).
699 See notes 7-12, 94-113 supra & accompanying text.
700

See id.

701 Abbott

Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 141 (1967).

U.S.C. §§ 701-06 (1970).
703 These provisions have been held to apply to respondents seeking review of
7025

FTC actions other than cease-and-desist orders; the appropriate forum was said
to be the district court. See, e.g., Robertson v. FTC, 415 F.2d 49 (4th Cir. 1969) ;
Rettinger v. FTC, 392 F.2d 454 (2d Cir. 1968). It would appear that third parties
appealing similar orders under the APA would be relegated to the district court.
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course, make the determination of which parties should be allowed
review a difficult one, particularly in cases where "public" and "private"
interests are difficult to distinguish. 70 1 One possible pattern, however,
seems clear: those parties, such as competitors, asserting a direct
economic interest in the proceeding might be denied review in favor
of those asserting interests shared by large segments of the public.
Under this analysis, there would be no reason to deny third parties
review of consent orders, as distinguished from enforcement orders resulting from adjudication, even though the party subject to the former
waives his right to review. 70 5 Moreover, review would not turn upon
whether one had participated in the Commission proceedings below. 70 6

Participation in FTC proceedings by third parties asserting broad
interests and claiming extensive procedural privileges and appellate review is a very recent phenomenon which has been so far confined to the
Campbell, Firestone,and Kennecott cases. The extent to which review
should be denied such parties should be clarified by Congress, particularly in light of the proposed Consumer Protection Agency, which would
be enabled
to participate as of right in formal adjudicative pro70 7
ceedings.

Thus SOUP, Inc. v. FTC, No. 24,476 (D.C. Cir., filed July 24, 1970), an attempt
of a third party to appeal from a consent order, was properly before a court of
appeals, while United Steelworkers v. FTC, No. 24,629 (D.C. Cir., filed Sept. 15,
1970), should have been brought in a district court. If the old holding in Wholesale
Grocers' Ass'n v. FTC, 277 F. 657 (5th Cir. 1922), that only a party subject to a
cease-and-desist or other enforcement order may appeal, were reaffirmed, third parties
might meet the APA's requirement of being "adversely affected or aggrieved" only
in that relatively small class of cases in which an enforcement order is not being
challenged. The trade association in Wholesale Grocers included respondents who
had sought review on their ovn initiative of the cease-and-desist order the association
sought to challenge; the shopkeeper in FTC v. Klesner, 280 U.S. 19 (1929), was a
competitor, and the dispute, as Justice Brandeis noted, 280 U.S. at 28, was "essentially
private in its nature"--the sort of dispute Senator Cummins wished to exclude from
the FTC. See notes 695-97 supra & accompanying text. Neither these cases nor
the legislative history of the provisions for review clearly forecloses either the Commission's complaint counsel or a public interest intervenor from obtaining review.
As a practical matter, complaint counsel will hold his peace once the Commission
has decided against him. If the Commission had so decided in Kennecott, a group
like the Steelworkers would have been the only party with an incentive to seek
review. If it is held that such groups may obtain review under the provisions of the
organic act or the Clayton Act, the appropriate forum would of course be the court
of appeals. If the right to appeal were grounded on the APA, it might be argued
on the basis of Robertson and Rettinger (neither of which dealt with cease-and-desist
orders) that the court of competent jurisdiction is the district court. It would seem
anomolous, however, to have respondents appeal enforcement orders to a court of
appeals and other parties appeal to a district court (where the respondent almost
certainly would move to intervene). Cf. Foti v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv.,
375 U.S. 217 (1963); Environmental Defense Fund v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093, 1099
(D.C. Cir. 1970) ; L. JAFFE, supra note 33, at 422. This Comment agrees with Professor Jaffe's conclusion: "I would strive to the greatest extent possible to consolidate
review in a single court." Id.
704 Cf. notes 533-47 supra & accompanying text.
705 16 C.F.R. §2.33 (1971).
706

Cf. notes 39-44 supra & accompanying text.

707 See notes 306-21 .upra & accompanying text.
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4. Funding Public Participation
However the Commission or the court may expand the scope of
participation to be afforded third parties in FTC proceedings, the practical problem of funding must be confronted. 708 In Firestonethe Commission, to the extent it felt its statutory authority permitted, allowed
SOUP to proceed in forma pauperis. 70 9 The Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit subsequently denied SOUP's motion to
proceed in forma pauperis on appeal, on the ground that the in forma
pauperis statute 710 comprehends only natural persons, and, even if it
does apply to a corporation, its individual members must lack the means
to pay the costs involved.711 One judge dissented from the order, maintaining that the statutory language does comprehend corporations and
that to require evaluation of the personal financial resources of each of
a corporation's members would disregard the corporate form, impose an
unnecessarily time-consuming burden on the court, and discourage nonindigent individuals unwilling to assume personal liability for costs from
joining 712
corporations that might bring suits to promote the public
interest.
It is the current policy of the FTC to provide counsel for indigent
respondents, including corporations.713 If one criterion for permitting
a third party to participate in a proceeding is the adequacy of representation of its interest by existing parties, then perhaps counsel should
be provided indigent parties whose interests would otherwise be inadequately represented. The tentative standards for intervention advanced in Firestone714 emphasize the potential contribution an applicant
might make to the proceeding. An indigent applicant asserting an
otherwise inadequately represented interest obviously promises to contribute little, standing alone. If that applicant's interest were effectively
articulated by counsel, the potential contribution would be substantially
increased. If, however, the Commission itself were to provide counsel
to such indigent applicants, it would have, perhaps, too much control
708

See notes 289-321 supra & accompanying text. The following assessment of
the cost to the Commission of participation in hearings gives some suggestion of the
financial burden on intervenors:
It is estimated that it costs the Commission approximately $1,000 per
day of trial. This does not include the cost of preparation, briefing, time
spent writing the initial decision, etc.
Letter from Joachim Volhard, Office of FTC Commissioner MacIntyre, to the
University of Pennsylvania Law Review (undated), on file in Biddle Law Library,
Univ. of Pa. Law School.
709 Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 3 TRADE REG. REP. 19,519 (FTC 1971).
71028 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (1970).
711 SOUP, Inc. v. FTC, 5 TRADE REG. REP. 73,660 (D.C. Cir., July 27, 1971)
(order
denying motion to proceed in forma pauperis).
712

Id.

Chinchilla Corp., [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP.
119,059 (FTC 1969). See Comment, Trumpets in the Corridors of Bureaucracy:
A Coming Right to Appointed Counsel in Administrative Adjudicative Proceedings,
18 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 758, 766-67 (1971).
714
Notes 658-59 supra & accompanying text.
713 American
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over determining whether their interests were worthy of representation
and how staff counsel should present their cases. Alternative approaches
might better insure independent control of such applicants' cases.7 5
Short of providing counsel, the Commission could take other steps
to alleviate the financial burden on indigent intervenors. It could, as it
did in Campbell,716 provide a free transcript and, as in Firestone717 require the intervenor to file one copy of its documents rather than the
twenty or twenty-five now required. 718 In Firestone, SOUP requested
that the Commission pay travel expenses, living expenses, and per diem
fees for its witnesses. The Commission declined to rule on the request,
pending a determination by the Comptroller General on its statutory
authority to make such payments. Chairman Kirkpatrick requested a
ruling from the Comptroller General on the matter.71 At this writing,
no ruling has yet been made. Commissioner Jones has suggested that
these expenses be considered necessary to the conduct of the Commission's proceedings, 720 as are expenses of complaint counsel and Commission witnesses.72 1
D. Federal Agencies Regulating Power Generation
Federal regulation of the generation of energy, primarily electricity,
is an extremely complex and highly technical matter. The problems
that arise stem from both the nature of the subject matter and the
multiplicity of regulatory bodies at various governmental levels charged
with responsibility for different, or even identical, subject-matter regulation. Depending upon the energy source used, the generation of
electric power may be federally regulated, in some aspects, by two
agencies, the Federal Power Commission and the Atomic Energy Commission. The regulatory schemes of both agencies in this area are
premised on congressional grants of licensing power over the construction and operation of generating facilities,7 22 each agency having responsibility for implementing a broad but not unlimited set of federal
policies.72
Public participation in the decisionmaking procedures of the two
agencies has developed independently of their common concern with
715

See notes 285-88 .spra & accompanying text.
Brief for Petitioner at 14, SOUP, Inc. v. FTC, No. 24,476 (D.C. Cir., filed
July 24, 1970).
717 Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 3 TRADE REG. REP. 1119,519 (FTC 1971).
716

718

See 16 C.F.R. §4.2(c) (1971).

719

Letter from FTC Chairman Kirkpatrick to Comptroller General Staats, Mar.

17, 1971, copy on file in Biddle Law Library, Univ. of Pa. Law School.
720
See 15 U.S.C. § 42 (1970).
721 Letter from FTC Commissioner Mary Gardiner Jones to Comptroller General
Staats, Mar. 17, 1971, copy on file in Biddle Law Library, Univ. of Pa. Law School.
Cf. Lazarus & Onek, supra note 19, at 1100.
722 See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 797(e) (1970); 42 U.S.C. § 2133 (a) (1970).
7
723 See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. §79 (c) (1970); 42 U.S.C. §2013 (1970).
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the regulation of power generation. The following discussion treats
each agency separately for this reason. At the same time, however,
each discussion will emphasize the licensing of power generating facilities, and these discussions will be followed by a joint discussion focusing
on this subject. Two reasons support this approach. First, public concern has singled out this activity of the agencies in recent years, and
thus provides sufficient data to suggest problems and trends within the
agencies. Second, most recent criticism of such regulation has been
directed at the multiplicity of regulatory agencies at the state and federal
level charged with responsibility for licensing power plants, the complexity thus injected into the decisionmaking process, and the consequent difficulties presented to those wishing to participate in the
agencies' planning and licensing decisions. Recent proposals for improving the decisionmaking process would merge the agencies involved,
instituting a consolidated system of licensing under federal authority
(one-stop licensing) and formal long-range planning.72 4 Such proposals carry broad implications for the future role of public participation, and therefore warrant separate treatment.
1. Federal Power Commission
Certificates authorizing the construction and operation of hydroelectric facilities are granted by the Federal Power Commission for periods of up to fifty years.72 5 As of this time none of the certificates
granted by the FPC has expired. 26 Consequently, and in contrast to
the FCC's emphasis on frequent review of broadcasters' licenses to use
the public airways,7 27 challenges by members of the public to the way
in which certified facilities have been operated have been narrowly
occurring only in carefully circumscribed ratemaking proceedlimited,
728
ings.
See text accompanying notes 918-21, 926-30 infra.
72516 U.S.C. § 799 (1970).
726 Interview with James Michael, Center for the Study of Responsive Law,
Washington, D.C., in Washington, D.C., Sept. 27, 1971.
724

See text accompanying notes 325, 337 supra.
A recent instance of public interest intervention before the FPC occurred in
Gulf Oil Corp., No. C164-26 (FPC 1972), a proceeding to amend a certificate of
public convenience and necessity granted Gulf for the sale of 4.4 trillion cubic feet
of gas to Texas Eastern Transmission Corporation under a warranty contract.
SOUP, the Washington Urban League, Inc., and 50 utilities were granted intervention
Countering the
under §15(a) of the Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. §717n (1970).
position taken by all but one of the intervening utilities, they argued that, if granted,
the amendment would "ultimately cost the consuming public in excess of $160 million"
and that Gulf should therefore be held to its original contract. Petitioners' Motion
for Emergency Relief at 5, SOUP, Inc. v. FPC, No. 72-1103 (D.C. Cir., filed Feb. 4,
1972). The issue presented in the Motion for Emergency Relief was "[t]o what
extent does the public interest require the Commission to immediately provide intervenors, recognized [by the Commission] as responsible representatives of the public
interest, the loan of a copy of the daily transcript [see 18 C.F.R. § 1.21 (a) (1971)]
and relief from burdensome service requirements imposed by the Commission's Rules
[see 18 C.F.R. §§ 1.15(b), .17(b), .26(c), .29(e) (1971)], irrespective of intervenors'
indigent status?" Id. SOUP and the Urban League argued that they were "not
727
728
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Initial certification of new facilities has been a more active area.
As will appear below, the FPC has been liberal in admitting members
of the public to such hearings so long as they wish to address matters
the agency considers its responsibility. But when efforts have been
made to invoke judicial review, and subsequently to force the agency
to broaden its vision to encompass previously unexplored consequences
of its certification, resistance has been frequent.
Despite the FPC's apparent acquiescence to participation at the
hearing stage, few members of the public have exercised the opportunity,
and the number is smaller yet if participation by competitors who have
a substantial economic stake in the outcome is excluded. Traceable to
the high cost of presenting an effective case in proceedings which are
inherently complex and extraordinarily long, this pattern has a number
of potentially unsatisfactory consequences. The agency attempts to
limit the number of factors it must take into account in working out
the "public interest." Those participants able to afford participation
and then gain attention for issues otherwise avoided by the agency are
extremely few. Because of this, the agency may often fail to consider
the full range of issues relevant to the public interest. But even where
it does consider these issues, the agency's perspective may be confined
to the narrow interests of the rare intervenor. Fuller consideration is
not necessarily better consideration, when the potential for limited or
skewed perspectives is so great. Moreover, the effectiveness of judicial
review as a prod on agency action is also reduced, when there is only
infrequent intervention by narrowly interested groups.
The Federal Power Act (FPA) 729 and the Natural Gas Act
(NGA) 730 are the basic sources for the regulatory authority of the
Federal Power Commission.7 3' The FPC's jurisdictional responsibility
under each has been expanded judicially over the years and is formulated somewhat differently in each, as will be shown below. Rules
governing participation in FPC proceedings under these Acts are, however, identical in at least two respects. First, both statutes make participation discretionary with the Commission:
In any proceeding before it, the Commission, in accordance
with such rules and regulations as it may prescribe, may admit
attempting to proceed as paupers in the conventional sense, but rather that they
should receive financial relief in line with their status as recognized public interest
intervenors." Id. 9-10; cf. notes 709-12 supra & accompanying text. The motion
was denied on Mar. 9, 1972, and the hearing examiner has not yet reached a decision
on the merits. Telephone interview with Stuart Bluestone, Institute for Public
Interest Representation, Washington, D.C., May 30, 1972.
72916 U.S.C. §§791a-825r (1970).
730 15 U.S.C. §§717-717w (1970).
731 "The Federal Power Commission has certain specified duties under other
statutes, but most of the Commission's time and other resources are consumed in the
administration of the two basic Acts." RESPONSES, supra note 30, at 89. For an
exhaustive compilation of other statutes defining the powers and duties of the FPC,
see FPC, FEDERA-L PoWER AcT 61-156 (1970).
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as a party any interested State, State commission, municipality, or any representative of interested consumers or security holders, or any competitor of a party to such proceeding,
or any other person whose participation . . . may be in the
public interest.78 2
Second, in furtherance of a policy of close cooperation with state regulatory commissions, 733 the Commission has promulgated rules which
give any interested state commission an absolute right to intervene in
any proceeding,73 4 relegating all other intervenors to the status of petitioners for the opportunity to intervene.7 3 5
a. The Natural Gas Act
Under the NGA the Commission is empowered to regulate natural
gas companies engaged in interstate transportation, or sale for resale, of
natural gas.7 1' This power is exercised by certification of new facilities,
regulation of producer and pipeline rates, and regulation of accounts,
records, and securities. 737 Applicants for proposed facilities must be
granted construction certificates by the FPC, if it finds them "required
by the present or future public convenience and necessity," 73' but "such
reasonable terms and conditions as the public convenience and necessity
may require" may be imposed. 739 Before the grant of such a certificate,
notice "to all interested parties" and a hearing are mandatory,740 even
though participation in that hearing is said in the statute to be discretionary. 741
Certification proceedings under the NGA have not been major
battlegrounds. As has been observed:
Principal reasons for [the lack of controversy in NGA certifications compared to FPA certifications discussed below] include the fact that a great number of the major natural gas
pipeline facilities were constructed throughout the United
States under the spur and necessity of war-time needs or
postwar-time recovery conditions. Secondly, during both
periods, public need for gas utility facility development was
not questioned. Third, the emergence of environmental pro73216 U.S.C. §825g(a) (1970); accord, 15 U.S.C. §717n(a) (1970).
73318 C.F.R. § 1.37(a) (1971).
734Id. § 1.37(f); see id. §1.8(a) (1).

735 Id. § 1.8(a) (2).
73615 U.S.C. § 717(b) (1970).
3

7 7

Id. §§ 717c, f, g, Ic.

738 Id.

§ 717f(e).
739 Id.
740 Id. § 717f (c).
741 Id. § 717n.
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tection as
a great goal of our society is of relatively recent
742
origin.
The pressure on the FPC to admit nongovernmental participants
during the periods of greatest construction came from producers of
competing fuels and the litigation surrounding those efforts to intervene
constituted an important chapter in the judiciary's expansion of the
role of the public participant.74 3 The FPC consistently denied that the
NGA's mandate to regulate to further the "public convenience and
necessity" required the agency to consider the impact of its regulation
of natural gas facilities on competing fuel industries. The reasoning,
generally sustained by the courts, was succinctly stated in Alston Coal
Co. v. FPC,4 a ratemaking proceeding:
[T]he purpose of those provisions . . . relating to rates and
prices . . . [was] to protect the consuming public against
exorbitant and excessive charges . . . . [T]he Commission
must . . . fix a rate which will yield a fair return ....
The effect of a gas rate upon a competing industry fuel is not
a factor which . . . the Commission may consider ....
It follows that petitioners did not have the right . . . to intervene for the purpose of establishing the economic effect a
reduction in gas rates would have upon the coal industry.7 45
This was not, of course, the end of the matter. In National Coal
Association v. FPC, 7" the court decided that it was appropriate to
allow competitors judicial review of NGA certification. Apparently
taking a somewhat different view of congressional intent than was expressed in Alston Coal, the court decided that all persons who would
have a recognized right to obtain judicial review of a Commission order
should be allowed to participate initially in the certification hearings.
[T]here are some persons who have a right to participate in
Commission proceedings and some who do not. We think it
clear that any person who would be "aggrieved" by the
Commission's order, such as a competitor, is also a person
who has a right to intervene. Otherwise, judicial review,
which may be had only by a party to the proceedings before
the Commission who has been "aggrieved" by its order,
could be denied or unduly forestalled
by the Commission
47
merely by denying intervention.
742 Nassikas, Public Participation in Locating Facilities, 88
Sept. 16, 1971, at 108, 109.
743 See text accompanying notes 33-120 supra.
744 137 F.2d 740 (10th Cir. 1943).

PUB. UTIL. FORT.,

74

5 Id. at 741-42.
746 191 F.2d 462

(D.C. Cir. 1951).
Id. at 467. See 15 U.S.C. § 717r(b) (1970) ; Juarez Gas Co. v. FPC, 375
F.2d 595 (D.C. Cir. 1967). See also Virginia Petroleum Jobbers Ass'n v. FPC,
265 F.2d 364, 368 (D.C. Cir. 1959); Mississippi River Transmission Corp., 39
F.P.C. 486 (1968); Consolidated Gas Supply Corp., 39 F.P.C. 38 (1968).
747
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With some practical justification, 748 a distinction between certification
and ratemaking proceedings has been retained. Because both the
judicial review and hearing participation provisions in the NGA apply
to all proceedings under that Act,74 there seems no firmer ground upon
which to place the distinction than assumptions or conclusions concerning congressional intent. As a consequence of the distinction, the
history of public participation under the National Gas Act remains of
interest primarily for the judicially developed theory of intervention as
of right rather than for its practical consequences within the FPC.
Public participation in fact has been allowed fairly freely. Using
its statutory grant of discretion to allow intervention, the FPC, with
judicial approval, has allowed coal companies to intervene in ratemaking
proceedings.7 50 Furthermore, competitors have found the door almost
completely open to intervention in ratemaking proceedings, despite the
supposed principle of intervention by competitors only to serve the
public interest. 7 5 ' Finally, the FPC has several industry advisory
committees,752 which "perform some valuable services in keeping the
Commission informed about many developments and in making useful
suggestions on policy matters."1

713

Nevertheless, National Coal presents a significant lesson. The
FPC had not in fact denied intervention to the competitor in National
Coal, but instead had asserted its power to deny intervention as one
ground supporting a denial of judicial review.75 4 A possible inference
is that the agency was more concerned about the scope of the issues
to be considered than about the burden of the additional participant.
This suggestion finds support in the reviewing court's abrupt affirmance
after reciting as the FPC's "substantial evidence," only evidence going
affirmatively to the appropriateness of natural gas as a fuel.7"5 The
conclusion suggested is that additional parties were not felt objectionable, but independent inquiry into the economic conditions of the coal
industry was.
748

Professor Jaffe suggests that "[i]n terms simply of injury it is hard to explain

a difference in standing of coal interests to contest a decision to certify new gas and
one to price it so as to increase competition. But in terms of effect on the administrative process the distinction is valid. The initial decision to certify new gas is taken
once and for all and is nearly irreversible. Rates can be changed; they should be
flexible and the ratemaking process not too cumbersome." Jaffe, Standing to Secure
Judicial Review: Private Actions, 75 HARv. L. REv. 255, 276 n.71 (1961).
749 15 U.S.C. §§ 717b (c), r (b) (1970).
750 See Atlantic Seaboard Corp., 35 F.P.C. 158, 159 (1966) ; cf. 15 U.S.C. § 717r
(1970) ; 18 C.F.R. § 1.8(b) (3) (1971).
751 Fuels Research Council, Inc. v. FPC, 374 F.2d 842, 853 (7th Cir. 1967).
See also United Fuel Gas Co., 28 F.P.C. 30 (1962); Northern Natural Gas Co.,
23 F.P.C. 708 (1960).
752 RE PONSES, supra note 30, at 92.
753 Id. at 86.
754 See 191 F.2d at 466-67.
755 Id.

at 467.
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b. The Federal Power Act
Under the FPA the Commission is empowered to regulate supplies
of electric power by licensing non-federal hydroelectric power projects,
regulating interstate transmission and wholesale rates of electrical
energy, and regulating the securities and accounts, and the mergers,
consolidations, and acquisitions, of companies subject to its jurisdiction. 75 The Commission is not required to license any project, but in
those cases in which it chooses to grant licenses its responsibility is not
framed in the traditionally expansive term "public interest." Instead
licenses are to be issued in accordance with an elaborate list of "conditions, 7' 57 including one to the effect that the project

shall be such as in the judgment of the Commission will be
best adapted to a comprehensive plan for improving or developing a waterway or waterways for the use or benefit of
interstate or foreign commerce, for the improvement and
utilization of water-power development, and for other beneficial public uses, including recreational purposes ....
7"
A general provision adds that the Commission may impose conditions
other than those listed in the statute if it wishes,7 59 presumably only so
long as they serve some purpose implicit within the ActThe FPA does not specifically require a hearing before the grant
or denial of a license. 760 The Ninth Circuit, however, has held that
section 308 of the Act 71 implicitly requires a hearing prior to the
granting of a license.762 Under this construction the procedures of the
73
Administrative Procedure Act are automatically incorporated. 1
Whether acknowledging this as a proper construction of the FPA or
independently determining that, for reasons of its own, a hearing is
appropriate, the FPC has apparently adopted the practice of holding a
75616 U.S.C. §797 (1970).
757 Id.

§ 803.

758Id. §803(a).
7

591d. §803(g).

Hearing procedures for proceedings under the FPA are specified generally in
id. § 825g, which provides only that "[h]earings under this chapter may be held . .. ."
Power to issue licenses is conferred on the Commission by id. §797(e), which
requires general notice by publication and specific notice to "any state or municipality
likely to be interested," id. § 797(f), but no hearing pursuant to that notice. Neither
the provisions for preliminary permits, id. §§797(f), 798, 800, nor the provisions
conditioning licenses, id. §§ 799, 801-03, add such a requirement as a condition to
the grant of a license.
In contrast, remedial action for violation of conditions imposed in a license, including revocation, may only be effectuated pursuant to a federal district court judg-ment. Id. § 820.
76116 t-S.C.- §825g (1970).
1 v- FPC, 242 F.2d 672, 678 (9th Cir. 1957). The
762 Public Titn. Dit. l,.
court declared that: "Under § 308 . . . the order granting the license was a matter
'required by statute to be determined . . . after opportunity for an agency hearing'
within the meaning of § 1004 of Title 5 U.S.C.A."
63
See 5 U.S.C. §554 (1970).
760
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hearing if a protest is filed to the proposed grant of a license. 76" The
former explanation is unlikely, for if a requirement of a hearing on a
record can be inferred from the nature of the license provided for in
the FPA, there is no justification for making the hearing conditional.
In any event, since the Commission has promulgated no rules or orders
either limiting the class of persons who may protest or requiring that
protests meet any objective criteria,76 5 it appears that hearings are
usually held before the grant of a license, and intervention is freely
allowed.
766
Participation in such hearings is discretionary with the agency,
but, as under the certification provisions of the NGA, the opportunity
to participate apparently has not often been withheld. That the FPC
has liberally allowed participation may fairly be inferred from the
absence of detailed CAB-like rules governing the form of participation.
Yet, as noted at the beginning of this section, meaningful citizen
participation before the agency has been "sorely lacking." 767 Furthermore, interested environmentalists and consumers have met resistance
that has caused them to go to the courts for help in forcing the FPC
to broaden its concept of its responsibility. Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC 768 is the leading case on the standing of conservationists to protect aesthetic and environmental interests by obtaining judicial review, 769 forcing the FPC to broaden the subject matter
under consideration in its licensing hearings. The Second Circuit
found that the Conference-"an unincorporated association consisting
of a number of non-profit, conservationist organizations" 770 seeking to
present relevant data in opposition to the proposed construction of a
hydroelectric plant-had standing in court as a "party . . . aggrieved
by an order issued by the Commission." 771 Although the Conference
had "sufficient economic interest to establish [its] standing," 772 the
court added that the FPA "seeks to protect non-economic as well as
economic interests," 7" and granted standing to the petitioners on the
basis of their non-economic interests.
In order to insure that the Federal Power Commission
will adequately protect the public interest in the aesthetic, conSee 18 C.F.R. §§ 1.10, 4.32 (1970).
See id.
76616 U.S.C. §825g(a) (1970).
767 See REspo0sEs, spra note 30, at 85; accord, Hearings on S. 3434 & S. 2544
Before the Subcominm. on Administrative Practice & Procedure of the Senate Comm.
764
765

on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 82 (1970).
768 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966).
769 See K. DAvis, supra note 23, §22.19 (Supp. 1970).
770 354 F.2d at 611.
771 Id. at 615-16 (citing 16 U.S.C. §8251(b) (1970)). Scenic Hudson was initiated under the FPA. The parallel provisions under the NGA are found at 15
U.S.C. §717r (1970), which was the basis for National Coal. See note 747 supra.
772 354 F.2d at 616.
773 Id. at 615.
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servational, and recreational aspects of power development,
those who by their activities and conduct have exhibited a
special interest in such areas, must be held to be included in
the class of "aggrieved" parties .

.

.

. We hold that the

Federal Power Act gives petitioners a legal right to protect
their special interests.7
The FPA requires that as a condition for a license, a "project . . .
shall be such as . . .will be best adapted to a comprehensive plan for
improving or developing a waterway or waterways for . . .beneficial

public uses, including recreational purposes .... ,,775 The court
thought that the statute "encompasses the conservation of natural resources, the maintenance of natural beauty, and the preservation of
historic sites," 77' and remanded the case with instructions that the FPC
admit and consider the evidence that the petitioners sought to offer.777
The court's logic on the standing issue has been criticized for being
"filled with courageous leaps over intellectual chasms that might never
be bridged" 778 and for "fail[ing] to connect the injury allegedly suffered . .

with the proposed relief." 7 9 Despite its technical short-

comings, however, the decision clearly shows the court's increasing
willingness to supervise the FPC and dictate the breadth of its responsibility.7"' Apparently Scenic Hudson considerably expanded the subject
matter which the FPC must consider before granting a license. But it
should be noted that when the case reached the court of appeals for the
second time, FPC consideration of the impact of its licensing decision
was approved on a record that showed a rather limited consideration
of the effect the project would have on the environment and of the
7741d. at

616.
"7716 U.S.C. § 803(a) (1970).
776 354 F.2d at 614.
777Id. at 624. Such consideration was subsequently mandated by the Supreme
Court in Udall v. FPC, 387 U.S. 428 (1967) (the High Mountain Sheep case).
The test is whether the project will be in the public interest. And that
determination can be made only after an exploration of all issues relevant
to the "public interest," including future power demand and supply, alternate
sources of power, the public interest in preserving reaches of wild rivers
and wilderness areas, the preservation of anadromous fish for commercial
and recreational purposes, and the protection of wildlife.
Id. at 450. Under these decisions, the consideration of non-power interests and the
development of a full record are mandatory, see Comment, Of Birds, Bees, and the
FPC 77 YALE L.J. 117, 120 (1967), and the FPC has recognized this obligation,
see 35 Fed. Reg. 18,958 (1970).
The Second Circuit finally upheld the granting of a license, finding that the
Commission's action complied with the remand and was supported by substantial
evidence. Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 453 F.2d 463, 470 (2d
Cir. 1971) (Scenic Hudson II).
778 K. DAvis, supra note 23, §22.19, at 775 (Supp. 1970).
779Comment, Standing of Conservation Organizations to Challenge Federal
Administrative Action in Federal Court, 12 B.C. IND. & Com. L. REv. 637, 642 (1971).
780 Cf. Tarlock, Preservation of Scenic Rivers, 55 Ky. L.J. 745, 777 (1967).
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available alternatives to that installation.78 1 In fact, the issues examined
appear to have been limited to the impact of the one project rather than
a "comprehensive plan" as called for by the FPA,8 2 and to the impact
that project would have on an environment limited by the distance from
78 3
which the installation could be seen, as a scathing dissent pointed out.
Although the public participants in the proceeding included only nearby
townships and groups of people concerned with the preservation of the
Hudson River,78 4 the impact of the license will undoubtedly extend well
beyond that area.
c. The Public Interest and the Power Commission
If public participation is thus limited in impact, it seems appropriate to consider the ways in which, within the context of the present
federal regulatory structure, the deficiencies may be remedied, and
whether there is room for adaptation of public participation to provide
those remedies.
The expense and technical complexity of litigating before the FPC
is recognized by the Commission to be "a very practical obstacle to
widespread citizen participation." 785 This obstacle was judicially noted
in Scenic Hudson in responding to the FPC's fears of thousands seeking intervention and review: "Our experience with public actions confirms the view that the expense and vexation of legal proceedings is not
lightly undertaken." 78' By the time Scenic Hudson initially reached
the Second Circuit, the Conference had expended $250,000, with the
hearing on remand still awaiting. 78 7 Few environmental or consumer
groups possess the resources or staff to present such technical evidence
as possible alternative sources of electrical energy, the effects on 7 a
river's oxygen caused by projects, or the thermal effects on fish. 1
Moreover, the difficulty of obtaining engineers or other qualified wit781 453 F.2d 482-85 (Oakes, J., dissenting). Cf. Comment, supra note 777, at
121. For a comprehensive report on the FPC response to environmental concern,
see 50 FPC ANN. REP. 4-5 (1970) ; Bagge, The Federal Power Commission, 11 B.C.

IND. & Coar. L. REv. 689, 719-20 (1970). See also RESPONSES, supra note 30, at 87.
7 82
See note 758 supra & accompanying text. The court appears to have attached
no significance to the fact that the project was not geared to "improving or developing
a waterway," as 16 U.S.C. § 803 (a) (1970) requires. See 453 F.2d at 467.
783
See 453 F.2d at 492 (Oakes, J., dissenting).
784 The parties and intervenors are listed at 453 F.2d at 464-65; 354 F.2d at 610.
785 RESPONSES, supra note 30, at 86.
786 354 F.2d at 617.
787 Comment, supra note 777, at 120.
788 Kitzmiller, Environmental Preservation: Organizing and Protecting Consumer and Conservation Issues in an Administrative Proceeding, in PROCEEDINGS OF
THE FEDERAL HEARING EXAMINERS' SEVENTH ANNUAL SEMINAR 34, 50 (1969).
The Sierra Club, however, may be able to make an adequate evidentiary showing,
as it has nearly 100,000 members, a budget of $3,000,000, and a 60-man staff with 20
volunteer attorneys. See Sierra Club Mounts a New Crusade, BUSINESS WEEK.
May 23, 1970, at 64-65.
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nesses to testify is exacerbated by the fact that most of the experts on
those matters have allegiance to power companies. 8 9
The Commission has recently considered the extent to which participants in FPC proceedings may receive public financial support. In
1970, People Organized to Win Effective Regulation (POWER) was
allowed to intervene in rate increase hearings but the Commission
den[ied] the request by POWER that it be allowed an initial
$10,000 in costs and fees payable by the Commission to act as
public interest and consumer surrogate in lieu of the Commission. Although the participation of POWER and all other
parties is encouraged in this proceeding, the Commission has
not and will not abdicate its mandate to represent the public
interest. Therefore, a volunteer surrogate will not be appointed in lieu of the Commission.79
The Commission did, however, allow intervening parties leave to proceed in forma pauperis in order to receive a transcript without charge or
to be relieved of filing copies of written submissions and of serving
copies upon other parties. 79'
The Commission and the public interest seem, however, to be in a
state of equilibrium:
Increasingly, matters coming before the Commission involve complex issues of industrial technology, law, economics
and finance. This acts as a very real limitation on effective
participation by the individual citizen or private citizen groups
unless they have substantial resources to employ the required
expertise. On the other hand, our liberal policy of allowing
all interested parties to intervene . . . does bring into play

powerful forces that represent the consumer and the general
public, or whose interests are essentially the same.792
It has been suggested that "perhaps all we have to do is raise the
[environmental] question to a responsive commission which, recognizing that it may face a court review, should then . . . of its own motion

see that the question was properly answered." 7" The principle of intensive staff involvement in the planning and execution of service and
facility proposals has been called regulatory "activism." 711 In approSee Kitzmiller, supra note 788, at 51.
79o Initial Rates for Future Sales of Natural Gas for All Areas, 44 F.P.C. 655,
789

657 (1970).
791Id. at 659.
792

REsPONsEs, supra note 30,

at 110.

supra note 788, at 36. But cf. Rocky Mountain Power Co. v.
FPC, 409 F.2d 1122, 1129 n.29 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
794 Seder, Regulatory Activisn--The Aftermath of Scenic Hudson, in A3A
Pun. UTIL. L. SEcTON ANN. REP. 3, 8 (1969).
793 Kitzmiller,
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priate cases, the FPC staff 79 should move beyond the mere consideration of competing proposals to directing the parties to consider alternatives or even to preparing its own proposals,7 9 a practice which the
staff has occasionally followed with limited success. Staff investigation
could obviate much of the need for costly and time-consuming intervention, thereby removing a burden that citizen groups must otherwise
shoulder. Staff initiative and intervention, however, may present due
process/requisite notice problems. 7 According to one authority, "If
.

.

the Commission favors an alternative not comprehended by the

original public notice, due process would appear to require additional
notice and opportunity for hearing." 711 Meeting such requirements
might produce endless delay and repetitious proceedings. 79 9
Whether the FPC staff or citizen groups should bear the responsibility of protecting the public's concern with the environment or
whether public intervention should increase, are questions which can be
expected to be asked with increasing frequency. The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) 800 directs all federal agencies
to "study, develop, and describe appropriate alternatives to recommended courses of action in any proposal which involves unresolved
conflicts concerning alternative uses of available resources," s01 and to
"initiate and utilize ecological information in the planning and development of resource-oriented projects." 802 The FPC has adopted rules to
implement the NEPA. °3
Judicial and congressional requirements alone, irrespective of citizen intervention, can, of course, lead to added delay in the administrative process.
795 The Commissioners themselves rely very heavily on the expertise of the staff
on specialized questions of law, engineering, economics, and accounting. See RESimilarly, some intervenors rely on the FPC staff
SPONSES, supra note 30, at 111.
analysis of a proposed project. Telephone interview with William Arkin, Staff of
FPC General Counsel, Aug. 17, 1971.
7o6 Seder, supra note 794, at 17. Notwithstanding the requirement that the
FPC fully consider alternatives presented by parties to proceedings under Scenic
Hudson, "the role of the agency in encouraging or directing the presentation of
alternatives should be limited principally to situations in which a clearly-defined question of public policy presented by the application can best be resolved by formulating
and presenting an alternative proposal." Id.
797TId. 15.
798 Id.
799 See, e.g., Manufacturers Light & Heat Co., 39 F.P.C. 294 (1968); Pacific
Gas Transmission Co., 40 F.P.C. 1147 (1968); Great Lakes Transmission Co., 37
F.P.C. 1070 (1967).
The remand of the High Mountain Sheep case, 387 U.S. 428 (1967), is perhaps
the most sterling example of regulatory activism. The FPC staff, which had testified
about power supply resources, see Initial & Reply Brief of Commission Staff Counsel at 58, Pacific Northwest Power Co., Project No. 2243 (FPC, Feb. 23, 1971)
(Presiding Examiner's Initial Decision on Remand), developed in its own cost
estimates, id. 66-102, and asserted the same sentiment for environmental protection
which would be expected from the conservation groups.
80042 U.S.C. §§4321 et seq. (1970).
8011d. § 4332(D).
802 Id. § 4332(G).
80
3 See 18 C.F.R. §§2.80-.82 (1971).
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The question as to whether the agency's decision-making
processes operate with reasonable speed is not a simple one.
. . . The problems arise when unique situations are presented or there are parties opposing one another. When a
matter goes to full hearing, there are many opportunities for
delay, either intentional or unintentional. Some delay is inherent and, indeed, essential to a full consideration of all
relevant factors, particularly with the increased concern . .
on the part of the public . . . [with] the environment. In
the past, the Commission has not given as much attention to
environmental factors as it should have, with the result that
our expertise is not fully developed. This can lead to delay
when we have to grapple with unfamiliar areas of concern ....

804

The "unprecedented concern and agitation for the environment" 805 has delayed the construction of new power facilities as the
demand for power approaches the crisis stage. After nine years,8 8 the
Scenic Hudson battle has finally been resolved 80. and Consolidated
Edison has made a number of concessions,8 08 and it is not at all clear
whether the public interest will be served by further delay.8" 9 Where
the choice is one between air-conditioning in the summer and cheap
power in the ghetto, as opposed to healthy fish swimming in crystalline
streams, the value of intervention by environmentalists is not always
clear. "[M]any of these groups may have their own interests to protect which, while protecting one group of citizens, may be adverse to
another group." 810 For example, landowners, claiming that the public
interest commands intervention, may intervene to delay proceedings in
order "to force higher prices for rights of way." 811 The "flood of horribles" argument offered in opposition to increased participation has
been consistently rejected,812 but agencies must be aware of what interests are being urged and what risks accompany them.
804 RESPONSES,

supra note 30, at 87 (Statement of Chairman White).

805 Ramey & Murray, Delays and Bottlenecks in the Licensing Process Affecting

Utilities: The Role of Improved Procedures and Advance Planning, 1970 DunE L.J.
25, 28.
806 Thimmescb, Lilliputian Ecologists Hogtie Utility Giants, Evening Bulletin
(Philadelphia), Oct. 5, 1971, at 29, col. 1. Intervenor expenses have now risen
above the half-million dollar mark. Id. col. 3.
80T See Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 453 F.2d 463 (2d
Cir. 1971).
s0s Id. at 466.
809 The controversial Blue Ridge hydroelectric project is presently being challenged by environmental groups and political units and promises to be a protracted
proceeding. See N.Y. Times, Nov. 12, 1971, at 18, col. 1.
810 RESPONSES, supra note 30, at 85.
811 Id. 87.
812 See, e.g., Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d at 617:
We see no justification for the Commission's fear that our determination
will encourage "literally thousands" to intervene and seek review in future
proceedings.
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In 1960, Dean Landis castigated the FPC as representing "the
outstanding example in the federal government of the breakdown of the
administrative process." 813 This statement was largely provoked by
the enormous backlog of cases before the FPC, including several thousand individual gas producer rate cases.814 By 1969, producer rate
cases numbered six, due to the implementation of the procedure of setting area rates.8 15 The hearing process has also been simplified by use
of prehearing conferences, filing of written rather than oral testimony,
independent accounting certifications, and bifurcated hearings which
encourage settlement after the first phase. 8
From all indications, then, it appears that the FPC has been liberal
in its intervention policy. Yet dissatisfaction with the results of the
agency's work is widespread, and appears to come from members of
the public not represented in the hearing process, experts in the field,
and judges, with equal vigor. If a broader base of public participation
is to be found, and the frequency of such participation increased, without a restructuring of the FPC or an enormous increase in the administrative burdens of the agency, perhaps the most appropriate solution
is a decrease in formal participation and the expansion of the FPC
advisory committees to include concerned citizen groups, a proposal
urged by former FPC Chairman White."'7 Alternatively, Commissioner Bagge has suggested the establishment of a formalized consultative process between government and business, joint planning, and
increased reliance on rulemaking at the expense of adjudication."1 8
2. Atomic Energy Commission
The Atomic Energy Commission is charged by the Atomic Energy
Act 819 with broad responsibility for the licensing and regulation of
nonmilitary aspects of the development and application of atomic
. . . Representation of common interests by an organization such as
Scenic Hudson serves to limit the number of those who might otherwise apply
for intervention and serves to expedite the administrative process.

Accord, Associated Indus., Inc. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694 (2d Cir.), vacated as moot,
320 U.S. 707 (1943).
813 CHAIRMAN OF THE SUBCOMM. ON ADMINIsTRATIvE PRACTICE & PROCEDURE OF
THE SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., 2D SESS., REPORT ON REGULATORY
AGENCIES TO THE PRESIDENT-ELEcT 54 (Comm. Print 1960).
814 Bagge, supra note 781, at 690.
815

Id.

See also Jaffe, The Federal Regulatory Agencies in Perspective: Ad-

ininistrative Limitations in a Political Setting, 11 B.C.
569 (1970).
816 REsPONSES, supra note 30, at 95.

IND.

& CoM. L. REv. 565,

817 Id. 86.

818 Bagge, Broadening the Supply Base-A Proposal to Eliminate ProducerPrice
Regulation, 3 NAT. RES. LAw. 430, 432 (1970).
81942 U.S.C. §§2011-96 (1970).
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energy. A nonexhaustive list of those activities that are licensed by the
AEC includes the construction and operation of any facility producing
or using nuclear material, and the possession, shipment, or disposal of
such material. 20 While intervenors have been active in other areas of
AEC concern,"2 the most significant proceedings in terms of public
participation and volume of litigation are applications for licenses authorizing the construction of new nuclear power plants. 22 Standards
for issuance of such licenses are stated generally in the Act:
The Commission shall issue such licenses on a nonexclusive basis to persons applying therefor (1) whose proposed activities will serve a useful purpose proportionate to
the quantities of special nuclear material or source material to
be utilized; (2) who are equipped to observe and who agree
to observe such safety standards to protect health and to minimize danger to life or property as the Commission may by
rule establish; and (3) who agree to make available to the
Commission such technical information and data concerning
activities under such licenses as the Commission may determine necessary to promote the common defense and security
8 23
and to protect the health and safety of the public.
Additionally, all power-generating facilities licensed by the AEC are
explicitly subjected by the Act to regulation
by the Federal Power
8 24
Act.
Power
Federal
the
under
Commission
a. The Licensing Proceeding
Section 185 of the Atomic Energy Act 825 establishes a two-stage
licensing process through which an applicant may secure the permission
of the AEC to operate a nuclear power plant. The first stage involves
the issuance of a provisional construction permit, which may be secured
only after a mandatory public hearing. 26 The issuance of an operating
license, which comprises the second stage of the licensing procedure,
may occur without another public hearing unless one is requested by
820 For a complete listing of AEC licensing responsibilities, see 42 U.S.C.
§32073, 2139 (1970).
821 See, e.g., City of New Britain v. AEC, 308 F.2d 648 (D.C. Cir. 1962)
(municipality opposing licensing of trucking firm to receive, store, and dispose of
radioactive waste).
82 2 An analysis of the role of public representatives in the AEC rulemaking
process will not be extensively treated. In conformity with the Administrative
Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 553-54 (1970), the AEC has provided for formal hearings
in licensing cases and informal hearings, with public participation limited to written
submissions and non-record interviews, in rulemaking proceedings. See Siegel v.
AEC, 400 F.2d 778, 785-86 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
82342 U.S.C. § 2133(b) (1970).
824

Id. § 2019.

825 Id. § 2235.
826 See id. §2239(a).
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The mandatory hearing requirement at the

construction permit stage recognizes that the grant of permission to
build is the most critical decision in the licensing process.8 "
Upon receipt, an application for a construction permit82 9 is evaluated by the AEC's Division of Reactor Licensing, which normally consults with the applicant to solve problems discovered in its review of the
applicant's preliminary safety report. 3 0 During the review of a construction permit application, the regulatory staff analyzes the safety
features of the application and balances the risk of a major accident
against the cost to the applicant and the benefit to society of having the
utility."" This process involves extended informal discussions and
negotiations between the staff and the industry applicant, where "the
staff may yield more than the public interest would allow." 832 An
independent review of the safety of the proposed project is required to
be made by the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, 83 3 and
this report and the AEC staff's safety evaluation are then introduced
as evidence at the mandatory hearing. 34 At an uncontested hearing
the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board does not consider the evidence
de novo but determines whether the AEC staff review has been adequate to support the proposed findings. 3 8 If an application is contested,
either by the AEC regulatory staff or by an intervening party, then the
board will make an independent determination of any matters in con8271d.
828 See H.R. REP. No. 1966, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1962)

(emphasizing impor-

tance of the fact that site selection is finally determined at this stage of the process).
See also Power Reactor Dev. Co. v. Union of Elec. Workers, 367 U.S. 396, 417
(1961) (dissenting opinion) (recognizing that the investment of millions of dollars
subsequent to the grant of a construction permit would make decisions at that stage
practically irreversible).
For a detailed discussion of the construction permit process, see Kingsley, The
Licensing of Nuclear Power Reactors in the United States, 7 ATOM. EN. L.J. 309
(1965). See also AEC, LIcENSING OF POWER REACTORS (1967); Murphy, Atomic
Safety and Licensing Boards: An Experiment in Administrative Decision Making on

Safety Questions, 33 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 566 (1968) ; Note, The Regulation of
Nuclear Power After the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 24 RUTGERS
L. REv. 753, 755-58 (1970).
829 For the required contents of an application, see 10 C.F.R. §§ 50.33-.34 (1972);
id. § 50, Apps. B-E.
830 See Kingsley, supra note 828, at 319-20.
831 Ellis & Johnston, Licensing of Nuclear Power Plants by the Atomic Energy
Commission 7 (1971) (tent. staff report prepared for the Administrative Conference).
832 Cavers, Administering That Ounce of Prevention: New Drugs and Nuclear
Reactors-lI, 68 W. VA. L. REv. 238, 242 (1966) ; cf. REsPoNsEs, supra note 30, at
789 ("The AEC regulatory staff operates under the philosophy of making an independent assessment of the safety of a proposed nuclear facility or installation.
Although this assessment requires much of the information to be provided by the
").
regulated enterprises, independent calculations are made in appropriate areas .
833
See 42 U.S.C. § 2039 (1970). The Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards consists of fifteen members of the sciehtific community, who are appointed by
the Commission and serve on a part-time basis. See Kingsley, supra note 828, at
322-24.
834 See Kingsley, supra note 828, at 326-28.
835 Green, Safety Determinations in Nuclear Power Licensing: A Critical View,
43 NomuE DAmE LAW. 633, 642 (1968).
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troversy s 36 "By the time the recommendations reach the board-and
are first made public-the staff, ACRS, and the applicant have ironed
out all of their differences. In a subsequent public hearing all three
will present a united front against anyone seeking to challenge the results of their private deliberations." s" The "public hearings are mere
window dressing," "38 with the "basic licensing decisions . . . made by
technical specialists operating beyond effective public scrutiny." 839
This situation is compounded by the fact that "the reactor licensing
program is presently conducted with some degree of bias in the direction
of technological advance." 84o It becomes clear that "once a construction permit proceeding emerges into the public arena with the imprimatur of the ACRS and the AEC regulatory staff affixed to the license
application, the presumption is that the permit will be issued, and all
official efforts are exerted in behalf of issuance of the permit." 841 Any
member of the public challenging issuance must bear a heavy burden
of proof.8 42
b. Intervention Before the AEC
The Commission's intervention rules state:
(a) Any person whose interest may be affected by a proceeding and who desires to participate as a party shall file a written
petition . . . to intervene. . . . The petition shall set forth
the interest of the petitioner in the proceeding, how that interest may be affected by Commission action, and the contentions of the petitioner in reasonably specific detail. A
petition which sets forth contentions relating only to matters
outside the jurisdiction of the Commission will be denied.
(d) An order permitting intervention may be conditioned on
such terms as the Commission or presiding officer may direct.
836 See AEC, LICENSING OF

PoWER

REACToRs 9

(1967).

837 Ellis & Johnston, supra note 831, at 15.
838 Green, supra note 835, at 652.
839 Id. 653.
8
40 Id. 649. Dr. Glenn T. Seaborg, former chairman of the AEC, however, has
stated that the licensing and regulatory branches of the AEC "were relatively free
of the influence of these branches that promote the use of atomic energy." N.Y.
Times, Sept. 16, 1971, at 14, col. 1.
841 Green, supra note 835, at 655. Cf. Ellis & Johnston, supra note 831, at 42.
842 It has been suggested that the burden of proof at the hearing be inverted and
that the AEC staff counsel "adopt the posture of representing the interest of the
public health and safety. Rather than exerting his efforts on behalf of the applicant
as is now done, he could very easily put the applicant to its proof . . . ." Green,
supra note 835, at 656. Dr. James R. Schlesinger, present AEC chairman, by
redefining the agency's role as that of performing "as a referee serving the public
interest," has indicated that the AEC is moving in this direction. See N.Y. Times,
Oct. 21, 1971, at 23, col. 4.
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The granting of a petition to intervene does not change

or enlarge the issues specified in a notice of hearing unless
otherwise expressly provided in the order allowing intervention.84 3
Pursuant to these rules, the AEC has consistently espoused a liberal
policy in favor of granting intervention to interested members of the
public, 844 including labor unions,

groups.847

state and local governments,

8

and

conservation
The present rigidity in AEC intervention procedures partially
explains the Commission's apparent willingness to grant intervention
to representatives of the public. The Atomic Energy Act commands
that "the Commission shall grant a hearing upon the request of any
person whose interest may be affected by the proceeding, and shall admit any such person as a party to such proceeding." 848 This provision
has been interpreted to leave some room for administrative discretion
to deny participation to persons whose interests are already adequately
represented by other parties. 9 The Commission, however, has failed
to formulate any rule of procedure to deal with the problem of persons
seeking to intervene for the purpose of raising the same issues,"' 0
thereby inhibiting board exercise of its discretionary power to deny
intervention.
The rules governing the status of nonintervening participants in
construction permit hearings further inhibit the exercise of discretion
in the consideration of petitions to intervene.
843 10 C.F.R. §§2.714(a), (d)

(1972).
844 See, e.g., Ramey, The Role of the Public in the Development and Regulation
of Nuclear Power, 12 ATou. EN. L.J. 3, 17 (1970) (remarks of AEC Commissioner
Ramey at the Conference on Nuclear Energy and the Environment, Apr. 4, 1970) ;
Hennessey, Atomic Energy Law-A Look Into the Future, 12 ATom. EN. L.J. 235,
247 (1970) (address by AEC General Counsel Hennessey to the ALI-ABA Joint
Committee on Continuing Legal Education Course of Study on Atomic Energy
Licensing and Regulation, Sept. 10, 1970).
845See, e.g., Power Reactor Dev. Co., 1 A.E.C. 1 (1956), aff'd, 367 U.S. 396
(1961), rev'g 280 F.2d 645 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
846 See, e.g., Consumers Power Co., 1 A.E.C. 300 (1960) ; Department of Water
& Power, 3 A.E.C. 1 (1965).
847 See, e.g., Department of Water & Power (Malibu Nuclear Plant Unit No. 1),
3 A.E.C. 122 (1966) (board granted intervention to the Malibu Citizens for Conservation, Inc., in construction permit proceeding).
84842 U.S.C. §2239(a) (1970) (emphasis added). See also REsPoNSES, supra
note 30, at 779. One commentator has observed that a statutory provision which
gives any interested person a right to be a party is undesirable, insofar as it may
tend to limit the discretion of agencies to control the hearing process by denying
intervention to those persons whose interests are adequately represented by existing
parties. See Shapiro, supra note 37, at 766-67.
849 See Cities of Statesville v. AEC, 441 F.2d 962, 977 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
850 The Civil Aeronautics Board has promulgated seven criteria to guide the
hearing examiner in his determination whether or not to permit formal intervention.
See 14 C.F.R. § 302.15(b) (1971) & note 514 supra. See also 18 C.F.R. § 1.8(b) (2)
(1971) (Federal Power Commission regulation indicating that intervention need not
be granted if petitioner's interest is adequately represented by existing parties).
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A person who is not a party may .
be permitted to make a
limited appearance by making oral or written statement of his
position on the issues within such limits and on such conditions as may be fixed by the presiding officer, but he may not
otherwise participate in the proceeding 5 1
The above "limited appearance provision" does not bestow the limited
participant with a full panoply of litigation rights and would not appear
to satisfy the statutory command that interested persons affected by a
proceeding be accorded the rights of a party.s 52 As a result, the board
knows that if it denies intervention on the grounds that a person's interests are adequately represented and relegates such person to a limited
appearance status, the proceeding may be subject to successful challenge
on review if it turns out that their interests were not so represented at
the hearing. Thus, under the present rules, the failure of the limited
appearance provision to allow enough flexibility to permit nonparties
the privilege of cross-examination, discovery,8 3 and the opportunity to
avail themselves of the appellate review procedure 854 dictates that intervention be granted in order to minimize the risk of reversal. 5 The
procedural rules regarding limited appearances should be changed to
permit limited participants the right of cross-examination and other procedural rights, when it becomes apparent during the course of the hearing that the person's interests are not in fact adequately represented. 856
Combined with more selective granting of intervention, this would provide a means for greater control over the hearing process, while satisfy851 10 C.F.R. § 2.715(a) (1972).
852 See 42 U.S.C. § 2239(a) (1970) ; REsPoNs:s, supra note 30, at 780 ("The
Commission encourages members of the general public to state their position or to
raise any questions they wish, within the scope of the issue of the proceeding and
AEC jurisdiction. However, such persons do not become parties and their statements
or presentations are not part of the record for decision.").
853 The Commission may, "on motion of any party showing good cause and on
notice to all other parties," order discovery. 10 C.F.R. § 2.741 (1972). Only intervenors can get discovery, and petitions for leave to intervene are not acted upon
until notice of the mandatory hearing is issued. This would appear to be an
extremely short time for an intervenor to fully prepare his case. "Because of the
timing of an intervention in AEC hearings, the largest problem intervenors face is
getting information early enough to analyze issues." Letter from Myron M. Cherry,
Businessmen for the Public Interest, to the University of Pemmylvania Law Review,
Oct. 5, 1971, on file in Biddle Law Library, Univ. of Pa. Law School. It has been
suggested, however, that "[i]f . . . petitioners are allowed to intervene and require
time for discovery, the board may in its discretion adjust the date of the hearing as
the circumstances may indicate." Department of Water & Power, 2 A.E.C. 445
(1964). See also 10 C.F.R. §2.744 (1972) (limited access to AEC records).
854 10 C.F.R. §2, App. A, III(b) (5) (1972).
855 Compare the AEC rule on limited appearances, supra note 851, with the Civil
Aeronautics Board's rule 14, which governs informal participation in CAB proceedings. See notes 524-25 supra & accompanying text.
856 Cf. Palisades Citizens Ass'n v. CAB, 420 F.2d 188 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (CAB's
denial of formal intervention to certain public interest groups held not to be error,
where the groups were given the opportunity to present exhibits and to cross-examine
witnesses pursuant to CAB rule 14 and to participate in oral argument before the
examiner, a privilege not mentioned on the face of the rule).
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ing the statutory requirement that interested persons be given the status

of parties.
The AEC has to some extent modified the rigidity of its intervention scheme by directing that representatives of interested states which
are not parties be afforded "a reasonable opportunity to participate and
to introduce evidence, interrogate witnesses, and advise the Commission" without being required to take a position with respect to the
issues.857 In any future rule change, this special form of intervention
might be extended to those experienced public interest groups who are
perhaps better able than many government units to protect the public
interest in defined controversial areas.
In addition to the constraints imposed by the intervention rules,
the AEC's general lack of discrimination as to the type of person or
group allowed to intervene may be attributed to the Commission's longstanding desire to draw the public into the hearing process. 6 8 This
may in large measure be explained by the fact that construction permit
proceedings have been considered to function simply as a forum in
which "[m]embers of the public . . . can intervene . . . and can call

witnesses and cross-examine in order to try to satisfy themselves as to
the safety of the proposed plant." "' The primary purposes of the
hearing-to convince the public that the AEC staff has diligently reviewed an application and to demonstrate that it is decidedly in the
public interest 8 °0 -are actually promoted by liberally providing a public
forum.
As a result of the factors noted above, denials of petitions to intervene have been relatively few in number. In those cases where it has
occurred, two frequently cited grounds for denial have been that the petition to intervene alleged issues relating only to matters outside the
jurisdiction of the Commission or contained contentions that tended
to change or enlarge the issues to be considered at the hearing. Such
denials have included a case where the petitioner sought only to challenge the constitutionality of the Atomic Energy Act 861 and instances
where petitioners attempted to raise antitrust considerations at construction permit hearings.862
857 10 C.F.R. §2.715(c) (1972).
858 Telephone interview with A. W. Murphy, Professor of Law at Columbia
University and a member of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel, Aug. 16,
1971.

859 Ramey, supra note 844, at 17. See note 838 supra & accompanying text.
860 Report to the Atomic Energy Commission by the Regulatory Review Panel
(Mitchell Panel) (1965), in Hearingson Licensing & Regulation of Nuclear Reactors
Before the Joint Comm. on Atomic Energy, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1 App., at 415
(1967) ; Ellis & Johnston, supra note 831, at 42; Green, supra note 835, at 639-40.
861 See Toledo Edison Co. & Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co. (Davis-Besse

Nuclear Power Station), 2 CCH ATOm. EN. L. REP. 1f11,594.01, at 17,735-2 (1971).
862 See, e.g., Cities of Statesville v. AEC, 441 F.2d 962, 967 (D.C. Cir. 1969)
(court granted intervention but refused to consider the antitrust issues).
The AEC must now pass on the anticompetitive effect of an application prior to
issuing a construction permit. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2132-35 (1970) ; 10 C.F.R. §§ 50.41-
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Other grounds for denying intervention are that the petition failed
to conform with the AEC's technical rules of practice 863 or that the
petition was not filed within the required time. 64 The Commission's
rules state that "[a] petition for leave to intervene which is not timely
filed will be dismissed unless the petitioner shows good cause for failure
to file it on time." 86 In Easton Utilities Commission v. AEC, 66 the
court found the AEC's right to so limit intervention to reside in its
statutory authority to "make, promulgate, issue, rescind, and amend
such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of [the Atomic Energy Act]." 67 The court acknowledged that
the orderly conduct of public business demands that there be agency
discretion to deny an untimely application, notwithstanding the governing statutory language indicating that a person has an affirmative
right to intervene based on the interest he presents. 68
Another consideration in acting upon a petition to intervene is
whether a petitioner's interests will in fact be affected by the proceeding. 69 This determination must necessarily be made on a case-by-case
basis and is not amenable to detailed rulemaking. In the Diablo Canyon
construction permit hearing,87 0 a conservation group and an individual
filed a joint petition to intervene. Both sought intervention to contest
the ecological, health, and safety effects of a proposed nuclear power
plant. The environmentalist group asserted that approximately ten of
its members resided within ten to fifty miles of the proposed plant, and
was allowed to intervene. A decision on the status of the single individual, who lived 112 miles from the site, was deferred pending an
inquiry into the frequency of his visits to the plant area. The petitioner
failed to reply to the inquiry and intervention was denied. This decision
indicates that geographic proximity may be an element in the determination of whether a person's interest is affected to such an extent
that intervention must be granted.'
On the other hand, the board
.42, .55b (1972). This opportunity to challenge an application will likely increase
the number of interventions and further delay the application process. See Ellis &
Johnston, supra note 831, at 30-33.
863 See, e.g., Northern States Power Co. (Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant),
3 A.E.C. 216, 217 n.2 (1967) (local citizens group's petition to intervene denied for
failure to "set forth the interest of the petitioner, how that interest would be affected
by Commission action, and the contentions of petitioner").
864 See, e.g., Consolidated Edison Co. (Indian Point Station Unit No. 2),
3 A.E.C. 162 (1966).
865 10 C.F.R. §2.714(a) (1971).
866 424 F.2d 847 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
86
7Id. at 851 (citing 42 U.S.C. §2201(p) (1964)).
868
1d. at 852.

8 69

See 42 U.S.C. § 2239(a) (1970).
Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant), 2 CCH
ATOM. EN. L. REP. 1 11,270.01 (1968).
871 Cf. Petition to Intervene, Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Unit No. 2,2 CCH
ATOM. EN. L. REP. IT11,276 (1968), where the petitioners Businessmen for the
Public Interest, Sierra Club, and Protect Our Wisconsin Environmental Resources
(POWER), were careful to allege that some of their members were local residents
and otherwise geographically proximate to the site of the plant.
870
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may have been persuaded that the particular interests which the individual petitioner sought to protect were already represented by a public
interest group that was apparently better able to present a full case.
Granting the individual's petition could have placed additional burdens
on the hearing process without any assurance that the outcome would
be seriously affected.
The need to determine whether a particular intervenor can contribute to a proceeding as a basis for deciding whether to permit intervention will become increasingly important as additional applications
for construction permits are received 872 and the average hearing time
increases. 873 Prior to the recent expansion of the Commission's jurisdiction over environmental and antitrust issues, 74 relatively few persons
or groups sought to intervene in construction permit proceedings. 76
Only in the past few years have there been large numbers of attempted
interventions.

7

6

The legitimizing function of the mandatory hearing

has also contributed to protracted proceedings.
The result of privacy at the prehearing "negotiation"
stage and an air of partiality at the hearing stage has been the
creation of an artificial and distrustful atmosphere for the
licensing process. The interveners see the licensing hearing
as stacked, and they tend to retreat to the tactic of delay rather
than plotting a strategy for victory.
The problem is compounded by the advent of "public interest" groups which employ able counsel and participate fully
as interveners. Substantial delays have occurred at the hearing stage in almost every case in which private citizens or
872 In mid-1971 there were 22 operating nuclear power plants, 55 additional plants
under construction, and 45 planned or ordered. The AEC estimates that there will
be 950 operating plants by the end of the century. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 17, 1971,
at 41, col. 6. Cf. Ellis & Johnston, supra note 831, at 20.
873 Though the AEC claims that its decisionmaking procedures "generally operate
with reasonable speed considering the interests and issues" that are dealt with,
RESPoSES, supra note 30, at 787, the hearing time has increased geometrically in the
past few years. See Ellis & Johnston, supra note 831, at 23. The average hearing
time has increased more than twenty-five fold in the past four years. Id. 21.
A recent example of the burden which public intervenors may impose on the
administrative process is found in the Shoreham, N.Y., construction permit proceeding.
Hearings were held intermittently from Sept. 21, 1970, through Nov. 1971, and AEC
officials estimate that it could be at least mid-1972 before a construction permit could
issue. See N.Y. Times, Nov. 4, 1971, at 94, col. 1. The Lloyd Harbor Study Group,
a local conservation organization with the support of a number of national groups,
contributed to the length of the proceedings by conducting extensive cross-examination
of witnesses for both the AEC and the applicant. The length of the Shoreham
hearings may be compared to the three or four days consumed in other similar
hearings. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 24, 1971, at 44, col. 4.
874 Ellis & Johnston, supra note 831, at 20. See note 862 supra & notes 893-913
infra & accompanying text.
875 See note 886 infra & accompanying text.
876 See, e.g., Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. (Diablo Canyon Unit 2), 2 CCH AToM.
Ex. L. REP. 1[11,590.01 (1970) (8 petitions to intervene); Toledo Edison Co. &
Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co. (Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station), 2 CCH
ATom. EN. L. REP. 1 11,594.01 (1971) (6 petitions to intervene).
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public interest groups have participated as parties in opposition to an application. 77
There has also been a substantial increase in the number of challenged
operating licenses, and delay at that point in the construction and operating process is very costly to the utility. 878 It has been suggested that
[t]he proliferation of contested operating-license hearings has
stemmed in part from the limited opportunity for, and the restricted statutory scope of, public participation in the construction-permit hearings. It is also due in part from interthan willing to take two bites at the apple
veners being more
79
when offered.
The detrimental impact of such delay cannot be overemphasized. 8 0
Concerned representatives of both industry and environmentalist groups
have cited the inadequacy of AEC procedures as a major cause of the
problem, suggesting not only a re-examination of public hearing procedures, but also a complete restructuring of the licensing process.88 '
c. Standing of Parties to Raise ParticularIssues
Public intervenors have rarely been absolutely denied the opportunity to participate in Commission hearings,882 but intervention has
been granted on the condition that issues deemed beyond its jurisdiction
not be raised. Alternatively, intervention may be granted unconditionally, but the board may refuse to consider extra-jurisdictional evidence.
Challenges to the Applicant's Safety Analysis
At the construction permit hearing the basic inquiry has been
whether the nuclear facility can be safely operated. 8 3 A construction
(i)

877 Ellis & Johnston, supra note 831, at 42-43; cf. I. Like, Multi-Media Confrontation-The Environmentalists' Strategy for a "No-Win" Agency Proceeding
(1971) (advocating that public intervenors use the administrative arena as a forum
to educate the public and transform agency hearings into a dramatic medium to
expose environmental issues). The nuclear power industry is extremely concerned
with dilatory tactics adopted by public intervenors with the purpose of imposing
stricter requirements. See Statement of Myron M. Cherry on Behalf of Friends of
the Earth, Hearings on AEC Licensing Procedure & Related Legislation Before
the Subcomm. on Legislation of the Joint Comm. on Atomic Energy, 92d Cong.,

1st Sess., pt. 1, at 385, 390-91, 403-04 (1971)
878

[hereinafter cited as Cherry Statement].

Ellis & Johnston, supra note 831, at 35; cf. Cavers, supra note 832, at 249.

879 Ellis & Johnston, stpra note 831, at 35.
880 Long Island Lighting Co. estimates that continued delay in the Shoreham,
N.Y., construction permit hearings "would cost a minimum of $1-million a month."

N.Y. Times, Nov. 4, 1971, at 94, col. 1. Of course, much of this cost will be passed
on to the consumer.
881 See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Nov. 13, 1971, at 38, col. 5 (research director for Lloyd
Harbor Study Group cites inadequate hearing methods as a cause of delay at Shoreham
hearings); Smith, An Energy Threat, N.Y. Times, Nov. 7, 1971, § 3, at 26, col. 4
(H. W. Winterson, president of the Atomic Industrial Forum, calls for a complete
restructuring of licensing procedures).
882

883

See notes 844-47 supra & accompanying text.
Green, supra note 835, at 640.
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permit is to be issued only after the AEC considers the "health and
safety of the public." "s Because of the exceedingly technical issues
involved in reviewing the applicant's and the AEC staff's safety
analysis 8s' and the "difficulty in obtaining the technical expertise to
perform the type of detailed, careful study performed by the regulatory
staff and by ACRS," 880 intervenors have heretofore rarely challenged
reactor design. As public interest organizations become more sophisticated and better financed, the role of intervenors may be more constructive.8 7 Though no reactor design has ever been altered as a result of a
public hearing, 8 8 intervenors have successfully influenced applicants to
withdraw applications or to reach a settlement. The intervenors in the
Bodega 81' and Malibu s"' cases, alleging that there were undue earthquake hazards, successfully discouraged the siting of reactors near fault
lines. Public intervenors have also exacted quality control concessions
from the nuclear reactor industry, 9' resulting in industry concern with
the "serious problems" of public disclosure caused by "professional
dissidents."

(ii)

892

Challenges to Environmental Effects

The AEC's narrow view of its jurisdiction over nonradiological
environmental matters has led to the denial of standing of intervenors
88442

U.S.C. §2133(b) (1970).

885 For a layman's outline of the technical issues involved in a safety analysis,

see

J. HOGERTON, ATomic POWER SAFETY 20-32 (1964).

886 Ellis & Johnston, supra note 831, at 55-56. The cost of acquiring legal and
expert aid, see id. 50-51, and the reluctance of qualified experts to testify against
a project recommended by the AEC, see Like, supra note 877, at 11, are large
obstacles faced by intervenors in safety hearings. It has been suggested that public
intervenors should be provided "with access to scientific expertise and financial resources to enable the public intervenor more effectively to participate in public hearings." Cherry Statement, supra note 877, at 393.
887 See Cavers, supra note 832, at 253; Cherry Statement, supra note 877, at
398-99.
888 Ellis & Johnston, supra note 831, at 25.
889 The applicant withdrew its application after an adverse staff report on the
suitability of the site. See Proposed Nuclear Power Plant at Bodega Head by Pac.
Gas & Elec. Co., 2 CCH ATom. EN. L. REP. 11,261 (1964) ; Green, supra note 835,
at 642 n.64; Cavers, supra note 832, at 247.
890 In the Malibu case, the hearing resulted in a conditional initial decision for
the applicant. Department of Water & Power (Malibu Nuclear Plant Unit No. 1),
3 A.E.C. 122 (1966), but the board's authorization of a provisional construction
permit was set aside and remanded for amendments to the application, 3 A.E.C. 179
(1967). The applicants then withdrew their application. Ellis & Johnston, supra
note 831, at 25.
891 See Cherry Statement, supra note 877, at 398-402. Cherry recounts several
cases in which intervenors were able to raise safety problems constructively and to
participate in settlement agreements in which the applicant made important concessions.
See, e.g., Palisades Plant Settlement Agreement between Intervenors and Consumers
Power Co. (1971), copy on file in Biddle Law Library, Univ. of Pa. Law School.
The quote is from the
892 Cherry Statement, supra note 877, App. C, at 415.
record of a 1970 seminar on AEC hearings conducted at Gaithersburg, Md., for the
nuclear power industry. A large part of the seminar was devoted to the problems
caused by intervenors and how to mitigate their impact, including the "proper maintenance" of records that may be susceptible to damaging discovery. Id. 402.
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to raise such issues as thermal pollution and aesthetics at licensing
hearings.8 9 3

Prior to the National Environmental Policy Act

894

the

AEC consistently adhered to a position that its authority did not extend
to the consideration of environmental effects not directly related to
problems of atomic radiation 95
In the case of Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp.,8 6 the states
of New I-ampshire, Vermont, and Massachusetts unsuccessfully attempted to offer evidence into the hearing relating to the possible thermal pollution of the Connecticut River resulting from a proposed nuclear
power plant. At the outset of the hearing, the board advised that
[q]uestions about other aspects of health and safety or other
aspects of the plant not falling within the areas of radiological
health and safety and the common defense and security are
not within the AEC's jurisdiction and will not be considered
at this hearing. Thus, we will not consider such matters as
the possible thermal effects, as opposed to the radiological
effects, of the facility operation on the environment; the effect
of the construction of the facility on the recreational, economic
or political 7activities of the area near the site; or matters of
9
aesthetics.
On appeal the Commission affirmed the board's exclusion of the
evidence on the grounds that those issues were beyond the jurisdiction
of the board and that the Commission's rules of procedure prohibited
their consideration. 9 8 The Commission also noted that the admission
of such evidence would constitute a change or enlargement of the issues
specified in the notice of hearing and thus would breach the condition
under which the states had been permitted to intervene." 9 The states
appealed the grant of the construction permit, alleging as error the
893 See, e.g., Thermal Ecology Must Be Preserved v. AEC, 433 F.2d 524 (D.C.
Cir. 1970); Consolidated Edison, Inc. (Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit 3),
2 CCH ATom. ENT. L. REP. 111,579.01 (1969).
The recently expanded jurisdiction of the AEC to hear antitrust complaints, see
note 862 supra, will not be discussed.
894 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (1970).
895 See New Hampshire v. AEC, 406 F.2d 170 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S.
962 (1969). See also letter from Glenn T. Seaborg to Senator Muskie, Nov. 4, 1967,
in Hearings on Licensing & Regulation of Nuclear Reactors Before the Joint Comm.
on Atomic Energy, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 980 (1967).
The Commission interpreted its mandate to issue a license only when it is not
"inimical . . . to the health and safety of the public," 42 U.S.C. §§ 2133(d), 2134(d)
(1970), to refer only to dangers arising from the hazards of radioactivity. See letter
from Harold L. Price, AEC Director of Regulation, to Senator Muskie, Oct. 23,
1967, in Hearings on Licensing & Regulation of Nuclear Reactors Before the Joint
Comm. on Atomic Energy, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 977 (1967). See also Note, supra
note 828, at 764-65.
896 2 CCH ATom. EN. L. REP. g 11,267.02, at 17,503 (1967).
897 Id. at ff 11,267.04, at 17,503-5 n.2.
898 Id. at 11,267.03, at 17,503-5.
899 Id.
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Commission's refusal to consider evidence of thermal pollution. The
court thoroughly analyzed the legislative history of the Atomic Energy
Act and concluded that the Commission's responsibility was limited to
"scrutiny of and protection against hazards from radiation." 9oo
The NEPA has changed this situation, declaring "a national policy
which will encourage productive and enjoyable harmony between man
and his environment [and] promote efforts which will prevent or eliminate damage to the environment . ...

"

'01 All federal agencies are

directed, "to the fullest extent possible," to
include in every recommendation or report on proposals for
legislation and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, a detailed statement by the responsible official on(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be
avoided should the proposal be implemented,
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of
man's environment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of
resources which would be involved in the proposed action
should it be implemented. 0
Despite the NEPA's sweeping language, the AEC moved slowly
in adopting regulations to conform to its mandate. 0 3 Though the
promulgated rules did provide that intervenors would be permitted to
raise environmental issues at construction permit hearings,9 04 the Commission's implementation of the NEPA limited the scope of environmental issues that may be considered in the decisionmaking process." 5
The opinion of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit in Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Committee v. AEC 906 severely
criticized the AEC's minimal response to the NEPA. The petitioners
in Calvert Cliffs challenged the AEC's rules ostensibly effectuating the
NEPA, alleging that the rules limited full consideration and balancing
900 New Hampshire v. AEC, 406 F.2d 170, 175 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S.
962 (1969).
90142 U.S.C. § 4321 (1970).
90242 U.S.C. §4332(2) (c) (1970).
903 NEPA went into effect on Jan. 1, 1970, but a formal change in the AEC
rules implementing NEPA was not announced until Dec. 3, 1970. See Calvert Cliffs'
Coordinating Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1116 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
904
See 35 Fed. Reg. 18,474, 11 (a) (1970).
905 Ellis & Johnston, supra note 831, at 27; Like, supra note 877, at 18.
900 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
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of environmental values. The petitioners specifically attacked provisions
providing that hearing boards need not consider the environmental
impact of a licensed reactor unless that issue is affirmatively raised by a
party,90 7 and that boards are prohibited from conducting an independent
evaluation of environmental factors if other federal or state agencies
have certified that their standards are satisfied." 8 The court remanded
the case, directing that "the Commission must revise its rules governing
consideration of environmental issues." 909 The court made it clear
that the Commission may not permit licensing boards to adopt the
option of admitting evidence concerning nonradiological effects only to
ignore it in the decisionmaking process:
NEPA requires that an agency must-to the fullest extent
possible under its other statutory obligations-consider alternatives to its actions which would reduce environmental damage. That principle establishes that consideration of environmental matters must be more than a pro forma ritual. Clearly,
it is pointless to "consider" environmental costs without also
seriously considering action to avoid them. Such a full exercise of substantive discretion is required at every important,
appropriate and nonduplicative stage of an agency's proceed-

ings.

91 0

The Commission has revised its rules consistent with the opinion. 11
Calvert Cliffs has informed the AEC that the NEPA requires a substantive change in the Commission's narrow interpretation of the
"health and safety of the public." Both the expanded jurisdiction and
the justification for it given in Calvert Cliffs have been criticized on
the grounds that jurisdiction over environmental impact is already
vested in other bodies and that AEC consideration is thus redundant
as well as of little potential benefit in view of the AEC's exhibited
biases.912 This redefinition of the Commission's statutory licensing responsibilities will, however, provide public intervenors an opportunity
to raise a broad spectrum of environmental issues at construction permit
907

See 35 Fed. Reg. 18,474, 13 (1970).
11(b) ; cf. Ellis & Johnston, supra note 831, at 27-28. The complaint
also attacked the regulations which prohibited the raising of nonradiological issues
in cases where the notice for the hearing appeared before Mar. 4, 1971, 35 Fed. Reg.
18,474, 11(a) (1970), and which stated that, for any construction permit issued
prior to that date, the Commission would not formally consider environmental factors
until the time for issuance of an operating license, id. 14.
908 See id.

909 449 F.2d at 1129.

910 Id. at 1128 (emphasis in the original).

Consumers Power Co. of Jackson, Mich., has filed a petition for a rehearing of
Calvert Cliffs, stating that the new AEC regulations make the situation "particularly
acute" for its Palisades plant. 2 [Current Developments] BNA ENv. REP. 548 (Sept.
10, 1971).
91110 C.F.R. § 50, App. D (1972).
912 Tarlock, Tippy & Francis, Environmental Regulation of Power Plant Siting:
Existing and Proposed Institutions, 45 S. CAL. L. REv. 502, 534-38 (1972).
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hearings, and this expanded jurisdictional base will undoubtedly have
a significant impact upon the number of parties seeking to intervene and
upon the time consumed by the hearing.913
d. Conclusion
The standing of a party to raise particular issues is strongly influenced by the AEC's definition of its limited jurisdictional authority.
While the public has long been allowed to speak to safety problems
during the construction permit hearing, its effectiveness has been limited
by a lack of technical expertise and by the fact that the hearing is no
more than a public corroboration of the regulatory staff's review of an
application. With the advent of "the new breed of intervenors" 914 and
the NEPA, the public will have a larger role in assuring that both safety
and environmental considerations will be fully deliberated.
The AEC has only recently been faced with the administrative
problems accompanying hearings with large numbers of intervening
parties. The broadening of the Commission's decisionmaking responsibilities and the anticipated increase in license applications are likely to
demand procedures to insure that hearings are conducted in an orderly
fashion. The adoption of rules providing boards with guidance in dealing with the problems of multiple intervenors and of limited appearances
has already been suggested. 16 When acting on a petition to intervene
or when determining whether to admit evidence on a particular issue,
boards should look not only to whether the intervenor alleges interests
which may be affected by the proceeding but also to what the petitioner
will contribute, if permitted to participate fully in the hearing. 916 Perhaps more important to the efficient conduct of future AEC hearings is
the promulgation of more definite standards expressing Commission
policy on recurring issues.

91 7

Setting forth such rules once, through the

913 Ellis & Johnston, supra note 831, at 26-28. The real impact of the Calvert
Cliffs decision upon the status of intervenors has already been demonstrated. The
AEC, in authorizing a public hearing on the grant of an operating license for the
Maine Yankee Atomic Power Plant, reversed its prior position and granted previouslyrejected petitions to intervene by three conservation groups. See N.Y. Times, Nov.
14, 1971, at 24, col. 1.
914 Cherry Statement, supra note 877, at 387.
915
See notes 853-57 supra & accompanying text.
916 See Ellis & Johnston, supra note 831, at 54 ("Intervention should be restricted
to those who have shown any interest in the case which will not otherwise be represented by any other party and which is related to the limited issues raised by answers
to [an] order to show cause.").
917 Id. 45-46, 66. This technique has been successfully utilized; the Commission
has passed a rule stating that an application for a construction permit need not provide design features for the purpose of protecting a facility against enemy attack and
sabotage. See 10 C.F.R. § 50.13 (1972). This rule may be used by a licensing
board as grounds for denying an intervenor the opportunity to cross-examine an
applicant on the attack and sabotage issues. See Siegal v. AEC. 400 F.2d 778 (D.C.
Cir. 1968).
Several commentators have suggested that AEC proceedings could be expedited
by providing a public licensing hearing only in contested cases where the prospective
intervenor has "shown cause." Ellis & Johnston, supra note 831, at 47-57.
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rulemaking process, rather than repeatedly in adjudicative-permit proceedings, would allow public protestants to participate more effectively
in the establishment of licensing criteria and would expedite individual
licensing cases.
3. Proposals to Unify Power Plant License Decisionmaking
From such cases as Scenic Hudson and Calvert Cliffs, it is apparent that an ad hoc approach to power plant licensing prevails in both
the FPC and the AEC. Criticism of such an approach, and its tendency
to produce decisions that disregard the overall balance of costs and
benefits to society, may be viewed as an issue wholly distinct from the
issue of the proper role and scope of public participation in agency decisions. Either an ad hoc or an integrated decisionmaking process
could, for example, proceed by totally excluding the public or by providing limited opportunity for comment on formal decisions. Indeed,
one may imagine that there exist groups representing particular segments of the public that would benefit in particular cases by retention
of ad hoc decisionmaking-the most obvious example being an association of politically influential local property owners opposing construction of a facility that would face less opposition if placed in an area
more densely populated but less influential or more disorganized.
Despite these possibly ambivalent results of the integration of decisionmaking, those who favor increased public participation in power
plant siting decisions have advocated this reform with at least as much
vigor as have members of the industry9 1 and the agencies. 1 9 For
example, Judge Irving Kaufman, a veteran of the litigation surrounding the licensing of the Storm King Mountain power plant, has strongly
suggested such integration because he sees it as a cure for the problems
confronting public participants and the problems they, at least in part,
have in turn precipitated:
Specifically, I submit that, because of the absence of an agency
with a broad perspective and broad planning authority, the
ultimate decision whether to license the Storm King plant and
other electric power plants is unreasonably delayed and public
participation in the decision unduly restricted, however open
920
the proceedings may be theoretically.
This view suggests that the scope of public discussion before an
agency depends on the scope of the agency's responsibility as well as
the legislative standards set for the agency's action. Concerning Scenic
Hudson, Judge Kaufman observed:
918 See, e.g., Lowenstein, The Need for Separation of the AEC's Functions, 13
AToM. EN. L.J. 282 (1971).
919 See Nassikas, supra note 742.
920 Kaufman, Power for the People-and by the People: Utilities, the Enziron,nent and the Public Interest, 46 N.Y.U.L. REv. 867, 873 (1971).
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The basic defect in the process, as I see it, was the inevitably
narrow scope of the decision the agency had to make: whether
or not to license a single and specific electric generating plant.
The narrow scope of the decision before the agency led necessarily to a strictly limited discussion of the issues by the
public. Questions of other possible sites or of a planned dispersal of power plants and the like could not be discussed by
groups because these issues were not before the
public interest
1
agency.

92

The FPC is now required to approve only power facilities that
comport with a "comprehensive plan." Apparently recognizing that
such a term is too broad to be very useful, the court in Scenic Hudson
looked to the more specific statutory language following the term in
order to find a responsibility in the agency to consider "recreational"
uses. 22 By comparison the AEC, which certifies facilities already subject to regulation by the FPC,923 is charged with regulating to serve
the public interest. These broad standards for agency action are practically meaningless where "regulation is sadly fragmented between
various levels of government." 924 The passage of the NEPA with its
particular substantive values, and the Calvert Cliffs litigation following
that enactment, demonstrate convincingly the muddled, compartmentalized concept of regulatory responsibility that has resulted in the power
industry. Lapses in regulation are virtually certain to result as a consequence of each agency's decision that certain foreseeable costs of a siting decision should be disregarded because not relevant to that agency's
"limited" area of responsibility.9 25
Proposals for restructuring the regulation of the electric power
industry now commonly focus on balancing the two needs about which
debate has recently centered: environmental protection and power needs.
One bill which the Nixon administration has presented to Congress in
response to calls for restructuring does not attempt to unify regulation
fully, but it moves in that direction by consolidating federal regulation
and subjecting state regulation to federal oversight.9 2 At the same
time, the bill would establish more meaningful-and perhaps enforceable-standards for agency action, by charging the federal authority to
ascertain that a proposed facility "will not unduly impair important
environmental values and will be reasonably necessary to meet electric
power needs." 927 Although these terms conceal myriad costs and bene921Id. 872.

922354 F.2d at 614.
923

See note 722 supra & accompanying text.
Tippy & Francis, Environmental Regulation of Power Plant Siting:
Existing and Proposed Institutions, 45 S. CAL. L. REv. 502, 505 (1972).
925 See notes 767, 882-913 supra & accompanying text.
926 H.R 5277, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
9271d. § 8(c).
924 Tarlock,
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fits, their use nonetheless suggests a limited regulatory perspective
under the unified control established. In view of the general unwillingness of the FPC and AEC to broaden their perspectives when pressured
by members of the public,928 the use of terms more specific than "public
interest" may make even less likely agency response to new concerns
when now-silent members of the public appear to champion them.
Within the context of reforms directed at consolidation of regulation for the purpose of balancing a limited number of goals, the nature
of public participation remains a problem. One recent article 9 29 has
examined a one-step licensing procedure adopted in 1970 in the state of
Washington and has made an observation that applies to public participation as well as to the regulation focused upon:
The Washington experience indicates that one-stop
licensing can be either a means of preventing delays in plant
construction, or a means of shielding utilities from regulation
have a statutory mandate to improve environby agencies that
9 30
mental quality.
Unified regulation is a means of streamlining decisionmaking, not a
means of making that regulation more open or more careful. Seen
from this perspective, Judge Kaufman's proposal is but a sine qua non
to effective public participation, not a way of ensuring it. Indeed, the
Chairman of the Federal Power Commission has discussed the proposal in terms suggesting that it would reduce at least some, potentially
harmful, dimensions of public participation:
[T] here is the question of just how many times general public
participation is to be allowed in respect to the location of
specific utility facilities. Those who are close followers of
legislative siting proposals before the Congress and various
state legislatures, will recognize that I am referring to the
one-stop problem. 8 '
Unifying the regulation of the power industry, then, is not a panacea
for the frustrated public that wishes to participate. It should be, however, the occasion for a reexamination of the proper role of the public
participant, if for no other reason than the fact that the restructuring
will necessarily settle the issues. The number of specific proposals
recently put forward and the fluidity of the current situation precludes
detailed examination in the space available here. Certain conclusions
drawn from the discussions of the FPC and the AEC above should be
re-emphasized here, though, for they lend support to some of the programs proposed. Participation by the public as full parties in multiple,
See notes 767, 882-913 supra & accompanying text.
Tarlock, Tippy & Francis, supra note 912.
930 Id. 555.
931 Nassikas, supra note 742, at 113.
928

929
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formal power plant licensing hearings has been a conspicuously defective device for implementing the full, open debate called for by this Comment. Consolidation in one proceeding of particular and general questions concerning both technology and policy has made participation an
enormous undertaking, and has thus effectively foreclosed all but a few
strongly motivated and well financed members of the public. Putting
the burden on the parties to back normative arguments with technological data showing feasibility has only increased this problem. Public
participation should not mean participation by a few interest groups
outside the regulated industry, and reform ought to focus sharply on
eliminating these problems. Combined with a conscious articulation
of the scope of a unified agency's regulatory responsibility that provides
channels for easy entry of emerging groups of concerned individuals,
this provision for more effective but limited participation will go far
toward improving the decisionmaking process.
FPC Chairman Nassikas, while supporting broad public participation, has advocated reforms that may actually foreclose the public
from formal hearings completely. He has suggested that there be substituted an earlier and ongoing process of opinion and information
gathering, which, without further details, is called a "collaborative
analytic process." 932 While it is easy to agree that full participation
in formal hearings has been unsatisfactory in the regulated power industry, suggestions that decisions should be "collaborative" must be
viewed with scepticism, for they may be no more than a call for a return
to captive regulation. A more promising possibility has been advanced
by Professor Jerre Williams of the University of Texas. 3 3 Public
participation would be accomplished through a bifurcated hearing structure and the creation of a public counsel. One hearing would be "advisory," conducted informally and open to any interested person or
group; the other would be similar to the licensing hearing now in use,
and the public would be represented as a full party by the public counsel.
Backed by a requirement that written submissions be freely accepted
from the public in both proceedings and included in a record available
for purposes of review, this structure is at least a step in the right
direction. Perhaps supplemented by a requirement that the public
counsel participate in the informal hearing, this would guarantee competent representation of the public in the formal decisionmaking process
while offering significant hope that the public counsel thus appearing
will not himself become a captive of the institution and its views. While
the informal hearing should be the primary forum for wideranging
debate, an outside voice in the formal proceeding should be retained in
order both to allow rebuttal on issues raised by the parties to the formal
proceeding and to hold open a door to effective judicial review.
Id. 112.
933 Williams, Public Participationin Locating FacilitiesDedicated to Public Use,
88 PUB. Urn.. FoRT., Sept. 16, 1971, at 101 (1971).
932
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III. CONCLUSION
Public participation in federal agency decisionmaking is not, of
course, an end in itself. Rather it is only one means to insure that
regulation in fact furthers the "public interest." As noted in the first
section of this Comment, one of the most frequent criticisms directed
at the federal agencies is that they favor and too often accommodate
the desires and ends of the regulated industries. Attacks on the decisionmaking process are now loudest from currently "unrepresented"
groups-consumers and conservationists predominating.
The problem goes deeper, however. If the response to these criticisms is no more than an adjustment admitting the most organized and
well financed groups to a position of influence, it is doubtful that the
decisionmaking process will have been fundamentally improved. As
this Comment has noted, courts have taken numerous steps within the
confines of existing statutory schemes to open agency decisionmaking
to fuller debate and closer judicial scrutiny. But in taking these steps,
courts have favored "responsible" participants or group representatives
without exploring the implications of such restrictions for agency policy
evolution.
Where the channels for public participation in agency decisionmaking are adversary hearings and judicial review, one consequence is
that the costs of private litigation impose significant restraints. Another
consequence is that essentially political decisions are made not by the
agencies, but by courts relying as best they can on the vague statutory
standards established for regulatory action.
Statutory reform with the goal of emphasizing other channels for
public participation may be the most desirable direction in which to
move. The prior failure of the agencies to make greater use of rulemaking may be a primary cause of current problems. If the agencies
will not voluntarily engage in open, broadly debated, formalized policy
formulation, statutory measures to force them to take these steps are
appropriate. Where such measures have been enacted, judicial review
could be limited to cases where individual hardships appear.
As this Comment has detailed, however, much can be done within
existing statutory frameworks. Public participation generally is, and
should be, promoted where the agency is making choices based on essentially political rather than technological grounds. In the areas subject to FCC regulation, where the technological framework has become
relatively stable, both the public and the courts have readily entered
individual controversies. On the other hand, every decision by the
FPC or AEC to license a power plant involves complicated technological judgments, hardly susceptible to the type of debate possible
within FCC proceedings. Nevertheless, sharper delineation of the
political choices made by these agencies is clearly possible and frequently
suggested. Recognizing the practical constraints on maintaining full
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party status in agency adjudications, flexible techniques for limited
participation should be increasingly developed. At the same time courts,
agencies, and legislatures should seek ways to minimize the economic
burden placed on members of the public who seek to put relevant information before the agency and prod agency action in the public interest.

